THE

REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

NO. 3.—JULY, 1900.

I.

PRIESTS AND PROPHETS IN THE MODERN CHURCH.

SERMON BY THE REV. DR. LYMAN ABBOTT AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, LANCASTER, PA., ON MAY 9, 1900.*

TEXT:

In the eleventh chapter of Romans, the thirteenth verse and the last clause of the verse are found these words:

"I magnify my office."

I am to-night to magnify the office of the Christian ministry. In some respects, I wish, instead of speaking to this great audience of laymen, I might have spoken personally and individually to the students of this theological seminary, for I have come charged in my heart with a message to them. I would rather have talked with them than to them, and I am not sure that the message which I have for them will have much relation to the rest of you; and yet perhaps it may be well for us all, whether laymen or clergymen, to consider, and this is what I want to do to-night, the office of the Christian ministry. It is,

* Delivered extemporaneously; reported stenographically for the REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW by Miss Elizabeth Newbold and revised by the author.

I am sure, in no spirit of professional self-conceit, that I magnify that office. It is said that the pulpit is losing its power, and if the pulpit be simply a platform perhaps it is, and I am not sorry for it. It is said that the people are losing their reverence for the cloth, and if the cloth is a fabric which is supposed to make sacred the man that wears it, I hope it is true. But I do not believe there ever was a time in the history of the world when the Christian ministry was more needed than to-day in America, when there was really more desire deep down in the hearts of men and women for the service which the Christian ministry ought to render. We do not care so much for Levites as we once did, but we still want priests; we do not care so much for scribes as we once did, but we still want prophets; for these two words, priests and prophets, interpret the function of the Christian ministry.

What is a minister for? Is there any particular or specific service which he can render to us, which differentiates him from others? There are certain services which he renders in common with others. He may be a moral reformer. He may do the work which Savanarola did in Paris, or which Dr. Parkhurst did in New York; but this is not merely a minister's work, it belongs to the citizen not peculiarly to the clergyman. He may go into politics, be elected to the Senate of the United States, or undertake, as an ecclesiastic, to run a political machine, but this does not belong to him as a minister. If he does it, he does it outside the ministerial function. What I specially want these young men to consider with me to-night is this: What is there in the Christian ministry which differentiates it from all other offices, as an office? We know what a farmer is for—it is to cultivate the soil, and out of it to get a great harvest. We know what a merchant is for (although he does not always know himself)—it is to take the wealth of the country and scatter it abroad, that everyone may have some share in it. We know what a lawyer is for (although he does not always know himself)—it is to administer justice, and to organize society on the principles of divine equity. What is a minister for? What is his place in society? What

do you and I, as we come to church, have a right to desire and expect that he will give us? These two words are the answer: we expect of him the function of a priest, and we expect of him the function of a prophet. Of course, we all know that in the Old Testament times, these two words represented the two-fold function of the ministers of religion. There were priests who were an appointed order,—who served God in the Temple, and conducted the public services of the Temple; and there were the prophets who belonged to no specific order, who came from the plow, or from the college, now a statesman, now a poet, now a moral reformer. And these two words, priest and prophet, are the two words in the Old Testament which are used to designate the divine leaders of Israel.

Some of us have been inclined to think that the office of priest has forever passed away. I certainly think that some of the offices of the old priesthood have forever passed away. The whole sacrificial system has gone. There is no more in our temples the lowing of cattle, the bleating of lambs, no more the drawn knife, the rivers of blood, no more sacrificial altars. The priest is no longer an offerer of sacrifice. It is true that the whole Roman Catholic Church, and a few even in the Protestant Church, believe that the sacrifice is a perpetual sacrifice, and must be offered Sabbath after Sabbath. I do not need to discuss this question to-night. I shall assume that the sacrificial system has passed away, that there is no longer need of a priest to sacrifice for us. But the priestly office remains and the prophetic office remains. What are they? I call a priest one whose function it is to interpret man to God; I call a prophet one whose function it is to interpret God to man; these two functions constitute the function of the Christian ministry, and they are needed to-day as much as ever they were needed.

To interpret man to God—is this needed? Has not the veil of the Temple been rent? May not anyone enter into the Holy of Holies? Is there needed any mediator between the individual soul and God? Is it not the fundamental doctrine of our religion that every soul can go direct to God and no man need

ask for the intervention of a sacred order? Yes, this is all true, and yet we men and women do need someone to interpret us to God, because we need someone to interpret us first of all to ourselves. Let me try and make this clear.

What does a painter do? He sees beauty where you and I would fail to see it; then he puts the interpretation of that beauty upon the canvas, and by his painting, he not only interprets nature to us, but he interprets us to ourselves. He gives us new eyes. He gives us a new sense, a new perception of beauty. We are educated, because that which was deep down in us is uncovered, revealed, opened out to us, and we see through his eyes, because he, with his brush, has spoken to us. We are all musicians. You cannot play a note! You cannot make a chord! You know nothing whatever about the laws of harmony! Nevertheless, you are a musician. If you were not, you would care nothing for the singing of the birds, nothing for the dance music, nothing for the church choral—and we all like one or the other. You are a musician though you cannot compose music. The musician who creates music by his fingers, or by his voice, interprets the music to you, and interprets you to yourself, evokes the music out of you, makes you hear who before could not hear, makes you realize what before you could not realize. What we cannot hear, the musician hears though there is no music played, and transcribes on the piano what he has heard with the invisible ear. You and I lack the invisible ear, but the man who plays on the piano, and the woman who sings with her voice as it were, creates the hearing ear and we are interpreted to ourselves, and we find that we were musicians though we did not know it. So we are all poets, though most of us have the sense not to try to write rhymes. There is poetry in all men, and we take our Wordsworth, our Tennyson, our Browning, our Dante, our village poet it may be, it matters not who, and there is something in that poetry which appeals to us, evokes something we were not conscious of. Deep down below our visible self there is a hidden self, and the poet brings that out, and when he speaks, we say, "Yes, I see the beauty which I saw not before."

Now we men and women, weary and worn, or glad and joyous, come to our Church on Sunday morning, and we do not know ourselves. This man has sinned, has thrown away his opportunities, has violated the law of love, has been selfish with his employers, been unfaithful in his work, been cross with his wife, been unjust with his children, and he does not know it. He has what he calls "the blues." It is a little, secret, uninterpreted, unintelligible remorse, and he brings it with him to church. By his side, there sits a mother. God has reached down out of Heaven the arms of his love, and has taken the child from her to Himself; she always thought she believed in immortality, and now for a little time, she hardly knows whether her babe is living or dead. In the next pew, is a young bride, full of all the joy of love, glad, joyous, thankful, and yet she does not know that she is thankful. What this sinner with his heart burdened by unconscious remorse, what this mother shadowed by a half scepticism, what this bride full of a glad, uninterpreted joyousness desires, is some one in this pulpit to interpret themselves to themselves, and so interpret them to their God. What they want, what you and I want when we come to Church is, first of all, some man standing here who shall so say "We have erred and strayed from thy ways like lost sheep" that this man half conscious of his guilt, shall say to himself, "That is it; I have so erred"; who shall so say "I am the resurrection and the life," that this woman who cannot see the truth for her tears shall wipe them away and say "He is"; shall so say "We give thanks to Thee, Thou Giver of every good and perfect gift" that this half-grateful bride shall say "My love, He gave it to me." The minister ought to be an artist, a musician, a poet, that is a priest. He ought to know how to interpret the unutterable experiences of men, first to themselves, and then through that expression and interpretation, carry them up to God. Is it because God is afar off that only a few holy men can approach him? No, it is not that. It is that men, busy with the toil and care of life, have not time to think, or suppose that they have not time to think themselves out, to enter into their own nature, to interpret that which

is deepest and best in them. They need an interpreter. I do not know how it is in your Church, but in mine, the Congregational, we have been accustomed to go to Church to hear a minister preach, and the preaching has been preceded by what we call "preliminary exercises." Now, I want to put the stamp of condemnation on this idea that a church service is a lecture with "preliminary exercises." I can remember, when I was a boy, that I got the minister's sermon before he began it. First we sang it in a hymn, then we heard it read in the scriptures, then he prayed it to us, and before it came in the sermon, we knew it all. The Church ought to be a place where we come to lay all our burdens, whether of sorrow, of sin, of duty, or of joy, at the feet of our Lord. We want some man to lead us to Him and speak for us, and so teach us to speak for ourselves.

Young men, if you are going to fulfill this function of priest, if you are going to interpret the people to God, first of all you must understand what is in the people. It is said of Christ that He knew what was in men. I say it reverently, every minister ought to know what is in men. In a truer, deeper and better sense than it is generally used, you ought to "know your congregation better than they know themselves." You ought to know these hidden experiences which they conceal from one another, and which they conceal from themselves. You ought to see it in the eye, in the trembling of the voice, in the very silence; you ought to be able to press through their mask—not in order curiously to discern the secrets of men, but to help their needs, on the assumption that men do not know their own deepest selves, and want someone to interpret themselves to themselves, and then to interpret them to their God.

But it is not enough for the minister to understand these deep experiences; he must learn how to carry them to God. How? By reading devotional literature? By reading prayers? By writing prayers? That has only to do with the mere mechanism, that is the mere supplementary work. No minister ever leads a congregation in public devotion who is not accustomed to go to God in private prayer with that congregation in his heart. When

you know what your people are; when you know who they are; when you know what secret life they hide in this masquerade that we call life; when you have been accustomed on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, every day in the week, on your knees in your closet, to carry their sorrows and burdens to your Father; then when you come into the Church, you will find the way easy, and they will find the way easy. Sometimes we come to Church and our minister addresses to us an eloquent oration which he calls a prayer; sometimes he gives us a lecture on theology which he calls a prayer; sometimes he narrates the gossip of the village which he calls a prayer; sometimes he gives instructions to the Almighty which he calls a prayer; and when he goes stumbling through a wood that he has never walked in before, the trees not even blazed, nor the underbrush taken away, we refuse to follow him, and our thoughts go everywhither. But when he comes, on Sunday, bearing our burdens on his heart because he has borne them all week; when he comes ready to carry them to the Father now, because he has carried them all week; when he comes walking on the highway his faith has made plain and simple for him, he has made the pathway for us, and we follow where he leads though we can scarcely creep.

Nor is that priestly function any less important to the minister, because he has a liturgy. A minister may read a liturgy as though the quicker he got through it the better he served. I have heard it read so sometimes; haven't you? He may read the liturgy emptied of all devotion—prayers but no prayer. Or he may pour into that ancient Psalm of thanksgiving, that ancient confession, that longing desire for national welfare, that prayer for the Church, a heart surcharged with all the desires of the ages. He may know that he is walking, not alone, but with a long procession of men and women who walked by the aid of that liturgy, walk in the same pathway to the same God; and as he reads that liturgy, the congregation shall gather in behind him and know that they are one with the great Church Catholic. This is your first function: To interpet us to God. You remember how Jacob had cheated his father and then was afraid of his brother's wrath,

and fled away and laid himself down to sleep with his head on a pillow of stone, and as he slept, he dreamt, and in his dream saw a ladder reaching to Heaven and angels going up and down, and waking said, "How dreadful was this place. God was here and I knew it not." Out of our petty lives, out of our social entanglements, out of our triumphs, out of our visions and our dreams, we come to God's house; and we want someone there who can put that ladder of prayer so before us that we shall see the angels ascending and descending, and when at last the strains of the great organ die away, and we go out into the sunlight and back again to our busy lives, these words will be on our lips: Not that we heard an eloquent sermon, not that we heard an eloquent prayer, but this: "Lo, God was here. First we knew it not, but now we know it."

The Christian minister is not only to interpret men to God. He is to interpret God to men; he is to be not only a priest, he is to be prophet. Just as a dumb person, says Ewald, must have a speaker to speak for him and declare his wishes, so must God, who is dumb with regard to the mass of men, have a prophet, that is one who speaks not of himself, but who speaks for his God. A prophet is not a man who foretells; the foretelling is a mere incident; he is a man who forth-tells; a man who speaks for another; a man who brings his message from God; a man who so interprets to men the truth of God as to communicate to men the life of God. This we also want of our minister—someone who will interpret God to us. We are not satisfied when, having come to church to get someone to interpret God to us, we find someone who, instead, interprets a creed or theology to us. You will be told that men do not care about theology. That is not true. There is nothing purely intellectual men are more interested in than theology. We have a department in *The Outlook*, entitled "Notes and Queries," and I believe to one question on other subjects, we have had ten on theology. Last winter I gave a course of lectures to working men at the Cooper Institute; all sorts and conditions of men were there, except the people who go to Church, they were not there. At the end of

every address, there was an opportunity for inquiry, and the inquiries were on theology—What did I think about God? About Christ? About his divinity? About immortality? The miraculous conception? These and such as these were the questions. Take any of your preachers, Phillips Brooks, Spurgeon, Beecher, they are all theologians; they all deal with the great problems of God and His government. They are not mere lecturers. Take any one of them, liberal or conservative, they deal with great theological problems, but they deal with them vitally, not as mere intellectual theorems; they deal with them as problems of religion.

You young men have here studied theology, and when you graduate, you will have to study it more. But you will have to construct your own theology; or if you have constructed it here, you will have to revitalize it. No man soon to preach can take his theology ready made for him. It must be the product of his own thinking. He may take all that his professors can give to him, but when he has taken all, he must work it all over, and make his own theology. A theological seminary is not a manufactury where you can come and get the goods and then go out and sell them at retail. You are to have a theology underlying your preaching, but what we want of you after all is not theology but religion, not a philosophy of life but life itself; and for life you must come to God, and your theology, your teachers can be valuable to you only as they show you the way to Him. We come to you for religion, that is for an interpretation of God; not of a creed, not even of the Bible, but of God. Religion is the life of God in the soul of man. The Bible is beyond all other literature, because it is the record of the experiences of men who had that life of God in their soul. It is not a book about religion, it is a book of religion. The law-giver when he wrote there, wrote the divine law; the poet when he wrote there, drew aside the veil of nature and showed God the reality behind all; the historian when he wrote, wrote of God's dealings with the nations. These men saw God in their lives, and wrote what they saw that we may see God in our lives. When

we come to church, we do not want the statement that once three thousand, four thousand, eighteen hundred years ago, somebody did see God in his life; we want a man standing here who, because he has read the Book, and dwelt in it, and has lived in the companionship of that Book, has seen God in his own life, and then can make us see Him. We come for God and we are not satisfied with a book, a history, a philosophy. We are thirsty. The minister has prepared a speech which he has studied for days and over which he has worked, making it a work of art; he brings the beautiful cup which he has prepared of gold and silver ornamented, it is chased and carved, it is exquisite in its workmanship, and he holds it upside down, and lo! not a drop of water comes out of it. We do not want the cup. We want the water. If you are to reach men, if you are to do the work that men want of the minister, you must know how, not only to interpret the creed, not only how to interpret the Bible, you must know how to interpret God.

Nay, I go further, and at the risk of being misunderstood, I will say it is not enough that you interpret the gospel. What is the gospel? "I delivered unto you first of all what I also received, how that Christ died for our sins, was buried and rose again the third day according to the Scriptures." This is Paul's definition of the Gospel. It is the story of the life, the sufferings, the death, the resurrection of Jesus Christ for our salvation. Our faith is built upon it. Our Church is centered upon it. Our theology grows out of it. Our life is made by it. Nevertheless, when we come to Church on Sunday morning, it is not enough to tell us that Jesus Christ lived and suffered and died and rose again. Why did he do it? Do you remember what he says? "I am the door." What is the door for? To look at? No, to push open and go in. "I am the door." Through Christ, God enters into the human race; through Christ, the human race enters into God. We do not want a mere repetition of that historic fact. We want you to open the door and go in. Find God in Christ, find God in the Bible; go search, find him where you can, find him and then bring him to us. We want him.

The world wants God and never more than to-day. A God that can comfort the sorrowing, a God that can strengthen the weak, a God that can comfort the perplexed, a God that can lift the burden off the sinful. If you cannot find Him, if you have no message from Him, if you can only echo and re-echo the messages of others, you have no business in the ministry. Give your place to another man, and go to trade, or manufacturing, or agriculture, or what you will.

This power of the prophet is the secret of preaching. Any man that has in his soul the experience of God, and then in himself the capacity to impart that experience to another (and the two do not always go together), any man who has the experience of God in his soul and the capacity to impart that experience to another, is a prophet; and the world is not weary of prophets. It wants them still. I do not like the word "supernatural," because it seems to me to belong to a philosophy which I personally disown. It assumes that there is a great mechanism called Nature, and God outside that Nature, who interrupts now and again to keep it right, like a clock which you regulate because it goes out of time. I do not believe that. I believe God is in Nature, in humanity, in His world, and that is to be your message, and my message. But let us not be afraid in this so-called rationalistic age of what men mean by supernatural. I like the word "divine" better. It is a shorter word and means more. Let us not be afraid of a divine Bible, a Book that really has in it the record of divine experiences in the hearts of men. Let us not think that it is the revelation of a God who was in the world and now has gone away from it. Let us understand that God was there disclosed in Israelitish history that we might see him in American history. He was disclosed in David's personal experiences that we might have him in our personal experiences. Do not let us be afraid of the idea of a divine Church. The Church is not a mere ethical society; it is not a mere school of theology. This is what St. Paul denies so vigorously in his first letter to the Corinthians. He denies that he has come to teach a new philosophy to the Greeks already burdened with phi-

losophy. The Church is the Church of the living God. With all its errors, its coldnesses, its divisions, its half-faiths, nevertheless it is the great Army of God, and God is in the midst of it here. It is bound together by what? Its creed? No, no. Scotland has half a dozen churches, all having the same creed, and yet all separate. By its ritual? No. The Episcopal Church has the same ritual and is divided into High Church and Low Church. The common love for a living God dwelling among men, this is what holds us together. Do not be afraid of your faith in a divine Church, the Church of the living God. Do not be afraid of a divine Christ, in whom God walked, veiled, that he might be revealed, as we put a smoked glass to our eyes that we may look at the sun. Do not be afraid of a divine experience in the hearts of men. Do not be afraid to believe in a living God, to whom you can go as the prophets went, from whom you can take your message as the prophets took theirs, from whom you can come to the people, giving your message as they gave theirs; not infallible, not without error, but bringing to them the divine light and the divine life. I meant to read to-night some of the calls of the ancient prophets: of Isaiah who protested that his lips were unclean, and an angel with a live coal from off the altar touched his lips; of Jeremiah who protested, "I am like a little child," yet went forth on his sad errand; of Ezekiel, when he saw the vision of the Almighty in the desert, throwing himself prone upon his face until the Voice spake to him saying "Stand upon thy feet and I will speak to thee"; of the Great Unknown who cried out "All flesh is grass," and received his message in the answer "The people are grass but the word of God abideth forever"; of Christ himself who began his ministry saying "The spirit of the Lord God is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the glad tidings." There has been in the past some superstition about the divine call to the ministry, but let us beware, lest, breaking away from that superstition, we lose the faith which was behind it. Some coal from off the altar must touch your lips, some voice of courage from God must speak to you and say,

"Go, you have a message"; some word from the Almighty must come to you, prone upon the ground in your self-abasement, and bidding you "Stand upon your feet and I will speak to you"; some spirit of the Father must anoint you or you cannot preach what we want to hear. But if you will come to your pulpit on Sunday morning, knowing the hearts of your people, knowing the needs of men, knowing the way to God, and able to interpret the hearts of men to God, come from the closet where you have heard God speak to you, through the creed, through the Bible, through the gospel, through your own experiences, and bring to them the message God has given them through your lips, you may stumble and stammer, but we shall want to hear you; not because we care for your sermon, but because we want to hear your message from God.

II.

MIRACLES IN RELIGION HAVE A SCIENTIFIC COUNTERPART.

THE TRUE NATURE OF WHAT IS CALLED A MIRACLE.

By Prof. J. Cooper, D.C.L., LL.D.

What is a Miracle? This question will be answered differently according to the advance in culture both of the individual and of the world. The essence of the miraculous, however, consists in the fact that an occurrence cannot be accounted for on any principles of human action understood at the time, but must be brought about by a superior power. For whatever can be done by the agency of man working under the limitations of natural law, however unusual the act may be, is capable of scientific explanation. But even when the act involves superior power directed by extraordinary sagacity, if capable of being accounted for on these principles, it is natural and not miraculous. If it has been done once it can be repeated by the concurrence of the same factors which produced it the first time. Hence, as the human intelligence increases its dominion over the powers of nature, the intricacy and marvelous character of its work will be increased. The Miracle, accordingly is not a constant quantity; but varies with the progress of the race and the increase thereby of its skill to employ the recondite forces of nature. It is to be expected then that in the earlier ages and ruder conditions of men signs and wonders are more common; and events which can be accounted for on natural principles are received with childlike wonder as though they were miraculous. For the processes of nature being less understood by the race or the child, any occurrence which is not capable of solution by those who are most ignorant, will by them be deemed a Miracle. To them the Deity acts in person

not by deputy; directly by the exercise of divine power, and not through second causes.

The essence of the miraculous is measured not by our knowledge, but by our ignorance of the hidden powers of Nature. Miracles have always been admitted as true in every age of the world and among all its peoples. For, as we have seen whatever transcends the amount of knowledge held by the whole race at a particular time, or by the individual in his sphere, is the embodiment of the miraculous. Hence, he who by his superior knowledge can do what his fellows cannot, is looked upon as possessing miraculous powers. For the very essence of the miraculous consists in bringing to bear a power which we do not possess, and in employing this in a way beyond our comprehension. But this must necessarily be a sliding scale. To the savage it is miraculous that the gun of modern construction can kill in battle at the distance of one or more miles. To the uneducated even in civilized countries it is miraculous that not merely the meaning of words, but the tones of voice by which they are uttered, can be carried along a wire and reported a thousand miles away. Or, that by speaking before a metallic plate the voice, and the notes of a musical composition, may be received and retained for long periods of time by the sensitive surface, and made to repeat themselves again. It would have been far less astonishing to the lake dweller to have seen his brother come to life again after being hugged to death by a bear, than to have seen that same brother point a hollow steel tube and cause it to utter a sharp voice, and slay that bear a half mile off as he was descending the mountain to attack his dwelling built out in the lake. Plato and Aristotle would have been more smitten with wonder at the triumphs of modern science in declaring the metallic constituents of the sun and stars; in driving machinery by electricity to set type and print the intellectual panorama of a modern newspaper, than if Socrates had come to life after drinking the hemlock. The miracle of one age becomes the ordinary working of Nature in the next; and this in turn is superseded by a new one which is at bottom only the indication of man's increasing powers

over natural forces. Hence the objection that a miracle interferes with the established laws of nature has no meaning when we rightly understand the terms; and to say that such an event is impossible is measuring the resources of the Infinite Mind by the yard stick of our conceited ignorance. We should rather ask: What is there that the resources of Infinite Wisdom and power cannot do when finite man, by allying himself with the portions of these resources which he is able to wield, can do so much?

Accordingly, as knowledge increases those acts which in one age cannot be explained on natural principles, and are therefore attributed to the immediate Divine intervention, are found to be capable of explanation on principles now clearly understood. As men attain this mastery over nature's secrets they can do what before was deemed impossible; and hence, if events which are beyond the reach of the most advanced human agency as understood by the spectator take place at all, they must be by *Deus ex machinâ*. But as control of nature's forces grows the personality of God in the transactions of man is removed farther off; though his agency is discerned and acknowledged by the serious and fair minded. Still it must be borne in mind that the recognition of this Divine agency is possible only under a system where laws prevail and where the evidences of Design anticipate a result from obedience to them. The necessity of miraculous action becomes less because men of themselves do those things which before were referred to supernatural agency; but the feeling of reverence for the unseen Power, which takes man into partnership action, becomes deeper through gratitude for this favor. Yet the effect of this ability to explain all occurrences according to natural laws will be exactly opposite, depending upon the willingness to see in a perfect plan of action the evidence of a Power to devise and execute; or the voluntary blinding which dispenses with a personal Intelligence and Will in order to substitute Chance, or the impersonal Laws of Nature. To the reverent mind, the greater the perfections of the System to work without immediate supervision or interference, the more evidence

there is of a God who hides himself from irreverent eyes, but who can be discerned by those who look for him.* By such he is recognized as a Personality, and one of a character exalted in proportion to the wisdom of direction and difficulty of execution. This will increase the humility of the creature who yields a ready obedience to a Supreme Being, and reverence for one who gives him power over the domain of Nature through obedience to its laws. But he who persistently exalts himself, as he gains power by submission to these laws, will feel his own sufficiency to understand and to act; and hence can dispense with any power or wisdom higher than his own. He sees the world governed by laws which he calls natural and immanent, working exclusively by their own efficiency. Contrary to his own mode of action he finds everything done either by chance, or by a code of laws which enacted itself in the first place, and continues to execute itself automatically. He, therefore, who finds in Nature nothing greater than himself, and in the perfection of her laws no evidence of transcendent wisdom in their establishment, can believe in nothing miraculous, and sees no need of a Supreme Being to govern the Universe.

What is meant by Uniformity in Nature?

What is called interference with the Laws of Nature must be a varying quantity, depending upon the ability to understand the totality of this nature as a System. To one who was able to comprehend the whole there would be no interference by any event however strange it might appear to finite knowledge; provided that in the sum total of the government it was designed and enacted as a component part of the system. Hence he who authoritatively declares that there cannot be any interference with the government of the world must know all which this includes. Where the objector does not possess that amount of knowledge, and yet says a Miracle is impossible because contrary to a fixed

* Voulant paraitre à decouvert a ceux qui le cherchant de tout leur cœur, et caché a ceux qui le fuirent de tout leur cœur. Pascal, Pensées. Vol. II., p. 151. Ed Fangère.

uniformity he must tacitly assume one of two alternatives: 1st. That he actually possesses all knowledge that is involved in the government of the world; or, 2nd, he pronounces authoritatively on that of which it is impossible for him yet to know. None but a madman would assert the former honestly, and none but a fool or knave would attempt the latter. The fool might think he knew so thoroughly the compass of Natural Law that he could not be mistaken as to its reach, and would be self-deceived. The sophist, however, which class includes nearly or quite all who assert the impossibility of an exception to natural law, is aware that he has no right to make such an assertion. For:

> "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
> Than are dreamed of in our Philosophy."

And hence our adversaries make this surprising statement about something they do not and cannot know, in the hope that those against whom they contend will not see the fallacy: and so their point be carried by sheer audacity.

The government of the world must be by one of three alternatives: 1st. By Chance. This excludes both uniformity and Miracle alike. For where all is chaos, there can be no regular action, and therefore no interference with it. 2nd. By a Personal Agent working by Design—for no such agent could possibly work by Chance without at once wrecking his system. Or, 3d, By Design, immanent in the materials of which the world is composed, and directing them just as a Person would. And here it must not be lost sight of that Immanency, or Mechanical Causation, if it works by a plan—and if it does not, nothing is fixed, and so there is none of that vaunted uniformity or laws of nature—involves quite as many factors as a Personal agency. For there must be a foreknowledge of the end to be reached as much under the one supposition as the other. A connected chain of causes leading up to a definite result must be provided for by intelligence working under any method whatever. The end is just as much a part as the beginning, since one involves the other. Besides, there cannot be any more in the effect than was contained in the cause.

But on either one of these two alternatives a miracle is possible. For to constitute an event—a miracle—all that is necessary is that it transcend the amount of knowledge which the world possesses with reference to what it calls natural law. For any new event cannot be objected to as impossible under such a system, unless it contradicts some one of the laws which are a part of the totality of the regular action in that system. Hence such an event is quite as admissible under the hypothesis of Mechanical Causation, or Immanent Design, as on the theory of a Personal agent who designs as well as executes the laws of his Universe. It is clear, therefore, that Hume is wrong on his own theory, in rejecting Miracles because there is a fixed order in the reign of law which cannot permit interference. It is miraculous that this profound thinker, who was so fair in his judgments in History, did not discover his paralogism. He claims not to be reasoning as a sophist, and is altogether too shrewd for unconscious deception. Hence he surely ought not declare *ex cathedra*, what was impossible because of its interference with the unalterable Laws of Necessity, which he said rule the world. For, unless he possessed omniscience, he could not know but that what seemed to be interference with the regular order, and for that reason was termed miraculous, was a part of a higher order in the reign of law not yet understood. There were multitudes of phenomena in every department of science utterly incapable of solution by any knowledge in possession of the world in Bacon's day, which are now so well understood that they present no difficulty, and are considered parts of uniformity. The barometer in which mercury rises to a definite height, and water or other liquids to different elevations corresponding to their weights; the aberrations of Jupiter and Saturn from their proper orbits, and the heliocentric theory of our system may be cited as pertinent instances. Irreconcilable facts in physics, which are now admitted and have been incorporated in the sum total of human knowledge, would have been pronounced impossible, or at least miraculous, by the common consciousness. And the fact that a comparison of the knowledge admitted in Bacon's day with that of some centuries previous, *e. g.*, the

possibility of sailing west without reaching the limits of the world and falling off the edge into chaos, should have guarded such a philosopher as Hume from asserting that Miracles are to be rejected because they contradict the necessary order of Nature, no matter by what agency that order was brought about.

The question of Miracles then narrows itself down to this plain issue: Is any event a Miracle, and therefore scientifically impossible, because it contradicts the course of Natural Law as we understand it at any particular period? The history of the change of opinion in Science shows the absurdity of such a claim. For while we are regaled *ad nauseam* with an amount of "conflicts between Religion and Science," by those who shield their unbelief under this miserable subterfuge, we hear but little from them of the conflicts of Science with itself. Yet these are more numerous, quite as bitter, and still more absurd, because they draw opposite conclusions from palpable data in the same field. Take for example the Vulcanian and Neptunian theories of Geology; the ridicule, and, at last, the forced acknowledgment of the Deluge; the present controversies over Pangenesis and the Origin of Species. We see facts as strange and unaccountable by any process of natural law understood at a given period, as any miracle recorded in Holy Writ; yet taking place and winning their way to public recognition through as much hostility as ever Science exhibited toward the vouchers for Revealed Religion. Hence, those who think they have overthrown Religious belief, or the credibility of a Divine Revelation—because its advocates have at some period taken their stand upon an absurd or impossible interpretation of what the Scripture did not intend to say—do nothing but display their ignorance of the facts, and their own hostility to the truth. They know little of the extent to which this principle would go if applied to Science. It is not long since, when in an excellent edition of Newton's Principia by a couple of Jesuits, Le Seur and Jacquier, the admission was made, by a *Monitum*, that the decree of the Roman See, asserting the geocentric theory of the Universe, was accepted. And while this involved the falsity of the teachings of the book they edited, the

claims of the Church are also made to appear absurd. But we have only to antedate Kepler to find that Science roared as loudly against the heliocentric theory as did the Pope's Bull. For when the astronomer explained the movements of the Universe according to the Ptolemaic system—then universally accepted—to Alphonso X. of Castile, that monarch tauntingly exclaimed: "If God had asked me about the arrangements of this Universe I could have suggested a simpler system." Science, as then understood by the most learned in the world was brought face to face with learning aided by common sense and pronounced absurd. To the severely scientific man of that day the assertion that the earth stands still would have given the lie to all uniformity in nature, and been declared as impossible as any miracle. But it is scarcely necessary to speak of these controversies of science with itself, except to stop the mouths of those who prate about the perpetual necessity of modifying religious dogmas to meet the advance of verified knowledge.

Such objections to Miracles as those of Hume, Huxley and Büchner are superficial, and are based upon a misconception of the subject. For they proceed upon the assumption that these are accepted because they are contrary to the absolute laws of the Universe; that they are not subject to any causation, and are out of the chain of sequence provided for, whether by personal Design or impersonal Mechanism. But the view of Miracles held in this paper considers them a part of the system of law, provided for quite as much as any of the more obvious and admitted phenomena which can be accounted for by natural causes. And that this view is consistent with a fixed order of Immanent Causality by which each event is a necessary link in the chain of sequence, has been shown by Spinoza;* and can be maintained equally well on any system of uniformity. This, of course, excludes Chance as a principle of rule; since under it there can be no uniformity and, of course, no miraculous interference. But if Miracles were not parts of a system they would have no meaning. If they had no cause they could have no

* Tractatus Theolog. Polit., Cap. VI., Vol. II., Ed. Brüder.

effect. They would not only be nondescript, but isolated; and have no use or place in Nature. Conversely, if they have use and fix themselves in the chain of sequences which are subsequent, if they have an influence on the world, as they undoubtedly have, then their origin must come under Leibnitz' category of "Sufficient Reason." And this must be true whether their consequences are salutary or mischievous—it makes not the least difference to the purpose of this argument which view is taken of them; they must have their *raison d'être*, and the question then resolves itself into one of historical fact. That they are antecedently impossible must be ruled out of court as irrelevant. They cannot be antecedently impossible to one who can do all things; who established the principles on which the laws of Nature are conducted. To one who knows all things it will be a mere matter of fact. They did, or they did not, occur. To him who knows but in part—which will be forever the case with all human knowledge—the question must be of fact, whether they are vouched for in history; and whether the voucher be trustworthy. That they have been held in all ages of the world to be true must be admitted. That they are attested by such testimony as must be accepted for any facts in history is equally certain. For they have every sort of voucher that any occurrence can have. They are a component part of the sum of human thought, as universal as any belief whatever. It is not merely one age of the world which believes in them. All ages accept them alike; though what constitutes them differs with the progress of knowledge. It is not one class of men, the ignorant and foolish, but the most learned and shrewd men of affairs, as well. The most rigidly scientific find facts which must be accepted without proof because they are intuitively certain; facts in relation to the past which it is not now possible to verify; facts in relation to the present which transcend our knowledge, but upon which we must act if we act at all; facts adumbrated in the future which we know full well must take place, though we can give no satisfactory explanation of the causes now at work to produce them.

The Miracle has a purpose. It is not an absurd, an unreasonable or neutral occurrence, but one of the most positive significance and value in the moral economy of the world. And it will scarcely be denied that the moral character of the world is of more importance than all other forces combined. For the happiness, the well-being physically and spiritually, depends on the virtue and purity of the lives of the rational creatures which inhabit the earth. The purpose of all religions aims at making men better in all the relations of life, and in doing so to serve as a discipline for a higher stage of existence. This is the avowed object, and every form of religion while striving ostensibly to effect this, does in reality achieve some good. For Religion, as its name implies, is a restraint, a curbing in of selfishness for the common good. And not even the most outrageous infidel will dare deny that if men would obey the commands of those religious systems they profess, they would become better themselves; and in so doing add to the common virtue and happiness of the whole race. The complaint of the enemy is that men are false to their professions, and the doctrines do not effect their avowed purpose. But this is unconsciously granting the whole case. For the claim of Religion is that it will improve the character and increase the happiness if obeyed, and therefore it cannot be charged with the failure when not obeyed. Neither can it compel men to be good, for that would subvert responsibility, and render virtue impossible. The civil law when violated cannot be charged with the offense, which, though it prohibits, it cannot prevent. The morality and progress of the world are shown most clearly where the doctrines of Religion are most devotedly followed. And those nations are in the van in every sphere of progress where men are under the guiding principles of that faith in support of which those miracles are adduced which are made the chief object of attack by the enemies of Revealed Religion. These Miracles have a specific purpose as the vouchers for the system of religious belief, and if this belief has any influence on the character and happiness of men, as no one but a madman, or one wilfully hostile, can deny; then

there is a reason *à priori* for their existence. If, then, Religion has its uses for the good of men, and the advanced conditions of those who profess some form of it is the best proof, for those who deny its efficiency get their power to attack by its aid to their culture, and its toleration of them even in their opposition, then it follows that Miracles have their uses in attestation. For when a new Revelation is made, a system of doctrine and practice is offered for the acceptance of men, and, therefore, it must have some voucher. It is both novel in its doctrines, and untried in its working. It confessedly overturns the preëxisting order, and therefore is not accounted for by any existing facts. It strikes at the root of fixed habits and inveterate prejudices. It incurs the hostility of those whose views it condemns and whose vested rights it calls in question. Old prejudices have become a second nature. Men are swayed by them in all their thoughts and actions. But when a new religion is to be founded not only must old prejudices be combated but new truths inculcated. To dislodge these prejudices requires proof which arrests the attention by a force stronger even than old habits. The voucher for the new truths must be convincing enough to eradicate old modes of thought, and substitute for them such doctrines as are repulsive from their novelty, even if they did not require a new mode of life. Sacrifices are demanded by every form of religion; sacrifices of our substance as offerings to the spiritual power which commands these doctrines; sacrifices of our convenience, or even of our lives, in attestation of our belief. Accordingly if a new religion has nothing to appeal to save common facts patent to all, and which are explicable on principles of ordinary reason, then this new religion has no proof for its claim to divine origin, and therefore no reason for its acceptance. There must be something out of the ordinary to call attention to that which in itself is extraordinary. This is the method pursued by men in advocating measures which are generically human. Until the invention or discovery has had time to approve itself by use it must have an authoritative recommendation. This must come from the established character of the prime mover in the novelty,

or from someone else who has such a position among his fellowmen that his word is taken as a sufficient guarantee of the utility and adaptation to its purpose which the invention claims. Without this any new invention would be rejected, at least until sufficient time and opportunity had been given to test its value. For the lack of such voucher important improvements have languished for support. Sometimes they have been ignored for generations, and had to be as it were rediscovered when the age became ripe for their reception.

Proof Required in Advance for Anything that is New.

The analogy between the requirements for the acceptance of a new religion and the manner in which all new things in ordinary life are tested, is obvious. When a candidate presents himself for a place credentials are demanded. It matters not what kind or grade of work, the principle still holds good. The day laborer on a farm, the servant in the kitchen, as well as the applicant for a position as clerk or cashier in a corporation, or the teacher who seeks a place in a learned institution—each one must present credentials to show his fitness. The State demands this by requiring a Civil Service examination in all cases—except when worthless partisanship is content with a worthless service: any person seeking a new position must in some way show a fitness before his services will be engaged. So of new Inventions. They must be tested in advance of their acceptance. The corporation which is asked by a promoter to invest in a new machine or process must have assurance of some kind that it has a real value before money is risked in its use. The Patent Office must have evidence, and in turn by acceptance of the model, becomes voucher for its value.

The same holds good with reference to the acts of Physical Nature. New facts are heralded and accompanied by proofs. When something extraordinary is about to take place there are indications as vouchers from above and beneath. The tornado is preceded by an unnatural calmness showing that the elements are getting ready for a supreme effort. When the earthquake is close at

hand there is a stillness which precedes the tremor. When the mountain is going to open its dreadful jaws there are signs presaging, such as naturalists from Pliny to our day have noticed. The event in Nature has its forerunner or accompaniment; the thing signified has its sign. The bud swells the vapor ascends, the rivers are unlocked, by visible phenomena which assures us that the season of reviving is near. The beasts of the field and the fowls of the air instinctively understand the warning voice of God, and go to cover when "This thunder showeth concerning Him to the herds, even concerning it, (The Storm), that goeth up."* This voice speaks to them in the natural world in a language which they instinctively understand and they frame their lives according to His admonitions. The ox knoweth his owner and the ass his master's crib. But when God speaks to man and would attest His communication, He must do this by a supernatural proof to wrest unwilling attention. When, therefore, a new Religion is proclaimed as being the voice of God and embodying His will toward man, it must present its credentials, and of a kind to compel their reasonable attention. If it be from a superior Power it must show this fact, not by the ordinary acts of men, but by something that transcends their ability; and gives evidence that it comes from the Supreme One by doing something for which He alone is able. If it be the power of God it must show His works. The proof of the Divine origin can be shown only by acts which testify to His presence and approval. This all new religions admit. This the Mosaic and Christian systems acknowledged as the grounds on which they demanded acceptance from man. They constantly appealed to this species of proof at their first establishment; and even subsequently those who backslided from the faith were restored by a repetition of the same kind of acts which before were claimed to be wrought by the immediate interference of God. Without such proof they had no claim for the acceptance of what was new, untried, and contrary to the previous life and modes of thinking of those who were asked to embrace it.

* Job 36:33, Hebrew.

Hence if a Religion is to be established there must be recourse to this kind of a voucher. The Miracle then has its unquestioned value, and is as much a part of nature as the occurrence for which it vouches. If this has an accredited value, as we have seen that Religion has in the estimation of all reasonable men, then the means by which this shall be most readily established will be quite as necessary. And the argument would be as drastic if religion were mischievous in its effects. For as a secret power of evil it would find ready access to the corrupt heart, and would work unseen unless heralded by some marked manifestation; and so, such process would be necessary to enable men to foresee and elude its malignant consequences. Analogy therefore with the actions of rational creatures touching their own new inventions, and with Nature in attesting her processes, renders it *à priori* certain that if the Moral world is a part of the same system as the material, the establishment of a new Religion will be accompanied by Miracles as an attestation of its truth. These facts are equally true on the hypotheses of Immanent Design and Mechanical Causation. The presence of a fact new to us is accompanied by its voucher; which latter is as much a part of the system as the fact itself. For the bare fact, in order to be accepted and find its use, cannot be found apart from the proof which authenticates it. Hence, if the former be a necessary part, as argued by Spinoza,* the leading advocate of this view, so is the latter. So the objector gains nothing in his warfare against Miracles by his attempt to expel a Personal God—working not at random, not without a plan, but doing all things by Design—from the Universe which His hands have made. For the presence of an unusual voucher, *i. e.*, a Miracle, is quite as certain, and quite as necessary on the one hypothesis as the other. And as to Chance, if that be a principle on which Nature is governed, then of course there can be no uniformity, and no miraculous interference. For Chance, such as its advocates dream about, can have no law, no regularity, and hence no irregularity. But when we speak of Chance, Hazard, in the sense in which strict Science uses the term, then it becomes

* Tractat. Theol. Pol. Cap. vi., Vol. II.

just as amenable to the Calculus of La Place as the movements of material nature set forth in the *Mécanique Céleste*. The fact that it submits to rigorous calculation removes it from the category of uncertainty and places it under the uniform laws of Nature.

A Miracle is then as indispensable, as emphatically a part of the system embraced under the laws of Necessity advocated by Spinoza, or the uniform laws of Nature, which Hume claims to be unanswerable against their possibility, as under a scheme of Teleology. For the moment we may consider what is meant by uniformity of law which Hume says is decisive against the possibility of Miracles. Wherein does this uniformity consist? Is it in the absolutely uniform action of the forces of nature in themselves; or as we happen to understand them? If the former be required to constitute uniformity, then no scientist ever has, or ever can, reach this goal. The course of scientific progress consists in the discovery of new facts, hitherto both unknown, and at the time, unaccounted for. These are discovered because of their variation from the normal course, and are denied at first on the ground that they do not submit to natural law. They are next received as a probable hypothesis; and finally win their way from exceptions to a place in the natural order. The exception is found at every stage to prove the rule because it is discovered to be not an exception to the Laws of Nature, but to our interpretation of them. Shall we conclude that this determination of what is possible by the criteria of man's ignorance has come to an end when Lardner said that a steamer could not carry enough coal to cross the ocean—though one did arrive before he closed his course of lectures on Physical Science in New York? Shall we deny a well attested Miracle because Hume or Clifford says that such an event is contrary to their idea of uniformity? We cannot tell, and they are not able to show us what is uniformity, because the apparent exception of to-day is found to be the regular action of tomorrow. So that which seems to be a break in the uniformity by the miraculous healing of the sick or raising of the dead, would doubtless be found, if we could discover and

comprehend all the data so as to colligate them into the real rule of action, to be a counterpart of the perturbations of Jupiter and Saturn which showed divergence from natural law, but were found by the discovery of Neptune to verify it more completely. These exceptions to what we, in our fond dreams, claim to be adequate knowledge of natural law, only prove our ignorance, and should teach us humility. For the innumerable apparent discords in the case of the most rigidly demonstrative sciences are found to be concords by a wider generalization of facts colligated under a higher unity.

Analogy of That Which is Now Known to That Which is Unknown.

Analogy is the only method by which we can proceed from the known to the unknown. There can be no two things in nature which are identical. They may be very much alike, and when we discover a strong likeness we say they are children of the same family. So when we see a marked resemblance between persons the most removed we instinctively believe there is some relationship. It is said that one of his equerries accidentally slew William Rufus in a hunt in New Forest in August, 1100; that the slayer fled instantly and hid himself in France; lest the desire to punish the *lese* of "that Majesty which doth so hedge about a king" might demand his life. The fugitive married in France, and now, after 800 years, has numerous descendants between whom and the progeny of their kindred who remained in England can be seen a strong family likeness. So we hold that there is this indisputable likeness between the realms of spirit and matter, of moral law and intellectual energy, because they all spring from the same Source. There is a remarkable case in point. We have recently been passing through a Meteoric Shower, which occurs annually in November; sometimes more sometimes less conspicuous, but which attained its maximum November 13, 1833, "The night of the Falling Stars!" These meteors are admitted to be the fragments of a planet or star which once was solid, and had a fixed period of revolution. As such it was

amenable to the laws of the stellar system, and its movements were a part of the fixed laws of nature as they apply to the material Universe. There was one path with a certain degree of ellipticity, and the body made its various revolutions in specified times. As such it both acted and was acted upon by all its fellow members of the system of the Universe; and its, and their movements were parts of that uniformity of Nature on which all Astronomical Science builds. The Universe was adjusted to the presence of this member of the grand heavenly family; and they had doubtless all moved on harmoniously from the time whereof the "memory," even of the astronomical "man runneth not to the contrary." Hume and Huxley would have said, without any hesitation, that no change could take place in the history of this body because it was held fast by the prevailing law of uniformity. Yet the same astronomical science, which is so strong an exemplification of this uniformity that ephemera may be calculated for thousands, or, if one has the patience, for millions of years, tells us that there came a time when—by some convulsion that even physical science has not the hardihood to describe exactly—the planet or star was shivered to atoms. Then, instead of one grand body moving on majestically in its heavenly path, it suddenly was ground up by "the mills of the gods" into its primitive star dust. There is a Miracle for you, forsooth, taking place in the domain of physical nature—for if ever there was miraculous action this was such—when a member of the stellar family was missing from the brotherhood, and its place could be known only by the lurid glare of a countless myriad of fragments each pursuing its own orbit! These are henceforth, changing from the irregular shape which the explosion, or the violent concussion with another body would leave them, and taking on the spheroidal form which other bodies that are free to act, show a tendency to assume. There is an entirely new order of things, so far as the original body is concerned and the fragments of which it now consists. The laws of the stellar system which operated previous to this catastrophe were based upon its unity and solidity. The attraction on its neighbors of every degree of removal and their

action on it in turn, must have been provided for in advance. And it would make no difference, so far as our line of argument is concerned, whether the system of the Universe was based on Immanent Design, Mechanical Causation, or a Personal Intelligence: the order which once reigned in the system was based upon a condition of things which has come to a sudden and violent end.

Absolute Impossibility of Chance as a World Builder.

And it is worth while to remark that Chance as a factor or principle of uniform action—which involves both an absurdity and a *contradictio in adjecto*—is shown to be impossible by such a catastrophy as this. For be it granted that "the fortuitous concurrence of atoms" (a favorite idea from the time that Lucretius embodied all that could be said by an advocate of chance or rencontre, in such eloquent language that he has become the mouthpiece for such as hold his views)—was possible. That in the limitless aëons of the past eternity the materials of which the Universe consists must move in some way if they had motion at all; which is itself sheer assumption; and that, after trying an inconceivable number of plans which would not work nor get them out of chaos, they must finally hit upon some system that would work. The difficulty of adjusting countless millions of separate particles of matter into a system, and the certainty that until the most intricate motion of the smallest particle was provided for, the whole would of its own movement return to complete chaos has not been candidly admitted nor adequately estimated by the advocates of Chance. They take for granted that while the particles must arrange themselves in some way, and, therefore, give them time enough and they will undoubtedly arrange themselves in the right way. The element of time is a very necessary one for the realization of effort, provided there is a distinct object after which the effort is striving. For then the obstacles which are in the way, *ab initio*, or which arise in the course of the movement, are discerned and obviated. They are relegated from the category of disturbing forces, and either neu-

tralized or changed by purposed action from being hostile to helping movements. But such is not the case when Chance acts upon diverse bodies or forces. For any one of these, being disorderly or hostile in its movements, operates to disarrange the whole system, because there is no designing or guiding principle to adjust and control, and derangement cannot possibly rectify itself. And as there is confessedly, on the doctrine of Chance, no external guidance, the whole must go back, as we have shown, to chaos, as soon as any disorder arises. Therefore, no matter how much time be granted to those who base the invariable laws of nature on a fortuitous jumble, the origin of a perfect system, involving myriads of bodies acted upon, not by "three forces," the *bête noir* and Gordian knot of mathematicians—but by millions interacting among themselves—is logically and mathematically impossible. Hence the Lucretian dream, so grandly told that we are charmed by its enunciation while assured of its absurdity, must be relegated to the rubbish chamber of Science, where we hope it will be permitted to slumber forever.

Thus we see that the factor of Chance as a Universe builder has no standing in *foro rationis*. The creation of a Universe requires that where Chance begins its manipulations it cannot succeed unless it finds a plan already in operation; a plan which has been devised by Design so complete as to leave out no element of matter or force. And if it finds a plan already in operation which has been so exquisitely elaborated as to leave out no element either of matter or force, there must have been an Intelligence and Power at work before it began. Therefore if it finds its work done before it begins, it really has nothing to do; and hence may be dispensed with as a scientific principle. This fact is so clear that the attempt to foist it upon thinking men as a method of creation, preservation, or government, is so absurd that it could not be admitted by any except those who are purposely deceived because "they love darkness rather than light."

From this episode showing the absurdity of Chance as a creative agency we return to our Miracle, the wrecking of a

member of the stellar universe. That such an event has taken place is proved assuredly by the fact that our earth passes through the zone of revolution. This zone is a wide one, requiring some days for the earth to pass through. For as the earth moves at the rate of 68,000 miles per hour, in two days it would traverse more than 3,000,000 miles. We have adverted to the fact that the laws of Nature would have to be adjusted to the condition of things antecedent to the catastrophe. But when this has arrived a new order of movement must be provided for. There are, instead of one body acting upon the countless number of companion stars and being acted upon in turn by them, each exerting its forces at a particular angle in the several parts of its elliptical orbit, now myriads of small bodies, some of them even microscopic, into which the attraction of the star when in its integral existence, is diffused. For the fragments have inherited whatever belonged to the testator before his miraculous, though strictly scientific, demise; and so we have the innumerable parts of the defunct, each possessing its several share of the inherited gravitation; and each exerting its moiety of force; some of them at an angle varying at least a million miles from the direction in which the combined force of the whole was formerly exerted. But this new order must have been provided for in advance. The varieties of force and direction would not adjust themselves by automatic action, since both the amount and direction of the force are changed. A *novus ordo Stellarum* has arisen, with all the complications which such a change involves. The old system has been superseded, at least in part, by this miracle in Nature, which neither such a scoffer as Hume, or such pantheists as Clifford can gainsay. The change affects not one member of the stellar system, but all of whatsoever size or remove. Instead of the combined gravity, say of the Sun, or Jupiter, acting upon one body in one orbit, this is diffused over a countless number of bodies of the irregular shapes of broken fragments, and then of these same becoming orbicular. The strongest mathematical head may well grow dizzy over a problem, not of *the three forces*, but of millions multiplied by

millions! Nor must we allow ourselves to be so startled at the difficulty as to deny its occurrence. Higher Criticism may contemptuously reject the miraculous in the narrative of Jonah. It may explain the death of Ananias and Sapphira as the result of the sudden outburst of anger on the part of Peter; who, as naturally a passionate man, was goaded to fury by their horrible lying. And warming up with what it feeds on, it may reject with Strauss all that is miraculous in the Bible. It may join hands with Hume and Huxley in rejecting all that seems to contravene the laws of Nature as they comprehend them. But we are confronted with a miracle in Science which abrogated all uniformity in natural law in a matter which involved the fate of a world. This miracle stands out in bold relief, and no sophistical reasoning of Clifford or contemptuous sneer of Büchner can ridicule it away.

The Cardinal Miracle of Christianity has a Counterpart in a Scientific Fact which is Admitted.

It being an undeniable fact that this event has taken place, and the conditions of the star both before and after the catastrophe had to be provided for; and both the breaking into fragments and their subsequent movements are interferences with the laws of the uniformity, we are now prepared to consider by way of analogy a Miracle, such as those recorded in the New Testament. It is not the time nor place to enter upon the defense of all the Scripture Miracles. Whether all that are narrated are true, or whether, in some cases the narrator was deceived, or even tried to deceive his hearers, is not the question. For the matter at issue is with reference to the possibility and credibility of a Miracle in general as a voucher for the truth of that Revelation contained in the Bible, and held as the warrant for a specific system of faith. For our purpose we will select a single one, most prominent in the list, and most far-reaching in its influence as a Type of Divine interference with the laws of Nature. This is the Resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, and which is accepted by St. Paul as the cardinal fact by which Christianity

stands or falls.* It is not our purpose to sift the proof by which this particular Miracle is supported. This belongs to an entirely different line of argument from the one we have in hand.

The collapse of a world would be miraculous if any physical event could be. It would interfere as distinctly and drastically with the uniformity of Nature's laws as any fact that could be conceived—short of the Final Catastrophe—about which Clifford tells us with the complacency of assured knowledge. So we take it that the return to life of the man Christ Jesus after he had been put to death according to the method and under the direction of the relentless Roman law, involving torture which would exhaust every vital force, and his body guarded by the delegated power of the Empire—would be as unlikely as any case conceivable. Added to this the influence of that fact in establishing a Religion which to-day sways the intelligence and power of the world, constitutes it a Miracle, the most important in all history. The questions which gather around this cardinal fact are of prime interest in a scientific view of Miracles, and the answer to them involves an *Experimentum Crucis* for their establishment or overthrow. If this falls the entire system of Christianity falls with it. And we are not afraid of the alternative.

The return to life of Jesus Christ after he had been put to death by the Roman soldiery was an interference with the so-called uniformity in the Laws of Nature. Must it therefore be rejected on that account? The interference with these laws for specific purpose does not destroy their normal action. They may be so modified as to suit the interference, and thus the modification become a part of the general system. The order of Nature is, no doubt, that when the soul and body are completely separated they do not reunite again. The general testimony of mankind converges in this view, and for all our purposes the universality of the fact is established. Hence, if in the instance under consideration there was a return to life, this was contrary to what was hitherto known about life and death. But it may be

* I Cor. 15 : 14–20. *εἰ δὲ Χριστὸς οὐκ ἐγήγερται κενὸν ἄρα τὸ κήρυγμα ἡμῶν, κενὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν. κ. τ. λ.*

stated with confidence that this is not impossible. For the coming together of soul and body, the union of the material with the immaterial is occurring constantly whenever a child is born into the world. Here the subtle principle of life wrests its appropriate materials from the diversified environment, disintegrating them from their former compounds and integrating them into a new organ for its use. But here the body is already formed, already habituated to its spiritual guest; and though such violence has been done to the dwelling that it can no longer hold its tenant, yet the structure is, in the main, still intact. Hence the *vis medicatrix naturae* would have far less to do in repairing the house so as to make it habitable again, than the *vis viva, vel creativa* had to effect in constructing the dwelling at first. We hold, therefore, without fear of successful contradiction, that there is, *à priori*, a greater miracle in the birth of every child than in the resurrection of the perfected body from the dead.

Here we may address ourselves to the particular consideration of the Miracle selected as a crucial test. In the common consciousness of the world the cardinal fact of Christianity is a Miracle. For the Laws of Nature and the Laws of Morals were alike affected by it. The latter more, no doubt, than they could have been by any other fact possible in the history of the world. A new condition of existence was introduced in both departments. In the one of physical nature the return to life of the Lord was the introduction of a new order in the sphere of humanity. Hitherto death had been a perpetual end of man's existence. He that suffered dissolution of soul and body by that act lost his personality in the Universe. Death reigned over all with a sway which admitted no interference, and—except as encouraged by the declarations of prophecy which anticipated this event—no hope. It was the order of nature in the physical world, an order admitted to be fixed and irreversible. In the Moral world the case was parallel. Conduct could have reference only to this life because there was no other. Virtue and vice were to be estimated and graded by reference to the time of our life on earth, and, as there was nothing to follow, the whole sum of human existence

is embodied in the epicurean utterance, which is the cry of despair: "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." But this act of Jesus in rising from the grave breaks the fixed order, and as such is as much a Miracle in the moral as in the natural world. And in this former relation it is a fact which cannot be denied because of its positive influence upon the destinies of men. Here is the evidence of its reality just as of any fact in nature because it is the necessary link in a series of causes and effects. Henceforth man is to pass his time in this life simply as a preparatory stage. By a wider knowledge which Jesus Christ brings to light in the Gospel, the Resurrection becomes not an interference with fixed law, but the exposition of its eternal truth; illustrating in this, as in every part of his religion, that he came not to destroy the law but to fulfil.

This Miracle thus becomes an integral part of the system of the world physical and moral. It is to our conception the most important event in history from whatever point of view it be examined. As such it must have been considered in the plan of the Creator and Governor of the world. And while "great" and "small" are used as relative terms by us, and nothing can be small absolutely which engages the notice of the Ruler of the Universe, yet in a proper sense this miracle occupies the highest place. For it introduces a new order in the Moral System, the effect of which must be felt in increasing power and importance as long as the world stands. It enters into the doctrines of sin and holiness, of guilt and pardon, of ruin and recovery; and as such it affects the entire destiny of man for time and eternity. Occupying such a place it must have been a part of the whole scheme which involves man's sojourn upon earth, and which, therefore, gives the chief importance to the world itself. Hence it must have been foreseen and provided for in advance. All that led up to it while in a sense integral with it was preparatory, while all that follows is dependent thereon. And yet it seems miraculous because it is unique and employs extraordinary means for its accomplishment. But though unique, it was not, as we have seen, isolated, and must have been prepared for be-

fore it occurred, as well as have its consequences foreseen. The new order is foreign to our modes of thought and therefore miraculous, because we can measure and understand only that arc of the Divine Government, whether in physics or morals, which is let down into the sphere of our consciousness.

We have the analogy complete between the miracle of Science and that which is performed as the voucher for a system of Religion. The movements of the starry spheres were designed in advance of their formation, and were provided for while each star retained its original form and moved in its single course. The catastrophe came and the order is changed. The new order moves on in ever-increasing complications which were foreseen and provided for equally with the primordial condition. This collapse of a member of the system has happened, and according to the requirements of science, there has been a change in the order of Nature. After the body collapses and the innumerable fragments assume their proper orbits, this is in accordance with the laws of Nature, though the whole occurrence is miraculous. The factors which produced this change had existed forever, and were a part of the Scheme which anticipates and provides for the end as much as the beginning. But these factors are made to act in relations which are new, and so contravene the uniformity exhibited in their previous movements. Just so it is with the Miracle of the Resurrection. The power to create life had been in constant exercise, and, therefore, to renew it when suspended had existed from the beginning. The reunion of soul and body was really not so miraculous as when they first were united and man became a living personality. The plan for both occurrences was perfected in advance and the factors were at work under Divine guidance. Both are called creations; the one preparatory, the other the consummation. The new man effected by Christ's resurrection from the dead completes the work, but was involved in the idea of man's creation as a responsible moral agent.

To the believer in a personal God a Miracle we repeat, presents no difficulty whatever. For if the world be governed by laws, and

these be enacted, and executed by a Supreme Lawgiver, then He who made the law can modify or annul at his own pleasure. Finite lawgivers do this; and our only clew for investigating what God does in matters where He does not make a direct revelation, is by analogy. Earthly lawgivers change their orders to suit new conditions which arise. They are finite and have to deal with finite subjects. God is an Infinite Lawgiver before whom the future as well as the present and past are all open and clearly comprehended. He does not change neither does Morality change. But His creatures are finite whether material or spiritual; and the laws which govern both, if suited to their governments, must change to suit the changed conditions of their development. These changes seem strange, even miraculous to us; while in reality they are only a part of a System which embraces means as well as ends, and contemplates changes as a part of the uniform government. Assuredly to one who believes in an omniscient God the changed order and its effects are as necessary as the uniformity leading up to it, and grows out of it as an inevitable result. But a God who acts freely, who is under no necessity of Fate as were the Grecian deities, can modify the plan to suit circumstances as they arise. While He does not change yet the plan devised to meet the wants of such as are in a transition state, and developing new powers and interests, must change with reference to them, though uniform with reference to Him.

Fatalism is at the bottom of most forms of unbelief, and of the belief in the absolute uniformity of Nature, which is the stock argument of those who oppose a Revelation vouched for by Miracles. And this can rest on no other than a gratuitous assumption, that if there be a Supreme Lawgiver he must act from necessity; or if the rule be by impersonal Law the uniformity thereby effected must be such as we happen to imagine. The former is the view of Spinosa,* who accepts Miracles, making them a part of a general scheme which acts with absolute uniformity. But the paralogism of this profound thinker consists

* Tractat. Theol. Pol., vide supra.

in making the Supreme Being subject to necessity, which is a contradiction in terms. For He could not be Supreme if subject to anything. Nor could His law punish evil and reward good; since where there is necessity of action their can be no responsibility, and consequently no moral distinctions. Our language is of course anthropomorphic, as must be any that describes a Supreme Divinity whose ways are higher than our ways, and His thoughts above our thoughts. This form of speech is assumed throughout in dealing with men, since this is the only way they can be made to understand the actions of a Being whose thoughts and ways transcend our intellectual grasp. The failure to recognize this fact leads to much misapprehension when dealing with Divine interference in the affairs of man. For it is held that the purposes of God vary, and are contingent upon the actions of man; and that He repents of a certain course and abandons it when unexpected conduct on their part calls for a change in dealing with them. Hence arises the mistaken hypothesis which unbelievers assume against miraculous interference, that this is impossible for a Being who has both infinite wisdom and power. Against this view every factor of their intellect and hatred is strained. With a seeming jealousy for the Divine power they assert that He is not man that he should repent, or change the ordinances of Nature to accommodate the caprices of His creatures. In answer to this unwarranted assumption we say there is no change of plan when a Miracle is wrought; there is no interference with the course of Nature, except in condescension to our ignorance which demands sensible vouchers for that which contains in itself sufficient rational evidence. Freedom of choice is not subject to the limitations of necessity; and what seems to us to be a change of plan is really not so, but a procedure that appears new to us because not understood. It is on a par with any new discovery which does not change the essential nature of God's plan of action; but applies His power in a way different from what it had been employed heretofore. In this respect every new discovery or modification of knowledge already possessed, is an interference with the laws of Nature as we had understood

them heretofore. We thought their uniformity could not be any other than as we, with our partial knowledge conceived them; so that a course of action different from our opinion was an interference; while in reality it was the normal movement made plain by a wider generalizatian.

Fallacy of Hume's Argument against Miracles Demonstrated.

If we take the subject of Miracles on the low ground that Hume and other scoffers who have followed his lead treat them, their "uniformity of Nature" means those courses of action assumed in any age, or by any number of men, as unchangeable; against which no amount of testimony in favor of miraculous action is valid. Still the fact is that this "uniformity" is constantly modified by the advancement made, even in those departments of knowledge most strictly scientific. But it is asserted by the enemies of Revelation that the testimony for Miracles is not trustworthy; and, again, that no amount or kind of testimony in their favor could counterbalance the fixed and unalterable laws of Nature. Here we have a Dilemma with horns of portentous dimensions, warranted to toss outside the pale of reason any argument which may be offered. Of course when Hume * settles the question thus summarily in advance, it must needs be so to him and all who follow his method. It is briefly this: "No testimony which has been offered in favor of Miracles as a voucher for a Religious system is of any value as against uniformity of natural law; and: No testimony which could be offered, provided it were in favor, is of sufficient value to prove them true." We defy the whole range of Fallacies which have ever outraged the rational world, to produce as complete specimens of *Petitio Principii* as these. Admit Hume's premises and there is no room, and no use for argument. Whether this reasoning be sophistical, which, from the author's manifest ability seems to be the inevitable conclusion, or a paralogism, as is his celebrated argument against the unity of self-consciousness—"I never observe my own mental

* Essay on Miracles: Vol. II., Ed. Green and Grose.

processes without catching myself as only having a single impression"—each reader must judge for himself. But we verily believe that more sophisms lurk in the assertion of this author: "that no amount or kind of testimony is sufficient to establish the credibility of a Miracle, because it contradicts the uniformity of nature established by testimony" than can be found in so many words by any other writer. First: We have the Sophism that the uniformity of Nature is proved by universal testimony; while, as we have seen, the clearest proofs can be adduced to show that this invariability of Nature's laws, as understood by Hume, has never existed, because it is modified constantly by the addition of new facts, and the better interpretation of old ones. Again: this "uniformity" is proved by testimony, which is quite sufficient to establish anything, provided it points the right way. But when that consensus of testimony is adduced in proof of Miracles, then, since my ox is gored, the law in the case is wholly altered; and our caviler says that no kind and no amount of testimony can invalidate the same testimony which proves uniformity! For such testimony being in proof of religion must necessarily be false since it is the outgrowth of superstition. But our objector still further says that there is not that consensus of opinion in favor of Miracles that there is for Uniformity; that the former is held not merely by such as are ignorant and superstitious, but also this is constantly vacillating. Yet it can easily be shown that the belief in the Divine presence and participation in the affairs of men is universal. This view is confined to no nation. It is limited by no age. It is held alike by savage and civilized; by ignorant and cultured; by the greatest thinkers, the wisest statesmen, the most rigidly scientific, the shrewdest men of affairs. We may mention Plato, Pascal, Shakespeare, Leibnitz, Newton, Bacon, Moses, Solon, Alfred, Napoleon, Gladstone. It is the common property of the race as universal as any belief ever entertained. But, on the other hand, the doctrine of strict uniformity is held neither by the ignorant nor the learned. The savage of all degrees thinks the government of the world, both physical and moral, is wholly capricious, depending on temporary whim of the gods.

The Scientist is compelled to modify his doctrine of uniformity by every subsequent addition to the laws of Nature which shows him that his previous idea was inadequate to account for the facts. And the consummate fruit of modern science, as its devotees think, but which in fact is as old as Heraclitus and Democritus—the Development theory—precludes by change of species the possibility of uniformity. The notion that *πάντα ῥεῖ*, all things are in a constant flux, renders any uniformity impossible. So the contention of Hume and Gibbon and their *pedisequi*, whether English Naturalists or French Encyclopedists, that the constancy of Nature is so well established that no amount or kind of testimony can prove a Miracle, is shown from every point of view to be a sophism. For there is not a single argument by which they maintain any point of their contention, but is found to be untenable on their own hypothesis. They are all equally absurd, and can be turned against each other with overwhelming efficiency.

Two Questions: I. Do Miracles Still Take Place? II. If not, Why have they Ceased?

Two questions may be asked: Do Miracles still occur? and if not, Why have they ceased? These questions will be answered on the common assumption that they are interferences with the fixed laws of Nature. But it should also be noted that our contention is that this uniformity is not absolute, but our conception of it graded according to the degree of knowledge possessed at any given time.

I. Opinions vary among those who accept Miracles as vouchers for Revelation on the questions whether they are still wrought. The belief that they are is held throughout the Catholic and Greek churches, and by not a few among Protestants. The Mahomedan, Vedantic, Buddhistic and Confucian systems, rest entirely upon this proof for their origin; and their adherents believe that the same powers are still at work for the support of their faith. But generally among Protestants of every name the opinion prevails that they have ceased as a means of establishing the faith of the Gospel. So also admitting their continuance, the

views vary as to their character; whether they are public, and wrought in attestation of the Revealed truth; or done in private for the relief of the individual. The cases where cures and signal deliverances from peril have followed in answer to prayer are so numerous and well authenticated that it is useless to try to controvert them. For they have such evidence to the subjects of them that it would be impossible to adduce any proof from general reasoning sufficient to subvert that which is felt to be both intuitive to those affected and demonstrative to others who have been eyewitnesses of the occurrence. If a special Providence be admitted—and if there be a Providence at all it must be special as well as general—we must believe its interference in the concerns of men. For we must not forget that the general is made up of the special and cannot exist without it; just as in Logic or Natural Science Genera and Species involve each other. Accordingly when crises arise which cannot be foreseen nor met by human wisdom, then, if God rules the world and cares for His creatures as a whole, the supervision must begin with the individual. Hence if He cares for His creatures as individuals He may be expected to interfere for their relief. But the Miracle no longer retains the distinctive character as a voucher for a new Revelation. Those who expect and pray for Divine interposition have such faith already that it needs no confirmation. For the faith remains unshaken whether the prayer for help is answered in its terms or not. Men therefore pray for and receive Divine interposition not to show that there is a Superintending Power, and that this has given us a Revelation which we must accept at our peril; but that they may receive that extraordinary help when they are in such need that human knowledge and skill, though employed to the uttermost, are unavailing.

The continuance of Miracles in this sense may be expected as long as men are helpless and have a Divine Father as powerful as He is loving. But this category of Miracles must not be extended to embrace such cases as can be successfully met by human agency. To substitute prayer instead of the application of such means of relief as God has placed in our power, shows a

misconception of our duty as responsible creatures, and is dangerous in the last degree. When parents have reared their children so that they can walk, can work, and according to the ordinances of nature, care for themselves; while the same love which watched over their helpless infancy would come to their extraordinary relief in sickness or sudden misfortune, it would be absurd and show a dastardly idleness to lie inactive and bellow for parental aid. The revelation of God fosters knowledge and increase of self support, as has been shown in the history of the world's education; just as the loving parent teaches the child to walk alone and educates him up to the point of self support. The Church has been the repository of science and the foster mother of every species of intellectual growth. During many ages there was no learning nor culture outside its pale. To say that there have been narrow minded bigots within its fold, who opposed science because their ignorance would thereby be detected, is only to admit that the Church on earth must be made up of imperfect members, must take such materials as human nature furnishes, and improve them as far as they will submit to her direction. But when she has subdued the world by her enlightenment to such degree that those who are instructed by her teaching and made strong by the freedom she allows, turn with matricidal hate against their Mother, they are enabled to do so by the strength and knowledge obtained though her fostering care. This is the personal history of every noted infidel in every age. Such ask for no aid from Divine interposition after they have become strong enough to wield the murderous weapon; and as they do not believe in God, would attribute any supernatural relief, if it came, to accident, to any other than a Divine source. They would not believe in Miracles if they themselves were the subject of their beneficent action, because no proof can be strong enough for the establishment of that which savors of superstition!

Hence for neither of these classes would miraculous interposition be necessary. Therefore the tendency on the part of a few in the Church at this day toward what is termed "Christian Science" arises from a total misconception of duty on their part,

and of the nature of Miraculous action in relation to the Church. We are called to work with all the appliances within our reach. These are the skill and knowledge possessed in civilized lands and ages. Men grow more able to help themselves with the progress of general knowledge, as the individual does when passing from childhood to youth and from youth to maturity. The duty of us all when help is within reach is clearly to avail ourselves of it, and when we have done all to leave the result with God. This is the rational order of life as well as the teaching of unshaken faith. To ask for help before we have exhausted all the aids which human ingenuity can grasp is to deny our responsibility and render ourselves a nonentity. When entirely helpless the case is different, for we seek it then not as a confirmation of our faith, but a confession of our extremity. But when any means of succor is within our reach not to avail ourselves of it, is to dishonor God and render ourselves unworthy of His notice. We should therefore fail of supernatural help when we will not avail ourselves of that which is natural.

But why should Miracles cease in the Church as vouchers for the truth of the Revelation on which she is founded?

When first proclaimed the Gospel had nothing to show as a ground on which to base its claim for acceptance. But after such proof as was irresistible had been given, and the Religion had been established on a sure foundation, that is when it had approved itself by fulfilling all its promises as a system for making the world better and happier, then the necessity for supernatural proof would cease. There had been time for the tree to bear fruit by natural processes, which is the crucial test of excellence. It has done this. The Religion of the Gospel has won its way and secured its place among men as the factor which has the power to purify the heart and renovate the moral forces of the world. It speaks for itself in the lives of those who profess to be guided by its teaching and show the genuineness of their profession by obedience. At first it was known only by the description of its promoters, whose business it might be said was to introduce it. The necessity for this recommendation has passed

because it recommends itself. Its work is known and read of all men, for it is written in the hearts and lives of its adherents: a book open to the inspection of the world.

But the cessation of Miracles would not occur at once. The change wrought upon the character of those who accepted the Gospel would, as a whole, be gradual. Hence there would still be a necessity for some miraculous proof, but in a constantly diminishing degree, and it would not be possible to draw a line and say: Here Miracles ceased as a Divine authentication for the Revelation of God because the stage of religious advancement is such that it no longer needs this kind of proof. But though it may not be possible to fix a limit when they are no longer necessary, yet the analogy with the ordinary affairs of man justify us in saying that such a period must sometime be reached. And the clamor for supernatural proof when the natural is sufficient, is either unreasonable because it does not properly estimate what is necessary, or is a cavil of determined unbelief, an evidence of such hostility as cannot be satisfied with any proof because it has decided adversely in advance. The work of Christianity is its own voucher. The effect which it has already wrought as an earnest of what it will do when men not only believe its doctrines but embody them in their lives, is a proof constant, palpable, overwhelming. It is a proof which none can gainsay except by shutting the eyes and hardening the heart. For such there is no help. No miracle would convince and no argument satisfy those who cannot now see from its fruits that Christianity has come from God. For no one can do the works which it does for human nature except by such power as is above nature. This leaves inexcusable all who reject the Divine origin because it proves demonstratively that it is not through the lack of proof, but the determination in advance that they will not accept it, which makes them reject the claims of the Gospel.

III.

THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM.

BY REV. S. Z. BEAM, D.D.

The Heidelberg Catechism was conceived and born amid the strife and confusion of the sixteenth century: and though it was apparently the offspring of antagonism, it was nevertheless a messenger of peace. It expresses the Christian truth as apprehended in the inner life and conscious experience of the believer with a mild, irenical sweetness quite uncommon in that age of theological controversies and confessional antagonisms.

It rests substantially in the general system of the Calvinistic confessions; but it differs from them in its appeals to the emotional as well as to the intellectual nature. We may say, indeed, that it is more emotional than intellectual; while the contrary opposite is true in most other confessions.

Its Calvinism on the one hand appears more particularly in its Churchliness so beautifully revealed in its theory of sacramental grace. But on the other hand it avoids the icy fetters of extreme predestinarianism, the doctrine of a limited atonement, and the "horrible decree" of reprobation, with which Calvinism is unhappily bound.

It contains all that is good in Arminianism, divested of its grovelling Pelagian tendencies, allowing human freedom its legitimate place in the work of salvation, without ignoring or denying the sovereignty of divine grace upon which men are absolutely dependent. It teaches the inspiring doctrine of a universal redemption in Christ, by emphasizing the scriptural truth of an unlimited atonement. And yet the Catechism assumes throughout, that salvation can ordinarily be communicated to those only who are sacramentally engrafted into Christ, or that a genuine saving faith in Christ can manifest itself only in a proper use of the ordinances of the Church. Resting on this solid

foundation, it escapes the deceptive theory of universal salvation, and eschews the errors of Socinianism, while it maintains the fundamental truth that, in Christ, we have a redemption that is objectively sufficient for the salvation of every individual of the human race.

It is thought by some that there can be no middle ground between Calvinism and Arminianism, that one must be wholly Calvinistic or wholly Arminian. If we confine our thought to certain particular points in the two systems this may be true. But to this view, as a general proposition concerning the systems in their entirety, the Heidelberg Catechism is a standing contradiction. Any one who studies it intelligently, will find a middle ground between these two opposing systems, which is far more tenable and scriptural than either of them as a whole separately considered. "Mittel mass die beste Straas" holds good here in a pre-eminent degree. And yet the Catechism is far more Calvinistic than Arminian, especially in its churchly and sacramental position.

It may be affirmed generally, but not always, that extreme views on any debatable question are false, because they are the results of controversies. The heat and bitterness engendered by theological strifes, where the contending parties usually misunderstand, and therefore, misrepresent each others' views, often carry both to false extremes, which neither would have reached if they could have wrought out their systems without opposition. Or if they had used and understood their words in the same sense, much of the bitterness of discussion, and alienation among brethren might have been avoided; and the conflicts might have ended in a mutual understanding, by which a happy combination of opposite truths would have resulted in a harmonious system, which all parties could have adopted in unity and fraternal love. A lack of such mutual understanding, doubtless, alienated and divided our reformation fathers; and unhappily we have inherited too much of their controversial zeal.

A calm and thorough investigation with the sole purpose of attaining the truth, under divine guidance, would have shown that

the sovereignty of God could not be complete without the complementary freedom of intelligent subjects, but would have degenerated into a blind, unreasoning fate; *therefore, the creation.*

And likewise, human freedom, independent of divine Sovereignty in its relation to intelligent subjects, would prove to be mere lawless license, and as irresponsible as the ever-changing winds. If we study the divine sovereignty alone, we are likely to see in it only the foreknowledge, and its correlative, the fore ordination of God; and from these reach the logical conclusion that everything depends absolutely upon predestination. This one-sided view would make the "eternal decrees" the primal and ultimate source and cause of all that exists whether good or bad.

If on the contrary we study human freedom alone, apart from any moral government of God, it will appear as an independent power; and the development of human life, as it comes to view in the annals of the world, will afford a strong testimony to the absence of any higher power controlling and directing in the affairs of men. History then will become the record merely of a lawless, turbulent, never-ceasing, conflict, in which freedom and slavery, tyranny and rebellion, cruelty and bloodshed, run riot, without let or hindrance, and the gloomy query of the pessimist, "Is life worth living?" would be a very pertinent one.

From such a standpoint, God might indeed be acquitted of the authorship of evil, but He would at the same time be left out of the account altogether, and whatever else He might be, He would be only an invention for the convenience of designing priests, and ambitious rulers, who presume to misrule or tyrannize over their fellowmen, *jure divino*, for their own aggrandizement and pleasure.

Again if we attempt the study of the divine sovereignty in its relation to human freedom we may give undue prominence to one side or the other, according to the peculiar constitution, or predilection of our own mind. And then when we are confronted with a contrary view, we yield to the temptation to carry out our own under the impulse of antagonism, to a false extreme. It is

easy to see, therefore, that metaphysical problems, such as these, can not be satisfactorily solved by logical ratiocination, as is evident from the undeniable fact that the greatest and best men have exercised their intellectual energies in maintaining both sides without settling the questions in dispute. Hence they are still unsolved problems, and will be till they are discussed from the *central standpoint* of true Christian knowledge, so beautifully furnished in the words of St. Paul, "As the truth is in Jesus." If we take our stand in this center, and survey the field of inquiry, as it comes to view in all parts of the periphery, where every question can be considered in its true relations, we are far more likely to obtain just and satisfactory views of God, in His relations both to man and to His entire universe, than if we plant our feet on any other point of observation within the periphery. Hence any system of philosophy or theology, which has not Christ for its center, though it may contain great and fundamental truths, is nevertheless, deceptive and false. Nor does it better the matter much that the philosopher or theologian is a Christian in principle or profession. It is however a happy consideration that one's salvation is not necessarily and absolutely dependent on his theology or philosophy, since faith in Christ is the great subjective means by which we appropriate the salvation of Christ. For it is certain that if we make any Christian doctrine central in our system of theology, and, from that point attempt a general survey of the whole field, or to grasp the mysteries of nature or of grace, our effort will end in failure. In that case we must readjust our creed, or make a new one, or remain in the shadow of a defective faith. Here we think is the difficulty with many confessions of faith. They are not Christocentric. By this we mean that some doctrine, or form of government, or mode of worship, or Christian practice, is made the foundation of a system, and while all believe in Christ, of course, yet He is not the center of their system, nor is He treated as the sole source of their salvation. The incarnation is thought of as a mere means to an end, or as part of a scheme outside of and beyond itself, to which then it becomes a subordinate accessory.

The atonement is sometimes made a moral influence, or serves the purpose of showing the love of God, but is in no way an essential element in the plan of redemption.

It is just here that we see in the Heidelberg Catechism a deeper and more solid foundation, than that which underlies any symbol of faith, of which we have any knowledge. Others may surpass it in a mere literary point of view. In many of them we find logical consistency, acute metaphysical speculation, and beautifully polished diction. But in Christological theology, in genuine Biblical churchliness, and in childlike simplicity of faith, expressive of conscious Christian experience, we think, the Heidelberg Catechism surpasses them all.

With reference to the problem of divine sovereignty and human freedom, we believe, the true solution is approximated in this catechism. The reconciliation is found by recognizing Jesus Christ in His true mediatorial character, as the God-man, in whom the will of God and the will of man consciously meet, and completely harmonize. Jesus personally mediates the will of God to man, and the will of man to God, and joins them in conscious and indissoluble union. As God, He rules, commands, is sovereign—as man He hears, believes, obeys, is subject. And thus divine sovereignty and human freedom actually become identified in the person of the Mediator, the man Christ Jesus, "who is over all, God blessed forever." In Him the antagonism is reconciled. In this character He is head of "the Church which is His body, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all." And as the Church is animated by His Holy Spirit, by whom His followers are incorporated into Him, its members become thereby permeated by a new principle of life—the life of Christ, in which He manifests Himself as the ground and source of divine predestination. For they are chosen in Him before the foundation of the world, and so predestinated to become the Sons of God. Hence, in them, so far as they become assimilated to His perfect character, the antagonisms—products of sin—are removed, and human wills harmonize with the divine will. So "he that willeth to do His will, shall know of the doctrine" of Christ, that

it is of God; and in proportion to his obedience he reconciles his freedom to God's sovereignty. *Obedience to just law is freedom.*

Thus, in the Heidelberg Catechism, the antagonisms which are so conspicuous in other symbols of faith, are, in many instances, eliminated, and apparently opposing truths joined in beautiful harmony. To cite one instance besides that of predestination, the doctrine of the Lord's presence in the Holy Communion may serve our purpose. The Roman Catholic theory grossly turns the elements of bread and wine into material flesh and blood. The Lutheran theory modifies this by bringing the material body of Christ, in all its parts and properties, into material contact with all the parts and properties of the elements of bread and wine; and thus by the "communication of properties," they are after all identified, or at least intermingled, very much as the particles of heat communicate themselves throughout among the atoms of a bar of red hot iron.

The opposite extreme in some Protestant symbols of faith is taught, namely, that there is little else in the sacraments but the material elements; and so they fail to recognize the presence of Christ in any sense in the Holy Supper, different from His ordinary spiritual presence at all times with His people when engaged in divine worship. But the Heidelberg Catechism, consistent with its general principle, recognizes the real spiritual or mystical presence of Christ, not in the bread and wine, separately considered, but in the whole sacramental transaction, which brings His people into closer communion with Him than any other service (see Questions, 75–82). Accordingly it is a real memorial service, in which, however, the Person remembered is present and makes Himself felt by an inpouring of His own life into the soul of the communicant, thereby nourishing the spiritual life in him with the bread that cometh down from heaven. Through this transaction then, the believer is consciously confirmed in his faith, partakes spiritually of the death of Christ, and participates in the power of His resurrection, and is thereby assured of everlasting life in Him. Thus his faith in the word of Christ—"I will raise him up at the last day"—be-

comes an assured confidence, which the Holy Ghost works in his heart, that he is a child of God, and an heir of eternal life. In this way the Heidelberg Catechism combines what is true both in the Catholic and in the extreme Protestant theory of the Lord's Supper, while at the same time it is singularly free from their errors in other directions.

But perhaps the crowning glory of the catechism is found in its peculiarly irenical spirit, imitating the graceful loving character of the Christ, who is the central principle around which all its teachings revolve. Only in a few instances are its pages marred by polemical statements. In the question concerning the "Descent into Hades," the true meaning is entirely ignored in order to rebuke the old superstition of the Roman Church concerning purgatory; and the answer to the eightieth question charges the Popish mass with being an "accursed idolatry." This statement is correct enough, but it seems out of place in a Confession of Faith, which ought only to express what we believe, and not what we deny or condemn.

But aside from these imperfections which prove after all that it is only a human production, the Heidelberg Catechism is singularly free from the defects which appear in other symbolical books, while it embraces all the fundamental truths for which they contend.

We have not quoted from the Catechism, because it is so easily accessible for all, and because we did not desire to extend this article to an undue length. We wished rather to call the special attention of the readers to the Catechism itself, as, in general, a safe guide in the study and interpretation of holy Scripture.

IV.

CLERICAL CIVICS.

BY REV. S. L. KREBS, A.M.

What is the relation of the clergy to civics, of preachers to politics?

I.

Let us begin by defining terms. We shall incidentally get the first answer to our question in this process. We will select two representative definitions. Dr. Crafts calls civics, "the science of good citizenship." Webster says politics is "the science of government; that part of ethics which has to do with the regulation or government of a nation or state, the preservation of its peace, safety and prosperity, the protection of its citizens in their rights, and *the preservation and improvement of their morals.*"

From these definitions it would be easy enough to show that the gospel minister could consistently labor in the field of politics, "good citizenship," "ethics," "preservation and improvement of public morals."

Let us go on at once to see if this conclusion, thus readily reached, is corroborated by

II.

THE BIBLE ON THE QUESTION, which literature constitutes, perhaps, the best corroborative material we can get, and certainly so in the opinion of the readers of the REVIEW.

The first point I desire to call attention to is the fact that in Bible times the prophets and priests, who were the preachers of those inspired days, took such a deep interest in public affairs, state and national, that they *made political speeches*, distinct, direct, definite. Take only one case as an illustration from the

life of Isaiah, the friend and adviser of king Hezekiah. A political party in the kingdom wanted Hezekiah to ally himself with Egypt in order to get help against Assyria. The conduct of Isaiah in this crisis is interesting to watch. Did he keep culpable silence from fear of making a political speech and thus involving himself in the charge of going beyond his prophetical business and getting himself "into politics"? Read Isa. 20th chapter at this point. In short, he did not mince matters, dodge issues, indulge in glittering generalities and ambiguous platitudes, pretend to say something but dexterously avoid saying anything. No, no. He took sides, definitely, positively. He vehemently denounced the Egyptian party, and fought them to a political finish. He was thus laboring in the political field for the "preservation and improvement of public morals."

Other prophets made as careful a study of public affairs, tendencies and currents, and took as direct and personal a part in them, promoting what they deemed the right and opposing what they thought wrong in contemporary political movements of all kinds. Recall Shemaiah's interference with Rehoboam's plans and army; Azariah's encouragement to king Asa's work of civic reform; Hanani's "intermeddling" with Asa's proposed alliance with Syria; Eliezer's opposition to the naval alliance of Jehosaphat with Israel; and Jehu's rebuke of his military alliance with Ahab; Elisha's concern from the beginning to the end of his life with the morality and immorality of state affairs.

The plain fact is that all the prophets who appeared in the course of Israel's history, were, in their own opinion and in that of the people, God-sent ambassadors to kings and citizens. They lived moved and had their ecclesiastical or official being in the realm of civics, politics, *public* ethics, "the preservation and improvement of *public* morals." They all made political speeches and wrote political articles against wicked law-makers, law-expounders and law-executors. They laid emphasis on social purity, public truthfulness, civic honesty, honest government, righteousness, justice, for all the people, the poor as well as the rich. Fearlessly did they expose trickery, bribery and corrupt-

ionism on the part of their rulers and legislators (see Is. 1:21; 3:14–15); for calling wrong right, for deceiving the people and burdening them with exorbitant taxation (Micah 3:1–3); for enacting iniquitous laws (Is. 10:1, 2; Mich. 2:1, 2). The then preachers were not timidly silent in those inspired days nor cowardly connivent over the sins of public officials. It was God's command, "Cry aloud, spare not, lift up thy voice like a trumpet, and shew my people their transgressions and the house of Jacob their sins." On this practical principle the prophets consistently acted.

Let us turn to the New Testament. John the Baptist, a preacher of righteousness, had a great deal to say about economic and political affairs, wages, court customs, king's affairs, doings of rulers, dishonesty and corruption. He lost his head for his pains. Do we think he had no business to meddle with political affairs? Was he wrong? Wrong or not, all the world honors him. Jesus did. Jesus never criticized John for so boldly interfering for "the preservation and improvement of public morals."

Jesus Himself made three distinct political speeches or utterances, *i. e.*, He expressed publicly His political opinions. "Go tell that fox," has almost if not quite the ring of a modern political satire on a corrupt public official. Herod richly deserved the simile. "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," *i. e.*, to government what belongs to it, and this means we have a Political Duty. Thirdly, Jesus attacked rulers and law-makers for the sins committed by them as such (Mat. 23:14, 23; Lk. 11:46). What did Christ come for? He Himself answers the question: "For judgment am I come into this world." "Cry aloud, spare not." He too lost His life.

How do you like St. Paul's politics? He had two political principles. 1. "Thou shalt not speak evil of a ruler of thy people." (Based on Exodus.) Does this mean that we are to be silent and submissive when public officers are wicked, unjust and corrupt, selfish or remiss? If so, then Paul himself disobeyed it. He called Ananias, whom he knew was a ruler of some kind, a "whited sepulchre." A pretty strong epithet, by

the way! Jesus Himself did not obey it. He called scribes, Pharisees, lawyers, Herod the king, pretty hard names. There are thousands and millions of good Christians who do not obey it either, if that is what it means. We take it to enjoin, simply, abstinence from evil-speaking from malice, jealousy or partisanship. St. Paul's principle does not contradict the prophetical rule, "Cry aloud, spare not." We are to call a spade a spade, even if the spade be the governor, district attorney or some powerful political boss. Evil must not be allowed to go on unchecked by the indifference, silence and laziness of good people, of spiritually minded people, of the religious leaders of the people. 2. St. Paul's second principle is, "Be subject unto the higher powers, for the powers that be are ordained of God. Pay tribute also, for they are God's ministers." Does this mean total, abject submission to rulers and legislators, kings and potentates, even if evil, currupt, despotic, unjust? Then I cannot believe it, nor can I obey it, nor will I. Then Jesus was wrong, for He resisted. Then our heroic fore-fathers were wrong, for they resisted. We do not believe in the doctrine of non-resistance or *laizzes faire.* No. Evil rulers deserve punishment and overthrow. "Render unto Cæsar" whatever is his due. Good rulers deserve support and commendation. Render unto them their due, too. And we believe it is the modern preacher's duty to help forward both the condemnation of the one and the commendation of the other.

But not only did the prophets, preachers and saints of old make political speeches and write political articles, orations, symbols and threats, all in the name of Jehovah, but they also *held political positions, held office.* Moses was as much lawyer as prophet, as much legislator as leader or pastor, he was a preacher in the law-making business, and he did not make a failure of it either, and withal retained his modesty and his meekness.

Samuel, a preacher, held a position in the war office! Took part in war itself. Why not then in government too? Well, he was in government. (I Sam. 7:15–17.) Afterwards he was prime minister, counsellor and public advisor to the king, always interested in honest government and righteousness for the people.

If it is not undignified and incongruous for a preacher or prophet to organize armies and fight in war as a patriot for the maintenance of good government, as Samuel did at Mizpah, it certainly ought not be considered undignified and incongruous for a preacher to organize a peace army and fight as a patriot for good government in times of peace, as Samuel also did in Palestine.

If a preacher has no business to enter politics, then he has no business to enter war and armies. But he does enter war and armies. The Bible and all history are full of instances where preachers and prophets took a hand personally in war, either as soldiers or officers. Why, even God Himself does, according to Scripture representation. He gets His name from that fact, the Lord God of Hosts. God is also represented as Personally concerned in good government and justice among the children of earth. He opposes wickedness and promotes righteousness. We are safe, I should think, as God's chosen servants in following His example. "The servant is not above his master" "It is enough if he be *as his master.*"

Gad, the prophet and preacher, was David's chief advisor, his prime minister in civil councils, at hand with his plans for the national prosperity, interested in civic progress, in a word a a preacher in politics, active in the science of government.

To Nathan, Solomon owed his accession to the throne. Nathan, a preacher, formed the plan, hatched the political scheme, for scheme it was par excellence and God blessed it too. He was as shrewd as a serpent yet harmless as a dove. In I Kgs. 1:8 we see assembled the cabinet of advisors, with a preacher among them. In 1:5–14 we see the political scheme, concocted by a preacher! In 1:22, the plan or plot carried out, a preacher one of the actors! and in 1:32, the cabinet meeting again, with a preacher in the midst.

Daniel was both office-holder and preacher, a preacher in politics, and a man of prayer. (Dan. 6:1–4.)

Notice *the results* of this union of official functions. These preachers, Samuel, Nathan, Gad and Daniel, because they were

connected with the government, could see, expose and check the evils going on behind the scenes, as well as promote the good. And it was they who wrote the history of it all for subsequent ages (I Chron. 29:29; II Chron. 9:29). Because these preachers were in politics they became historians. They wrote up the good and evil deeds of the rulers. THEY WROTE OUR BIBLE, or at least a great part of it. Without preachers in politics we should never have had the Bible as it is.

To sum up regarding the nature, position and function of Scripture prophets I will quote from an article published in the "Biblical World" two years ago by Dr. Stibitz, of York, Pa., and which I at first thought was too strong, but have since come to see states the truth clearly and correctly as I apprehend it. "They did not recognize the modern divorce between religion, and especially the ministerial office on the one hand, and national or social duties on the other. The ideal of the prophets is not a church or congregation of worshipping believers, but a community, society or state, of men and women living in love and truth together, exercising justice and judgment toward the poor and helpless, the rich and mighty, the weak and strong, to one and all. The view, apparently so prevalent to-day which makes religion to consist chiefly, if not exclusively, of a pious state of mind, a condition of personal salvation for self is not found in the prophets."

They thought of society as a whole, of the body politic, of the State, and they labored and prayed, studied and toiled, sacrificed their very lives, in personally and practically fighting for good government and public virtue in the public or political arena.

III.

If then to-day in our churches we sing

> "Let our rulers ever be
> Men that love and honor Thee;
> Let the powers by Thee ordained
> Be in righteousness maintained";

if we can consistently *sing* and *pray* that in our churches, can we not also consistently *work* for that with the voters we meet

casually on our streets, in our stores, and labor for it at the nominating conventions, at the primaries and at the polls?

It seems to me, dear brethren, it will not do for us to shirk this responsibity and remain at ease in our studies and in the bosom of our congregations, by saying that the kingdoms of Israel and of Judah were *theocracies* and, therefore, the prophets were in duty bound and expected to take a direct hand in public affairs from which we are excused. It will not do for us to hide behind that theocratic argument. For, *mutatis mutandis*, we have as much of a theocracy here, in the United States, and now, as they had in Syria long ago in Bible times. The fact is, if there is any difference, which there is, we have more of a theocracy than they had, much more so, if the sweeping claims we make be sound. Do we not teach that since Pentecost the Spirit has been given to us in full measure? That He is to guide us, inspire us, move us INTO ALL TRUTH? That, therefore, we see truth more clearly than those early prophets did before Christ. We claim we are in a specially full and direct sense God-guided, God-lead, God-governed. Christ is our LIVING, ever-living Head, and as Head guides and governs us. There is a theocracy. Yea we teach, this dispensation is the genuine REALITY of which that was but the type and symbol. We should either cease to make this claim or else act upon it. If the claim be true, if the doctrine be sound, then the prophets of the modern theocracy, of the kingdom of God which is to leaven all society and its institutions, should lead in civic virtue, personally, directly, effectively, even if persecuted and misunderstood at first for it. What a mighty power the ministry could be for God, country and humanity!

Objection may be urged against this ideal application of the term "theocracy," a word coined by Josephus to designate the peculiar state organization of the Jews which, it was thought, had not developed the distinction between religious and civil functions but where both were merged in one court. It is legitimate to ask, however, whether such unification and centralization of functions was after all actual and complete, and whether distinc-

tion was really absent; in other words whether the time-honored term of Josephus is strictly and historically applicable especially to the prophetic period of the Hebrew people? We humbly venture to reply in the negative to all of these questions. Facts, appearing all along the line of development, sustain this assertion. The harlots, for example, quarreling about possession of a child, were tried not before a religious but a civil court; marriages were witnessed to and solemnized not by a religious but by a civil assembly; property was transferred by a body having a civil and not a religious complexion, and when, particularly, in the time of Samuel the people demanded a king, what was that but a popular demand for the distinct separation of the civil and the political from the religious functions of society, and from the very first the king assumed judicial power, extending even to the deposition of the high priest (I Kings, 2:27), but he was debarred from exercising religious functions. In this connection let us be particular to remember that it was only after the separation of the civil from the religious that the prophets appeared and insisted, as we have seen, so strongly, fearlessly and directly on political purity, civil righteousness and general justice, to high and low, rich and poor.

The distinction therefore existed. It was a felt fact in the land, and the ancient prophets had to face it, as the modern ones must too who, we repeat, cannot or ought not hide behind the "theocratic" argument as an excuse or palliation for dereliction of prophetical duties, heroism and self-sacrifice. The way of the reformer always was hard and always will be. Theocracy or no theocracy he will be opposed, misjudged, persecuted. But surely if we claim that the spiritual should lead and guide in all duties and relations of life, and that we possess the spiritual more fully now in the Gospel Dispensation, then it logically follows that those who are presumed to be in specially close touch with spiritual forces and laws and, indeed, represent this realm to the people as God's ambassadors, viz, the clergy, should also lead and guide in all duties and relations of life.

I am therefore heartily and conscientiously in favor of

preachers in politics. But when I say this, I do not say nor do I mean *politics in pulpits.* We do not need the pulpit for this civic prophetical work. We have the press and the platform. There was a time when it was necessary for politics to enter the pulpits, namely the time before the press and platform were known. The pulpit was then the only channel for reaching the people. Peter the Hermit was a great political preacher. It has been questioned whether John Knox ever preached a sermon that was not a political denunciation. In Scotland at the opening of the fourteenth century political sermons practically kindled the national flame of independence. Zwingli began his work of reform in the political sphere. Fisher says, "It was Wycliffe's relation to the politics of his day that enabled him to attack the mediæval and papal church in almost every feature which distinguished it from Protestantism" (p. 274, "Church History"). This "relation to politics" to which Dr. Fisher alludes but which he does not further specify was the fact that in 1366 Wycliffe came out in defence of the English Crown against the demands of the papal court, then at Avignon. In plain words, he took a direct hand in a hot political fight. But political pulpiteering is not necessary to-day. With Andrew Lang I think preachers and people alike need "one undisturbed hour in the course of the week, one place sacred to things mysterious and eternal, one isle of dreams unvexed by secular clamor and echoes of the brawling market place." Still, however, there are many to be found who think that politics is not out of place in the pulpit. A recent writer in a western paper reflects this sentiment when he says, "The fact is, the churches by their attitude on this question, namely, that politics must be kept out of the pulpit, make the present deplorable system of politics possible." There was an exciting discussion at Ocean Grove last year regarding the attitude which should be taken by the Methodist church on the consideration of political issues. "The Methodist Church ought to speak on political lines as the Roman Catholic Church does" declared Rev. J. H. Hawxhurst. This precipitated a strong discussion. A number of those present upheld the

speaker, claiming the agitation of political subjects in the pulpit was one of the needs of the church in order to keep abreast with the progress manifested in all other departments. It seems to me fair to say on this question that any problem that has a *moral* side or bearing to it can consistently be treated by the pulpit, nay, *should* be treated by it. The pulpit should be the moral metronome of society. That is its high and holy power.

There are great differences of opinion, however, on this point. But the proposition that preachers should be in politics because, say what you will, "politics" is in preachers, is quite a different proposition. Preachers as independent citizens should not lose their citizenship nor their manhood, with all its freedom, privileges and prerogatives here in America. As leading and intelligent citizens they should make themselves felt.

"Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's." Many ministers obey the latter clause but not the first. Both are commanded by the Son of God. Half duty is not whole duty. Duty to government is not simply paying tax. Some seem to think so. It is not simply enlisting in an army. Some think so. But it is also going to the trouble of studying situations, tendencies, and working, laboring, toiling for good government in times of peace.

Civic duty by the better classes, by good and true men, is the crying need of the age. It will be met. *We are wakening up.* Dr. Crafts, Strong, Brooks, Parkhurst, and others are evidence in point.

The pulpit, too, we hold can do something in addition to press and platform. The Right Rev. Frederick D. Huntington, bishop of the diocese of Central New York of the Episcopal Church, speaks wisely and well, we think, when he said recently, "Would the Church pulpit be seriously damaged or weakened in the spiritual purpose for which it was built, if abstractions, metaphysics, ritual niceties, the fine arts, literary news, ethical generalities and well-worn exhortations were to some extent exchanged for judicious and plain instructions in Christian Citizenship, and for a good tempered application of the words of our Lord to so-

ciety and to the wrongs and cruelties which sorely obstruct the advent of the Son of Man and His Kingdom?"

Be that as it may, I think there will scarcely be one dissenting voice to the statement that preachers have a duty *outside* of their pulpits in the wide field of politics, and that they are not now, as a class, discharging that duty. Rev. Hughes O. Gibbons, of Philadelphia, says, "I claim that the ministers of the Church, the teachers of religion, are face to face to-day with a call for duty that affects every great moral interest of society. The great practical question of to-day is this, Will the Christian men of this nation respond to the call which appeals to them for the salvation of our cherished institutions, which have been purchased at so great a price, and upon the perpetuity of which depends the life and glory of this great nation? The political corruption of the day is destroying our homes, is debasing the conscience of the multitudes of our young men, is a barrier to the efficiency of our great popular educational system, is entailing untold physical suffering upon our great cities, is hindering the missionary work of our churches, is destroying the spirit of healthy ambition on the part of multitudes who are simply losing all consciousness of the meaning of integrity and honor in the discharge of civic duties."

"It is doubtless true that Christians seek a better country, even a heavenly. But it is now the supreme duty of every man to make the kingdoms of this world become the kingdoms of our God and of His Christ. The time has come when every Christian should assume the duties and bear the burdens and responsibilities of true citizenship. This world belongs to Christ. He made it, upholds it, owns it, and will judge it. His purpose in this world is not merely the regeneration of the individual. He also desires the regeneration of the State. The State is as truly divine as the Church. Nay, the State is the designed outcome of the perfected Church. *A man may be as much a missionary of God in the politics of America as in the forests of Africa.*"*

* The Methodist Bishops on "Christian Citizenship," 1898.

"The ship of State," writes Dr. Crafts, "with Christian men on deck, will come safely through, God's hand on the helm and His breath in the sails." "The better citizens," he continues, "often stay home on election day, a thing they would have no need to do if they had not stayed at home on the night of the primary. Very likely the primary came on a prayer-meeting night, because prayer-meeting Christians were not influential enough in politics to be considered by the party managers, and because they were neither wanted nor expected. BUT THEY WERE NEEDED, and it would have been better if they had left the praying to the women, and had gone to the primaries, as one church did, pastor and all. We shall never get better officers until we nominate better candidates, and such will not be nominated unless good citizens attend the primaries which even now they could usually control, if they would."

Horace Fletcher, in "Menticulture," sizes up the situation pretty swiftly when he says, "Society and Politics at the present time are badly diseased. Mr. Max Nordau's diagnosis of them which he entitled 'Degeneration,' has met with general approval. Legislative and especially municipal corruption are open evidence of the fact. Statesmanship and politics have been divorced. The marriage of Might and Right has been sanctioned by popular consent. Power is no longer used as a lever with which to uplift the weak, but has been transformed into a social crushing machine. Caste, ostentation, dissipation and insincerity are the established idols that lure the present generation towards greedy ambition."

Now, I ask, does it not seem legitimate to expect that the 200,000 preachers in this country should act as the salt to stop this spreading corruption? But how, alas! if the salt itself have lost its savor and its strength, or, still possessing it, refuses to lay itself along side of or touch the decaying matter?

President Arthur Twining Hadley, of Yale, was the orator of the occasion at the January convocation of the University of Chicago. His address was on the timely subject, "Our Standards of Political Morality." "The crying, supreme need of the

hour in America to-day," he said, "is a high moral public spirit. The indifference of citizens to the issues of their own interest and their country's is the striking evil of the present." Among these "citizens" far up in the scale of intelligence, are the 200,000 clergy.

As already remarked, preachers are, however, beginning to take a virile and a vital part in civic duty. In addition to those already mentioned, let us name some others. Rev. Thos. R. Slicer has figured in the political arena of New York. New York always seems to have some minister in her political contests. In 1884 it was the Rev. Dr. Buchard, in 1894 Dr. Parkhurst, both successful in their efforts. Beecher was prominent in many a political campaign. Dr. Slicer had headed two or three political reform movements in Buffalo. Dr. Edward McGlynn, whose death has been the occasion of considerable comment on the part of the press of the land, made himself conspicuous because of his interest in politics some years ago and because of his defiance of the Roman machine that excommunicated him because of his alleged socialistic theories. But by his interest in politics he did much toward bringing the Roman Catholic Church a little more in accord with American ideas. Two anecdotes of Mr. Moody come in here with force. One day he asked a Christian gentleman, living in a town to which he had just come for special services, "What is the prospect about the election next month?" "Oh!" said his friend, "I don't have anything to do with politics; my citizenship is in heaven." Mr. Moody swiftly and sharply replied, "Better get it down to earth for the next sixty days." Mr. Moody practiced what he preached and as he prayed. There was danger at one time that local option would be repealed at Northfield. He hurried home several weeks before the election, and drove about early and late, getting votes by personal interviews, not only in the village, but throughout the surrounding country. "On election day he was a veritable Jehu, driving his two horses to their utmost speed and endurance, bringing in voters from the farms." Dr. Horace Bushnell, one of the great spiritual forces of this century, though

profoundly interested in technical theological problems in which his scholarly mind reveled, was yet a public spirited and dutiful citizen. "He threw himself with as much energy into the effort to secure a park for Hartford and a beautiful situation for its Court House, as for the preparation of one of his celebrated books. He impressed the stamp of his character upon the city in which he lived. He felt that no man had caught the true spirit of Christ who could not put his hand to any plow that was to turn up fresh, pure soil for a better harvest in the future."*

Several years ago in a little work on an economic subject I quoted with favor the burning words of Dr. Parkhurst and Phillips Brooks. I quote them again now with more fervor and favor than ever before. Dr. Parkhurst said: "Men are not only under obligations to *stand up* and declare what ought to be done, and what the collective character of the community ought to be but they are bound to *stand forth* in the midst of the community as men of God, to become the *channels* that shall make the attainment of our civic destiny a realized fact."

Dr. Brooks: "I plead with you for all that makes strong citizens. First, clear convictions, deep, careful, patient study of the goverment under which we live. And then a clear conscience, as much ashamed of public as of private sin, as ready to hate and rebuke and *vote down* corruption in the state, in your own party, as you would be *in your own church;* as ready to bring the one as the other to the judgment of a living God. And then unselfishness; an earnest and exalted sense that *you are for the land*, and not alone the land for you; something of the self-sacrifice which they showed who died for us from '61 to '65. And then activity; the readiness to wake and watch and do a *citizen's* work untiringly, counting it as base not to vote at an election, *not to work against a bad official*, or to *work for* a *good* one, as it would have been to shirk a battle in the war. Such strong citizenship let there be among *us;* such knightly doing of *our* duties on the field of peace."

* From Dr. C. Clever's article in the January issue of this REVIEW.

May the heartfelt prayer of the now sainted Dr. Henry Harbaugh, preacher—patriot, be fully realized in our beloved land and state:

"Let our rulers ever be
Men that love and honor Thee;
Let the powers by Thee ordained
Be in righteousness maintained;
In the people's hearts increase
Love of piety and peace;
Thus united we shall stand,
One wide, free and happy land."

V.

STANDARDS OF VALUE.

BY REV. J. B. RUST, PH.D.

To weigh and to measure is one of the great arts of civilized man. It enters only in limited and childlike form into the thought and life of the savage. He asks mainly for food and shelter of the simplest sort, and for his support requires a piece of territory five miles square. But the recognition and calculation of quantity, extent, degree, quality and character—values of all kinds—form an integral and constant element in civilization. As soon as the intellect awakens, the resources of nature are opened, wants multiply, the sense of man's worth among living creatures is aroused, desires, hopes, ambitions, and aspirations of a better order are engendered, then arise the consideration and determination of the inherent and relative, intrinsic and extrinsic importance of men and things. Then, too, there is presented the problem how the individual and the race may obey the command: Have dominion! In all this man imitates his Maker, for the deeper the student of nature delves into the secrets of the universe, into organic and inorganic world, with scalpel, microscope, test and experiment, the farther he reaches out with telescope and spectroscope, with micrometer and heliometer, into the immensities, and along the magnificent distances of interstellar space, the profounder becomes his realization of the marvelous nicety and precision, adjustment and balance, of substance and relation throughout the realm of created objects, all the way from crystal and element and living thing, to orbit and planet and glorious sun. This is true beyond cavil, irrespective of any theory of natural selection, with its "everywhere fiercely raging struggle for life," or the fact, as urged by Romanes, before he became a Christian again, that "amid all the millions of mechanisms and instincts in the animal kingdom, there is not one instance of mechanism or in-

stinct occurring in one species for the exclusive benefit of another species." It is true beyond question, whether or not the theory of "beneficent design" can be maintained from the standpoint of Natural Religion.* Not only so, with this revelation of the constantly widening perspective of universal law, the mystery of being and matter, of motion and force, of life and personality, deepens, forever deepens under the gaze of the searcher, and there creeps into mind and heart the adoring sense of the presence in all that He has made and upholds, of the Supreme Intelligence, the Master Builder, the Ancient of Days.

Apart from the inscrutable and insolvable problem—the *terra incognita*—of physical and metaphysical evil, one fact remains, that, as an agent of injustice and wrong in relation to truth and conduct, man himself is somehow involved in age-long transgression. Though he imitates God in the act of weighing and measuring, he does not always imitate Him in honesty and holiness of motive and aim. Nor does he, like God, in the scale of being, life and experience, subordinate value to worth, quantity to quality, policy to conviction, expediency to duty, pleasure to sacrifice. He too often seeks his own advantage by the use of a weight that is light, and a yard that is short. If sin and guilt are delusions; if men merely make mistakes; if the distinction between good and evil is only provisional, and the necessary accompaniment of finite existence, and all that is, is right, as Pope teaches in his Essay on Man, then anyone who holds that the race, however carefully things may be weighed and measured, is prone to depart from the rule of right and the God-given Ideal of Moral perfection, when present, or, when absent, follows false standards in thought and action, must plead guilty to the charge of indulging in a foolish, flagrant, and self-deceiving pessimism. But surely those spirits are wise, who see and bewail man's selfishness, and warn him against his fateful wanderings in the dark and devious ways of moral and spiritual estrangement, as the victim of superstition, unbelief, and hatred, and the chief disturber of the peace of the world. They walk in the footsteps of the

* Romanes, Thoughts on Religion, p. 88.

Hebrew prophets. They cry with John, the Baptizer: "Repent ye; for the kingdom of heaven is at hand."* They say with Jesus: "Except a man be born anew he cannot see the kingdom of God."† They confess with St. Paul: "Though I speak with the tongues of men and angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal."‡ They publish the precept of Jesus: "Judge not, and *ye* shall not be judged: condemn not, and *ye* shall not be condemned: forgive, and *ye* shall be forgiven: give, and it shall be given *unto you*; good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over, shall men give into your bosom. For with the same measure that *ye* mete withal, it shall be measured *to you again*."§ They repeat the message of St. John, the Revelator, the Seer of Patmos, whose ear had heard the pulsations of the Master's heart: "Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love one another. No man hath seen God at any time. If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and his love is perfected in us. Hereby know we that we dwell in him, and he in us, because he hath given us of his spirit."‖

Coin Value.

One of the ruling standards current among men, is coin-value. The use of money as a medium of exchange is coeval with organized society. The precious metals served as representatives of commercial value already in the patriarchal age. But they were not yet coined at the height of the Persian power, if the account which Herodotus gives of the reign of Darius, may be received as authentic.¶ In the third book of his history, called

* Matt. 3:2.

† St. John 3:3.

‡ I Cor. 13:1.

§ Luke 6:37, 38.

‖ I John 4:11, 12, 13.

¶ "Mr. Grote assumes that Darius did coin gold and silver for the first time in Persian history, but it is not implied in Herodotus, IV., 166. The coinage of Darius consisted, it is probable, both of a gold and silver issue. In any case it is indisputable that he was the first Persian king who coined on a large scale, and it is further certain that his gold coinage was regarded in later times

Thalia, he describes at length the financial policy of that great monarch. When Darius came to the throne he divided Persia into twenty provinces, appointed governors, subdivided the provinces into districts, some of which consisted of "many nations," and levied tribute. The leading product, or resource, of the respective provinces, grain, cattle, white horses, eunuchs, silver or golden ingots, as with India, determined the character of the tribute. Herodotus says: "They whose payment was to be made in silver, were to take the Babylonian talent for their standard. The Euboic talent was to regulate those who made their payment in gold. The Babylonian talent, it is to be observed, is equal to seventy Euboic minae. During the reign of Cambyses, there were no specific tributes, but presents were made to the sovereign. On account of these, and similar innovations, the Persians call Darius a merchant, Cambyses a despot, but Cyrus a parent."† Then he continues: "If the Babylonian money be reduced to the standard of the Euboic talent, the aggregate sum will be found to be nine thousand eight hundred and eighty talents in silver, and estimating the gold at thirteen times the value of silver,‡ there will be found, according to the Euboic talent, four thousand six hundred and eighty of these talents.§ Thus the annual trib-

as of peculiar value on account of its purity. It does not appear that any other kinds of coins besides these (the gold darics, named after Darius) were ever issued from the Persian mint. They must, therefore, it would seem, have satisfied the commercial needs of the people." Rawlinson, Seven Great Monarchies, Vol. II., p. 473.

"Sparta, with her simple form of government, was unfitted for the adoption of a regular system of finance; while in Athens the expenditure and revenue were so considerable, that attention to matters of finance soon became imperatively necessary. But it was not until the Persian war, that all the ramifications of her financial institutions were finally developed, and after the time of Alexander, they necessarily lost their peculiar character with the loss of national independence." Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, Vol. I., p. 10.

† Herodotus, History, Thalia, chapter 29.

‡ Fifth Century, B.C.

§ "The ancient Attic talent before the change of Solon was to the Euboic as 100 to 75, and Solon, in his diminution of the weight for silver, intended to introduce the Euboic standard without, however, entirely accomplishing his object." Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, Vol. I., p. 197.

ute paid to Darius, principally by Asia, and in part by Africa, was fourteen thousand five hundred and sixty talents. In process of time the islands also were taxed, as was that part of Europe which extends to Thessaly. The manner in which the king deposited these riches in his treasury was this: The gold and silver were melted and poured into earthen vessels. When full, the vessel was removed, leaving the metal in a mass. When any was wanted, such a piece was broken off as the contingency required."

Perhaps history is repeating itself in this younger day, on a far grander scale than ever entered into the dream of the gifted, but cruel Darius. If so, though we tremble as we stand at the threshold of these vistas, we hope and pray that to have become a world-power, may never anywhere mean to the people of the United States, or to those under their protection, the denial of the principles of civil and religious liberty.

It is impossible to carry on the business transactions of organized society without a representative of value and a medium of exchange. Money is necessary to purchase bread, and clothing and shelter. It is also necessary for the spread of the gospel, and for the evangelization of mankind. Civilization would languish without it. But at the same time an evil genius attends it, the proud spirit of mortal man. How often rich and poor alike do homage to the jingling coin! They make it the mark of greatness, the symbol of power, the pledge of influence, the talisman of ambition, more to be esteemed than learning and wisdom, honesty and honor, truth and righteousness. How many a man, with an itching palm, who lays this standard to the measurement of life, might see himself reflected in the story of Croesus, who dismissed Solon in anger because the sage refused to grant him the flattering distinction of being the happiest, as he was the richest man in the then known world. Thus it has ever been the habit of countless thousands, since the precious metals began to be employed in commerce and trade, to make money the measure of all things; to be sought after, to be preferred to, to be honored above, everything else. This master trait, almost universal among men, Franklin well depicts in the homely say-

ing: "Now I've a sheep and a cow, everybody bids me good morrow."*

When a great people move forward with gigantic stride in the march of material prosperity, money itself, though merely the exponent, and sometimes poor and inadequate at that, of the products of brawn and brain, is divorced from its purpose, in the view of the unthinking, and becomes identified with the causes of enlarged activity in every sphere of human endeavor. Thus, some years ago Senator Stewart, in a speech delivered before the Senate of the United States, committed the novel blunder of ascribing the darkness of the Middle Ages to the lack of money. In like manner, he accounted for the revival of learning and the great European awakening in the sixteenth century, by the discovery of new deposits of the precious metals in the Western hemisphere, which the Aztec chiefs and the Montezumas gave the Spaniards by compulsion, and which were transported in large quantities to the mother country, and to Europe. It seems strange that so evident a perversion of history should pass unchallenged in such a presence! Zwingli, for conscience' sake, refused a Cardinal's cap, and spurned the bribe of high official rank and abundant revenue. Luther was infinitely more concerned about getting the Bible translated, circulated, read and expounded, than about all the money in the world. Guizot says of Calvin: "Wherever he lived, and as long as he lived, at Basle, Strasburg and Geneva, he had scarcely the bare necessaries for the most simple and humble existence. He received a stipend sometimes from the small and parsimonious governments of the places in which he resided, and at others from private friends who were intimate with him and knew his needs. He arranged all domestic matters with the most scrupulous exactness. He wanted no more than would suffice regularly to supply the needs of every day, and would leave him free from anxiety on the subject. All his thoughts were entirely engrossed by his Christian work in the world, and by his intellectual life."†

* *Poor Richard's Almanack*, p. 81.

† Guizot, John Calvin, p. 72.

This is the record of history, and these are some of the master spirits, who, with their coadjutors, for the love of God, without money and without price, led great hosts in Germany, Switzerland, France, England, Scotland, Sweden, and the Netherlands, into higher light, and as far as this life goes, laid the foundation for the civil and religious freedom, which, under God, will be made the triumphant heritage of the world. What became of all the gold and treasure which poured into the coffers of Philip II. when Spain was the greatest power on the globe? What did it do for her, and for the rest of mankind? Did it enlighten and liberalize anyone? Did it bring the comfort of a purer gospel to anyone? Did it lift any race out of savagery and barbarism? Part of it, no doubt, was applied to build the Escorial, with its eleven thousand windows, on a cinder-heap, ten miles from Madrid, and on a barren plain, in honor of San Lorenzo and his sacred gridiron. Ah, there is your Belshazzar again!—this time, instead of a Belshazzar devoted to gluttony, wantonness, and tyranny, a gloomy monkish Belshazzar, worshipping at the shrine of fanaticism, bigotry, and cruelty, in the name of Christianity. Hence, to the fruit of this tree, the Voice said: "Weighed in the balance and found wanting!" So there, the pitiable victim of superstition and bad government, Iberia lies prostrate among the tattered remnants of her wasted opportunities, and the memories of her ancient glory.

The experience of the nations, in wisdom and folly, makes the lessons which history, in the light of a brighter day, presents to the generations of our time. If a man, like Robinson Crusoe, should be cast upon an unknown island, lost and alone, and should there discover a fabulous sum of gold in a cave, he could neither eat nor drink it. He would be unable to bend it to any purpose, either in commerce or in the arts. It would be of less use to him than the soil beneath his feet. Thus, since money derives its power and value from the complex conditions, as well as consent and custom, existing in organized society, its mission is to serve, and not to rule, to be a means and not an end, to be a possession and not an owner, and, as it makes its rounds in exchange, to bless, and not to curse.

Thomas Hook spoke truth when he said:

"Gold, gold, gold, gold!
Bright and yellow, hard and cold.
Molten, graven, hammer'd, roll'd:
Heavy to get, and light to hold:
Hoarded, barter'd, bought and sold.
Stolen, borrowed, squander'd, doled:
Spurned by the young, but hugg'd by the old,
To the very verge of the churchyard mould:
Price of many a crime untold:
Gold! Gold! Gold! Gold!
Good or bad a thousand fold!
How widely its agencies vary—
To save—to ruin—to curse—to bless—
As even its minted coins express,
Now stamp'd with the image of a Good Queen Bess,
And now of a Bloody Mary."

Power.

We name sovereignty as another standard common among men. It is impossible to have a well ordered society without government. To prevent anarchy and to protect the arts of peace, there must be a seat of authority which shall define and enforce the civil power. This authority may be vested as an hereditary prerogative in a single, central will, in an oligarchy, or in an aristocracy, or it may be held by the many as an inalienable right, to be delegated as a trust to chosen representatives. However, the corrupt heart of man does not only instigate endless robbery, devastation, and terror in the absence of government, but often defeats the wholesome purposes of organized society by self-seeking and chicanery both among those who rule, and those who obey. Official station, from door-keeper to king, from sheriff to President, has its temptations and pitfalls, its enemies and snares, under the most pronounced paternalism, as well as in the most liberal democracy. Like priest, like people! Like people, like priest! Solomon already said: "As a roaring lion, and as a ranging bear, so is a wicked ruler over the poor people. The prince that wanteth understanding, is also a great oppressor: but he that hateth covetousness shall prolong his

days."* "When the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice: but when the wicked rule, the people mourn."† Destroy the civil power, and men become beasts of prey, like the bandit hordes which roamed about over the wasted provinces and ruined cities of Germany at the close of the thirty years war. Establish government, and you arouse the lust for office, and the love of sway, which seek and hug a petty throne as if it were the pivot of the universe.

> "Ye gods, it doth amaze me,
> A man of such a feeble temper should
> So get the start of the majestic world,
> And bear the palm alone."‡
>
> ". . . O, but man! proud man!
> Dress'd in a little brief authority,
> Most ignorant of what he's most assur'd,
> His glassy essence, like an angry ape,
> Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
> As make the angels weep."§

The presence and possibility of power, which, Morley says, men love more than truth, lead to the thirst for dominion. With what passionate fondness the world has played at the game of kingship since time began! Nearly every man has a tyrant in his bosom. The smaller the man, the greater is the tyrant. Here we find the reason why monarchy has more often been a curse than a blessing. It is ground for vigilance, too, when the people take the helm, lest the iron heel of the few may be exchanged for the despotism of the many. Despite the uncertain lot of rulers, those are never lacking who stand ready to seize the scepter of sovereignty. Such is the spell worked by the desire to lord it over others! Perhaps there is not a page in history which so vividly and luridly exemplifies these facts, as the imperial line of Rome, with its rapid and horrible succession of assassinations, strangulations, abdications, depositions and suicides, extending from the foul death of Caius Caligula to the accession of Constan-

* Prov. 28 : 15, 16.

† Prov. 29 : 2.

‡ Shakespeare, Julius Cæsar, I., 2.

§ Measure for Measure, II., 2.

tine the Great.* But there were noble and lofty exceptions, even in more ancient times and in heathen lands, to this well-nigh universal thirst for power and abuse of privilege. Nearly three hundred years before Jesus was born they placed the following inscription upon the pillar of Feroz Shah at Delhi:

"Thus saith King Piyadasi, beloved of the gods, I have caused this edict to be engraved in the twenty-seventh year of my consecration: What is this religion? It is to avoid evil and to do good, to practice kindness and truth, liberality and purity of life."

And who was this famous ruler? "The touch of a strange new civilization," says Bishop Copleston, "the civilization of their distant Aryan brethren of Europe—had been felt by the Aryans of the Ganges. Aided by the Greek invader, a single monarchy had asserted itself, and claimed all India for its own, and had so far succeeded as to give vividness to a new conception, that of a universal monarch. A great man had arisen, representative of that dynasty, who had assimilated much of the new civilization, and felt its stimulating influence. In his person the idea of the world-monarch was embodied. He was a man of vast ambitions and vast designs. And on this man, Piyadasi-Asoka, at first a despot as careless as others of the means he used, the teaching of the ascetic community laid its spell. He became much more than its patron; he was its apostle. As his reign went on he was much more imbued with its spirit: the desire to serve it and extend it moulded his magnificent enterprise. He was not merely the Constantine of Buddhism; he was an Alexander with Buddhism for his Hellas; an unselfish Napoleon, with 'mettam' instead of 'gloire.' The world was his that he might protect all lives in it: might establish in every part of it the community of the disciples of the Buddha."†

In the glitter and pomp of power, the less fortunate see the touch-stone of unqualified happiness, and with aching heart and yearning soul desire to possess it. Massillon, the French

* See Haydn's Dictionary of Dates, p. 590.

† Copleston, Buddhism, p. 280.

Catholic pulpit orator, who inspired "religious joy and terror" by his "silvery cadence and polished phrase," was as fearless in his defense of Christian truth in the presence of royalty, as Knox had been bold and fiery in his arraignment of unhappy Mary Tudor, Queen of Scots. Louis XIV. said to him: "I have heard many eloquent orators in my chapel, and was well satisfied with them. But whenever I heard you, I was deeply displeased with myself." In a Lenten sermon preached before Louis XV., the following passage occurs: "Yes, my brethren, it is not by blind chance that you were born to greatness and might. From eternity God determined to clothe you, who bear the stamp of His greatness, and are set apart from the multitude by the shimmer of title and human superiority, with this temporal glory. What had you done to deserve such distinction among the rest of mankind, and among so many unfortunate ones, who eat the bread of tears and sorrow? Are not they like you the work of His hands, and bought by the same price? Are not you made of the same earth as they? Are not you burdened with more sins perhaps than they? Does not the blood from which you spring, though in the eyes of men nobler, flow from the same poisoned source that has tainted the whole human race? Nature conferred upon you a brilliant name, but have you therewith received a soul different in order from that of the humblest of your subjects, and destined for some other eternal realm? What prerogatives do you possess above your fellowmen in the eyes of Him who does not recognize any titles of renown among his creatures, save the gifts of His Grace? And yet God, who is both their and your Father, consigns them to labor, and toil, and misery, and sorrow, while He grants you only joy, ease, splendor, and abundance. They are born to suffer, to bear the burden and heat of the day, to create, by their labor and care, affluence and plenty for your wasteful enjoyment, to serve, so to speak, as weighted and wretched beasts, to draw the car of your unfeeling grandeur." On the third Sunday of Lent, in the same year, Massillon said: "One may rise upon the wings of fortune ever so high above other men, one will find

that blessedness lies ever higher, and seems to recede further and further with the boldness of the upward flight. Chagrin and tormenting cares climb into the seat with the monarch as he ascends the throne. The crown which adorns the illustrious head of a king, is often armed with needles and poisonous thorns, and the great, far from being the most fortunate persons in the world, are nothing more than exceeding mournful witnesses to the fact that one cannot be happy on earth without virtue."* Still true to the doctrine of the divine right of kings, unable, indeed, to divest himself of it, Massillon nevertheless, spoke as a prophet to the corrupt House of Bourbon, spoke in the language of freedom, and gave utterance to sentiments and convictions then blindly struggling for realization, midst the heaving sea of popular unrest which broke into the flood of the Revolution, and when it had subsided, cleared the ground for the French Republic.

Let us place the splendor of earthly royalty, and the *Vox populi, vox Dei* proclamation of a self-deifying democracy, in contrast with the teaching of Scripture: "Again the devil taketh him up into an exceeding high mountain, and showeth him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them; and saith unto him, All these things will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me. Then Jesus said unto him, Get the hence, Satan, for it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve. Then the Devil leaveth him, and behold, angels came and ministered unto him."† When Pilate asked: "What hast thou done?" Jesus answered: "My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews: but now is my kingdom not from hence." When Pilate said to Him: "Art thou a king then?" Jesus answered: "Thou sayest that I am a king. To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Everyone that is of the truth, heareth my voice."‡

* Massillon, Bishop of Clermont, Fastenpredigten, p. 38. Id., p. 61.

†Matt. 4 : 8–12.

‡ John 18 : 36–38.

Knowledge.

Above wealth and power stand intellect and knowledge as a commanding energy and a noble possession, and the goal of many an aspiration. Wherever dense ignorance exists, there want, imposture and oppression flourish. The mists of childish credulity are dispelled, and the bog of delusion is drained, when the hand of science unclasps the book of nature. In all the relations of this present life, next to ethics and religion, the greatest of all monarchies is the masterhood of mind. What a proud distinction, compared with the rich fool, or the mad king, anyone can claim, who, though ranked with the humblest of stations, has had the advantage of a college training, has studied language and numbers, history and art, science and philosophy, and can to some fair degree follow the path of man's struggle for liberty and civilization, and is able to contemplate the object world around him as the symbolism of infinite Power and Wisdom. The intellectual life, not unmixed with the sterner realities of experience, but for the most part free from the vexations of business, social and official station—the life of reading, study and composition,—the literary contemplative life—where it can be chosen as a career, and when stimulated and rounded by travel, certainly affords delight, profit and comfort far superior to the ordinary devices and games for amusement and entertainment. How empty must be the mind which is absolutely ignorant of even the pivotal events, and the names of epoch-making spirits in the history of mankind, and lacks the insight and understanding to interpret and appreciate the meaning of the movements in society, government, science and religion, which constitute so significant and forceful an element in the living present. During many centuries in the past, it was a wonder to meet a man or woman beyond the confines of cities like Athens and Alexandria perhaps, who could read. Now one is amazed, at least in a land like ours, to meet an adult who does not know the alphabet, and it calls for pity and commiseration to come into contact with anyone, who, despite the magnificent and beneficient progress of knowledge, has but little taste for literature and art.

In those ages when ignorance, superstition and slavery held universal sway, it was natural for men who followed the best light they had, the light of reason, to look with contempt upon the mass of mankind, and to separate themselves from a wild and wretched world whose sores they could not heal, whose woes they neither could nor cared to soothe. Thus, when Socrates had fallen victim to the malignant political machinations of Meletos, Anytos and Lycon—the leaders of the then reigning Democracy—Plato, a tender youth and an affectionate disciple, revolted from the conditions, spirit and conduct common to the people of his time, and, withdrawing from social intercourse, consecrated himself to philosophy. "The lords of philosophy," he says in the Theatetus, "have never, from their youth upward, known their way to the Agora, or the dicastery, or the council, or any other political assembly. They neither see nor hear the laws or votes of the State written or spoken. The eagerness of political societies in the attainment of offices—clubs, and banquets, and singing maidens, and revels—do not enter even into their dreams. Whether any event has turned out well or ill in the city, what disgrace may have descended to any one from his ancestors, male or female, are matters of which the philosopher no more knows than he can tell, as they say, how many pints are contained in the ocean. His soul, elevated above the earthly and perishable, wanders through the heavenly spaces, and though laughed at by the coarse and vulgar for his awkwardness, he does not limp any more than would they if led up into the realm of ideas and eternal truth."* Thus the Academy and the Porch were precints sacred to the aristocracy of ancient thought, whose immortal founders and ardent disciples looked down from their lofty height with piteous contempt upon the contending and unlettered multitudes around them.

The Gnostics at a later day, when new problems had been introduced into the world by Christianity, imitated at least the spirit of the Greek philosophers, when, by raising knowledge above faith, they prided themselves in the possession of a special

* Jowett's Plato, vol. 3, p. 374.

gift of comprehensive insight, which gave them meritorious superiority over the blind devotees of the traditional creed and the visible Church. *

In India a similar distinction exists at this hour, in the face of the fact that Buddhism claims as its proudest characteristic the doctrine of universal brotherhood and the sacredness of all living things. "The Siamese sect admits to the Community none but members of the highest caste, the Vellala, and the Amarapura and Ramanya sects, though professing to admit all classes of persons, exclude all castes lower than the fishers, the cinnamon-peelers, and the toddy-drawers."† The line which is drawn is the line of ability and worth. The Buddhist monks claim the possession of a certain order of knowledge,—the knowledge peculiar to their Community,—the pantheistic speculations of Gotama Buddha, and the contents of the cannonical scriptures, the Pitakas, together with their commentaries.

In like manner, but within the circle of the Mediæval Church, a certain class of men, the scholastic philosophers and their students, chose the monastic life, not only for the purpose of pious meditation, and to perform, as they conceived it to be, the justifying work of self-abnegation, but also, with most penetrating dialectical skill, and without molestation, to pursue their inquiries into the foundations of faith and knowledge. They worshipped in the fane of Aristotle, and bowed with reverence before the majesty of his intellectual achievements. They endorsed the opinion of the Arabians, and said with Averhoes: "Aristotle is the guide and exemplar whom nature produced to demonstrate ultimate human perfection. The teaching of Aristotle is the highest truth, since it is the boundary of the human intellect. Therefore it has been well explained that he was created and given to us by Providence, that we might know whatsoever it is

* "The Gnostics of Palestinian Judaism were the *νομοδιδάσκαλοι*, the lawyers of their time, and their self-opinionatedness was a type of intellectual arrogance, rather than pride of learning." Dr. Julius Mueller, Dogmatische Abhandlungen.

† Copleston, Buddhism, p. 430.

possible to know."* Thus this strange scholastic life of the Middle Age, borrowed from the childish science of the Greeks and colored by the creed of the Latin Church, exhibits the ominous union of the servility of thought and the tyranny of dogmatism whose vicious reasoning in a circle checked the growth of liberal knowledge for more than five hundred years.

It is needless to speak at length of men like Michel de Montaigne, whose detestation of the puerilities which characterized his age, and whose unexampled tolerance drove him into the retirement of a country estate; and of Rene Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, who loved solitude so fondly, that for many years, like a hermit in a desert, he lived alone and unknown in the great city of Amsterdam.†

When we consider the indifference and positive aversion so many in every generation manifest toward the cultivation of the mind, and the study of earnest themes; when we contemplate the turmoil of commonplace interests, and the contentions occasioned by the selfishness of mankind, we are not surprised that Bacon sought refuge in his library, and said of his books: "They are true friends, that will neither flatter nor dissemble; be you but true to yourself, applying that which they teach unto the party aggrieved, and you shall need no other comfort nor counsel."

"A vast abundance of objects must lie before us ere we can think upon them," said Goethe. But as a standard of value, mere acquaintance with an endless array of facts and figures proves insufficient. The culture of the intellect in this sense is always defective, not only because the memory is too frail and treacherous, and life too short for the mastery, but because it leaves unsolved the chief problem of human existence, the salvation of the self, and the problem altruistic.

* Aristotles est regula et exemplar, quod natura invenit ad demonstrandam ultimam perfectionem humanam. Aristotelis doctrina est summa veritas, quoniam ejus intellectus fuit finis humani intellectus. Quare bene dicitur, quod fuit creatus et datus nobis divina providentia, ut sciremus, quicquid potest sciri. See Gieseler, Kirchen Geschichte, Vol. 4, p. 417.

† Guizot, History of France, vol. 4. p. 140. Ibid, p. 142.

Reputation.

Fame is another rule by which men measure. A good reputation is an exceedingly precious possession, especially when based upon actual merit. Scarcely anything is so trying to win, and when marred, so difficult to renew. Like financial credit, to be always gilt-edged, it must never be abused. But to live and to labor, with or without merit, only to receive the applause and encomiums of men, or to go about in search of a hero to lionize and court, constitutes one of the many phases of human vanity. It is not wrong to recognize talent, to praise achievement, to enjoy the fruits of ennobling genius, to encourage and to help the toiler in any legitimate sphere of action. Nevertheless, a strict construction of the moral law, the reign of the conscience, can never transcend or fall below the love of virtue for virtue's sake, and the doing of right for right's sake. The signal which Nelson gave the British sailors at the momentous battle of Trafalgar: "England expects every man will do his duty," contains the essence of moral obligation. God expects every man to do his duty. "Virtue is the moral force which leads to duty, and duty follows the command of motive." Cicero says in his De Officiis: "Enough for us, if only we have effected something in philosophy, it ought to persuade us, though we might be able to deceive both gods and men, never to crave anything, nor do anything unjust, impure or unlawful."* Elsewhere he says: "Reason should rule, desire obey."† Nevertheless, there are those, both great and small, who constantly seek the eye and ear of the public, and make the sweet flattery of men the measure of their happiness. They deify mankind. Their religion is the worship of humanity, and their heaven the immortality of fame. It resembles the precarious and toilsome hunt for gold. Thousands with beating heart venture upon its quest, but few there be who find it. If ever Vanity had its cravings satisfied, it happened in the case of Voltaire. When

* Satis enim nobis, si modo in philosophia aliquid profecimus, persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos hominesque celare possimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil injuste, nihil libidinose, nihil incontinenter esse faciendum. De Officiis, Lib. III., c. VIII.

† Ita fit, ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet. Ibid, Lib. I., c. XXVIII.

finally, after long absence and many vicissitudes, that erratic and irreverent genius returned to Paris, shortly before his death, and one night visited the theatre to witness the performance of his play, Irene, the populace went wild with adoration. Midst the shouts of the multitude, his statue was placed upon the stage and crowned with a laurel wreath. For this he had labored all his life—to make the world forget God, and do homage to Voltaire. And when he was thus overwhelmed with praise, he cried out: "Stop, Frenchmen, stop! You will kill me with ecstasy!" Perhaps never before was a great man's vanity thus canonized.

Unless a fair reputation and a good name are the reflection and fruit of solid personal worth, the praise of men will soon prove evanescent. At best this is an unfixed rule to follow, and an uncertain mead to cherish. One finds the widest disagreement in the judgments of mankind. Men still love novelty as much as did the ancient Greeks. Nowhere do they show such great docility as at the beck and call of prodigy and sensation. There is an instant attitude of curious attention, when the drums beat and the trumpets blow, in the van of Cagliostro in his car. But a far different lot falls to him, who, on some higher plane than this, begs the plaudits of the many. The coquetting divinity of public opinion, to whom he appeals for empty honor, meets his ambition with envy, and hinders the heralding of his deeds. Hence where reputation comes as borrowed light, or as niggardly acknowledgment, wise men and women do not want it, for since reason rules with them, they do not need it. This it is, and much besides, that Jesus meant, when He said to His disciples: "The kingdom of heaven is within you."

Money and power, pride and unholy pleasure, were the ruling motives of the masters of ancient times, and the great nations of the past, lacking the life in God, by conscious union with the Father of Lights, and the moral author and Judge of the universe, failed to sustain themselves by the charm of these imperfect ideals, and wasted their energies in luxury, vice, and war.*

* "Let us confess rather, that of the most excellent men of antiquity, many labored under the failings common to the human race; that in their less polished nature these vices broke out so much the more powerfully, as

A new era has come. When it is said: "We are the heirs of all the ages," and: "One generation is the teacher of the next," this applies not only to what is good, but also to what is bad. The superstitions of paganism live on long after the decay and death of the nations that gave them birth. The struggle between Christianity and heathenism in the Roman Empire covered three hundred years, but many of the traditions of the land of the Cæsars were inherited by the people beyond the Alps. New tyrannies were established. New struggles ensued. The papacy adapted itself as readily to the confusion of feudal times, as it had to the ordering genius of Charles the Great. Then later, when the art of printing was discovered, the Bible saw the light of day, and the treasures of ancient classical learning became the common heritage of mankind. The great universities of Mediæval Europe felt, to some degree, the force of this momentous change, but the culture which was to be sanctified by Christianity, could not be consummated until, by asserting the right of private judgment against the ownership of conscience, the German monk, the Swiss priest, and the French lawyer, had shaken to their center, the torpid and decadent dominions of the Papal See. And now that the old animosities growing out of the travail of the Reformation, have been mellowed by the passage of years, with more wealth than the world ever had in all the centuries of the past, with inventions without number to improve man's material conditions, to shorten the hours of manual labor, and to give more room to thought, under the influence of a broader Christianity, the leaven of righteousness working midst the blessing of civil and religious liberty, God, in these closing days of the nineteenth century, has placed the Anglo-Saxon race on trial in the arena of His purposes, with so majestic a sweep of mighty opportunity and promise, as to stagger belief. What will happen? Will men bow down in servile submission to, and be ground to dust by the giant of industrialism? Will the

their hearts were less awakened to piety by the mildness and humility of a more benevolent religion; that, lastly, these faults, so long encouraged and cherished, undermined and overthrew the lordly edifice of antiquity itself." Boechk, Public Economy of Athens, vol. I., p. 9.

leaven of righteousness be killed by new idolatries? Will reason, enlightened by the Divine Word, turn to madness, as reason failed in its most daring flights in other climes, without the Heavenly Light, and the Incarnate word?

Thus, wherever we gaze, we discover the relativity of material things and terrestrial pursuits. According to the plan of God, they are not to be masters, but servants, rather, and servants only for a time, though that time be a chain of ages. It is intended that they shall be used as aids to self-culture, and for the mental and moral elevation of the race. This fact is easily discerned. "Gelegenheit macht Diebe," say the Germans. You have read Lord Macaulay's description of the condition of society in London before the streets were lighted with gas by night. Not only its by-ways, but its thoroughfares were infested with thieves and robbers, and murder was a common crime. Even Sir Walter Scott laughed at the idea that gas would ever be utilized to modify the dangers of nightly travel. Now the introduction of electricity reduces still more the opportunities for plunder by night, and forces many a man, who otherwise would drift into crime, to seek an honest living. But having fulfilled their mission, these material agencies of civilization, like all things else, will pass away. How much has already been lost! Excepting some hymns to the gods, the manifold parts of the Book of the Dead, and the meagre records of royal achievements, chiseled into stone, the literature of Egypt, the most ancient in the world, has vanished from the face of the earth. More of the fruit of authorship among the Greeks and Romans has been lost in, than has been saved from, the wreck of their civilizations. In all probability original copies of the Gospels perished when the Mohammedan fanatics, under Amru, at the order of the Kalif Omar, set fire to the Alexandrian Museum. This same fate must overtake not only the precious remnants of ancient genius now in our possession, the writings of Homer, and Sophocles, Plato and Aristotle, Virgil and Horace and Cicero, but also the masterpieces of a later day, from Dante to Shakespeare, from Milton to Goethe and Tennyson. The wonders of art, the pro-

ductions of Michael Angelo, Rubens, Rafael, Tintoretto, and Titian, Bach, Mozart and Beethoven, the contents of the galleries of Europe, from Dresden, Paris, and Berlin, to Madrid, the greatest in the world, mural decorations, Milan Cathedrals, Westminster Abbeys, and Taj Mahals, together with the marvels of man's inventive genius, and the results of his advancement in unlocking the secrets of the material universe—all, all, all will some day sink into one common grave. Viewed from the stage of the glory of this world and the worship of humanity, without bewailing the stubble which deserves to be burned, who could estimate the loss of all these treasures, and where could one find tears enough to consecrate their oblivion! This gloomy prospect pained Strauss and Helmholtz, whose materialistic theory taught them to conclude that in the distant future the race will become extinct, and that the earth, sharing the fate of the moon, will roll on for endless ages as a lifeless, cold and arid mass. But St. Peter says: "The day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night; then the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burned up. Seeing that these things are thus to be dissolved, what manner of persons ought ye to be in all holy living and godliness, looking for and earnestly desiring the coming of the day of God, by reason of which the heavens being on fire shall be dissolved and the elements shall melt with fervent heat? But, according to this promise, we look for a new heaven and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness."*

If the standards of value which men so often choose, and which influence to a greater or lesser extent the course of history throughout the centuries, are thus relative, provisional, and temporal, is there anywhere in the universe of God an existence, an essence, a being, which possesses intrinsic worth, and which, when it has once begun to live, to act, will never cease to be either in heaven or in hell? Yes, there is,—*the human soul*, the inner self of us, our mind and heart, the thought, feeling, and willing power of us, over which

* II Peter, 3: 10, 11, 12, 13.

the ego presides, the microcosm, the little world of tremendous destiny, in which responsibility is vested for love and hate, for joy and sorrow, for faith and unfaith, for the deeds done in the body, for moral masterhood and beggarly bondage. Goethe confessed: "Ich traeume nicht, ich waehne nicht! Nah am Grabe wird mir's heller. Wir werden sein! Wir werden uns wiedersehen!" Since it is needless to try to prove these facts to anyone who is true to his own consciousness, one cannot evade the question, one must ask in earnest thoughtfulness: *What are you worth to yourself?* The answer comes unbidden: All the grace you can obtain, all the mental training you can secure, and all the enlightenment you can receive. Even then and at the best, as long as we remain in this world, we must continue to look through a glass darkly. Both Laotze and Buddha taught the doctrine of self-control, narrow and insufficient, it is true, according to their conception of things, and Socrates made the problem of the conscience, made ethics in relation to character, the chief study of man. We follow the same path, we cannot, dare not leave it, but we follow it to infinitely better purpose, for we have Jesus to guide us, and His love to constrain us.* Through the Gospel and the instrumentality of Christian homes, teachers, schools and colleges, through the agency of the Church and the refining influence of royal friendships, and most of all by communion with God, one is to develop, in rich abundance if possible, the right kind of head and heart power. "Life is real, life is earnest." God gives it to men in trust. Earthly gain cannot compare with it. A novice in finance would certainly have reason to tremble at the responsibility, if he should be made the possessor of many millions of dollars on the condition that he shall invest and use the money in such a way as neither to lose nor to waste a single penny. One may take it that after this manner God confers the inestimable favor of life upon thinking beings, who enter the world as helpless infants, with undeveloped physical and mental powers, and says to them, this thou art to use, this that thou art, thyself, this thou art to deal with, and

* II Cor. 5 :14.

unfold, and preserve, after such fashion that thou mayest not lose nor waste a single moment in securing the spiritual enrichment and glorification of thy soul. Now we are moored to the nearer shore. But bye and bye we will weigh anchor and leave behind us this world with all its illusive glory. Let the bark be filled with the best cargo that God's Grace and Providence afford. Whether our years be few or many, we cannot escape the final change. "It is appointed unto men once to die; but after this the judgment."

Again every true and earnest soul must ask: *What are you worth to the world?* And the voice of the Unseen will say: The very best that you can be and do. Franklin declared that the noblest question in the world is: What good may I do in it? One is worth very little, not anything indeed, if one is of no benefit to others, if one's influence is indifferent or bad, and one's life does not make for righteousness. In youth, in early manhood and womanhood, the foundation for future usefulness ought to be deeply and firmly laid. He who idles away the most plastic and formative period of his existence upon earth, though he repent in dust and ashes and live thereafter a hundred years, can never wholly recover from the harm he has done himself. This is the subjective side of the process by which the soul proves its intrinsic worth. First comes the period of self-nurture and self-training, under the guidance, and with the help, counsel and advice of Christian parents, teachers and friends. Then above all there is needed ample protection against the temptations and snares of a pleasure-loving world, together with a glad consecration to studied withdrawal from the factors which disturb the moulding effects of thought and meditation. This done, there follows the hour when one enters the arena of combat for the good, the true, and the beautiful, to be of some beneficent service to one's fellowmen, and to begin a career which at its close shall leave the world better than it found it. Golden opportunities teem around us for the exercise of talent, for the prophetism of truth, for the manifestation of enlightened sympathy, and the extension of righteous influence toward the betterment of com-

munities, states, nations, and the race. Whether we labor as farmers, artisans, tradesmen, artists, lawyers, physicians, teachers or ministers, in any legitimate calling whatsoever, so we are true therein, and free from bondage to the beggarly elements, we can help God by our service to purify the social body, and to lift the old world still further out of its misery and sin. If we cannot, like Tennyson, write poems that shall lead back a sceptical Christendom to the landmarks of faith, we can aid in guarding those landmarks as the court of salvation. If we cannot, like Lincoln, by the kingly stroke of an heroic pen, liberate four million slaves, catching the spirit of that mighty lesson, we can sing with Timothy Dwight:

> Columbia, Columbia, to glory arise,
> The Queen of the world, and the child of the skies!
> Thy genius commands thee: with raptures behold,
> While ages on ages thy splendors unfold.
> Thy reign is the last and the noblest of time,
> Most fruitful thy soil, most inviting thy clime;
> Let the crimes of the East ne'er crimson thy name,
> Be freedom and science and virtue thy fame.

If we cannot establish Sunday-schools, ragged schools, night schools, reading rooms, and loan associations by the score, as did the noble Lord Shaftesbury in London and throughout England, to redeem thousands of waifs, street arabs, working women, and costermongers from the curse of filthy alleys, pestilential cellars, and fever-breeding tenement houses, and the vice and crime incident thereto, we can in some humbler way imitate his example, and help his helpers by heeding the words which moved him to rescue the perishing: "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of the least of these, my brethren, ye did it unto me." If we cannot, like John B. Gough, awaken a nation's conscience, or like Frances E. Willard, organize a nation's new-born convictions, we can do duty as privates in the ranks of the mighty host whose settled purpose it has become, under God, to destroy the drink evil, to put out of existence that standing menace and fiendish insult to a Christian civilization, the grogshop, whose defilements in every passing year the round world over ruin more lives, blast

more characters, and blight more homes than Spain ever wrecked during her long oppressive rule in the Gem of the Antilles. If we cannot add new lustre to the literature of English speech, as did Hawthorne when he wrote *The Scarlet Letter*, we can warn against sin without remorse, by leading pure and holy lives, and win the erring back to God and Truth by the force of exemplified virtue and the power of the endless life.

And finally, one who is true to himself, to the Light that is within, and to the revelation which shines upon him from above, must ask: *What are you worth to God?* In the all-sufficient redemptive work of the Eternal Word, Jesus sacrificed Himself to the false standards of value current in the world, in order that He might destroy them. He was immolated that He might deliver and cleanse man's heart, and create a new spiritual soil in which worldliness, the lust of the flesh and the pride of life, cannot grow nor mature. Thus we are worth to God the price of the Ideal Man, who was made sin for us. "Ye are bought with a price." "Great is the mystery of godliness: God was manifest in the flesh." Yes, it is a miracle, this that we have been told, which we have read, and which we confess, that Jesus, conceived by the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary, came into the world to save sinners. The Person, Character and Life of Jesus Christ constitute the supreme and holiest wonder of all history. Look where we may from this gateway to the twentieth century, everywhere we see the figure of the wondrous Nazarene, risen, glorified, the ministering angel of God's mercy, light and love. We must reckon with Him, too, whether or not we wish to do so. "What think ye of Christ? Whose son is He?" He stands there above and over the tide of times, for salvation and for judgment.

After you have dipped into all philosophies, like Justin Martyr, and have perhaps like St. Augustine in early life, feasted for nine long years at the banquetting table of the world in bitter defiance to the prayers of a mother's yearning heart; after you have sat at the feet of the Buddha, have studied the laws of Confucius and the precepts of Mencius, and have run the

gamut of the ethnic faiths and all the aberrations of the religious instinct, you will, if there is any heavenly light whatsoever in you, you will bow in adoration before the Figure of Jesus, as God's own rule and measure, not of fluctuating and relative value, but of unchangeable and enduring worth for time and eternity.

VI.

EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT.

Revelation or Discovery.

"My mind has long been running on the question: is it Revelation, or is it Discovery? If our heavenly Father were pleased to give us a revelation of His mind and purpose toward us, I cannot get over the thought that the documents containing the revelation would come to us in such shape that an honest mind need not doubt whence they came. Such documents could not speak of God in a self-contradictory manner; nor attribute to Him what neither Christ nor our moral sense would attribute to Him. The 'notae revelationis,' it seems, would be plain and convincing; while in fact they are such as they are. Hence I cannot rid myself of the thought that good men have put into God's mouth their own highest and best ideas, instead of *vice versa*. In my reading I have not been able to find any help in this difficulty. In theology I find so many of the hardest questions passed over, or answers assumed without examination. * * * Are we to be forced into a semi-Romish position of blind acceptance of a dogmatic system, and live under the perpetual suspicion that the system is false? It is with such thoughts that I have been full for months, almost years. Nothing seems firm, but the thought that God is good and cannot be anything else, and that right is right. This is enough to live by, but very little to preach by."

The above quotation is an extract from a letter received some time ago from a highly esteemed friend. Believing that the writer's state of mind is representative of the state of mind of many others, both in the ministry and out of it, we have concluded to make the question presented by him the subject of a brief discussion in the Review. Such difficulties as those in the mind of our friend are not only common, but natural at this

time, when there is taking place a general clearing up in the world of theological ideas. Men are no longer satisfied to take things on trust or tradition, but want to be sure in their own minds of the truth of what they are asked to accept. It is not words or formulas that they want, but reality that shall authenticate itself to their own reason.

Now the theological world has long been accustomed to the idea that the Bible is a supernatural or miraculous book, infallible by reason of its very origin, and containing a multitude of ready-made doctrinal and ethical truths to be accepted by the human mind in a merely passive way. As Moses was said to have received the tables of stone engraved by the finger of God, so the contents of the Bible were believed to have been communicated to man by the Spirit of God. It was written indeed by human hands; but these were supposed to have served merely as instruments of the Holy Spirit; and the writing therefore is God's writing, and every sentence and letter must be believed to be an infallible expression of an absolute divine truth. But such a theory now encounters insuperable difficulties. The most superficial examination of the Bible discloses the fact that there are doctrinal as well as ethical contradictions contained therein. The conceptions of God, for instance, are by no means just the same in its earliest and latest books. Neither are its moral conceptions the same everywhere. Characters are eulogized which no Christian could wish to imitate; and acts of cruelty and immorality are reported without disapproval, and sometimes even with manifest approval, like David's torture of the conquered Ammonites, and his cowardly surrender of the Sons of Rizpah and Michal to be murdered by the Gibenonites. And what shall we say of the imprecatory psalms, and of the wholesale divorcement of their wives by the Israelites returned from Babylon, at the instigation of Ezra? It is no wonder, surely, that entertaining the traditional views of the origin of the Bible, an honest mind should get into a world of difficulties in view of the facts of the Bible as they are. Such difficulties and doubts should not be regarded as evidences of unbelief, but rather as evidences of a determina-

tion on the part of honest minds to know the truth as it is. They are evidences of *honest thinking* on the subject; and it is only such thinking that can at last lead to satisfactory conclusions. The mere acceptance, on authority, of a dogmatic system, with the perpetual suspicion that it may be false, surely can afford no relief.

What is the Bible? We believe that a candid and careful examination of the contents of the Bible as we now know them, will lead to the conclusion that *the Bible is a faithful record of a progressive revelation of divine truth, in a historical form and under historical conditions.* It contains the record, in concrete form, of an advancing knowledge of God and of divine things, such as would not be possible without a self-revealing activity of God on the one hand, and a true and normal activity of the mind of man on the other. In answer to our correspondent's question, whether it is *revelation* or *discovery*, we would, therefore, say that *it is both.* By revelation we understand a self-disclosing activity on the part of God; and by discovery we understand an acquirement of knowledge by an exercise of the human mind according to its own constitution and inherent laws. The truth laid up in the Bible thus conforms, in its manifestation or attainment, to the condition of all truth; for truth, that is knowledge of reality, is attainable only on condition of a reciprocal activity between a knowing subject and a known object.

There can be no knowledge of any kind without an exercise of our cognitive faculties. We only know what we have learned to know by our own mental activity. No ready-made ideas or cognitions can be communicated to us by a foreign agent without our coöperation. Any theory of inspiration which makes this to consist in an infusion of ready-made ideas previously unknown must necessarily be false, as contradicting the fundamental laws of knowledge. If ideas could be communicated in such way, the result would not be knowledge. Such a theory would reduce the human mind to the condition of a mere thing, of which knowledge is not predicable. An object may be reflected in a mirror, but the mirror, because devoid of any self-action, does not

know the object reflected. Words may be communicated to a parrot, and the parrot may be trained to repeat them; but to the parrot they mean nothing—they do not constitute knowledge. So it is possible that ideas and words may be communicated by a teacher to a pupil, and the pupil may be taught mechanically to repeat them. But if that is all, then there is no knowledge. Knowledge is a state of mind reflecting reality, which is effected by the mind's own activity, and no man really knows more than what he has thought out or "discovered" for himself. But while knowledge implies discovery, it also implies *revelation*, or self-disclosure of the object known. There can be no knowledge without some activity in the object, corresponding to its nature, and impinging upon our faculties and stimulating them to the formation of ideas, conceptions, thoughts.

Let us here call to mind for a moment some of the fundamental principles of the philosophy of knowledge. How do we come to know anything whatever, say natural objects or events? Such knowledge, knowledge of reality, cannot be simply evolved out of our mental constitution. The human mind is, indeed, furnished with original cognitive principles which are regulative in the attainment of knowledge; but knowledge cannot be spun out of these principles alone, as the spider's web is spun out of its belly. Knowledge thus produced would at best be merely formal. It would have no contents; it would not be real knowledge. All real knowledge of an objective world is dependent upon experience. It begins with sense-impressions; and out of these we form our ideas, our conceptions, and cognitions. These impressions presuppose an *activity* in the objects making them. If the object of sensation were merely a passive, inert, dead thing, it could manifestly make no *impression*. And what is this impression? An excitation of the nerves of sense, and through that an affection of the mind in its primary function of *feeling*. All knowledge begins in feeling, and results from the translation of feeling into thought. The word *feeling* is here used in a somewhat wider sense than that in which it is usually employed in English works on psychology, according to which it merely signi-

fies states of pleasure or pain. It implies that, but it also implies an objective element of perception. In a word, feeling is that state of the mind in which the subjective and objective consciousness, the consciousness of the self and of the not-self, have not yet become differentiated. And this is a state which does not disappear with the progress of mental development. It is a state into which the mind ever again and again returns to renew itself, and to gather new material for its intellectual and volitional activity. It is in states of feeling, then, that the mind receives its impressions of an external world. These states of feeling contain the stuff out of which knowledge is created by an interpretative activity of the mind. The mind interprets its impressions, its sensations, its feelings, and the result is knowledge.

This interpretation of impressions and feelings, however, is progressive, and is not always correct. We make many mistakes before our interpretation of nature becomes even approximately conformable to reality. This is true of the collective mind of the race, as well as of the single mind of the individual. What singular interpretations of their impressions of nature the ancients put forth may still be seen in their systems of mythology. Nothing in nature impressed them more powerfully than the sun; and the sun was apprehended as a living personal being, hitching his horses to his chariot and making daily journeys through the sky, and was, therefore, treated as an object of worship. The infant gazing at the moon still puts forth his hand to touch it—a striking but familiar illustration of this misinterpretation of impressions of nature. But nature never ceases to make impressions, and to stimulate the human mind to ever new interpretations; and thus, little by little, our knowledge of nature increases. Nature discloses itself to our senses and stimulates our minds to the discovery of the *thoughts* which it contains. For nature is an intellectual system—a system of related thoughts, whose original, absolute, creative thinker is God. In learning to know nature we learn to know God's thoughts. But we could not learn to know these thoughts if they did not impress us, and stimulate our own thought-producing faculties. Nature does not transfer

her thoughts to our minds without any activity of our own; on the contrary, she compels us to discover them. Thus, then, our knowledge of nature rests upon revelation as well as upon discovery; and this revelation, too, is in a sense divine.

But, now, what is true of the manner in which we come to know nature, or God's thoughts in nature, must be true also of the manner in which we come to know God Himself, directly and personally, or of the manner in which we come to know His nature, His character, His mind, His will toward us. And this is the knowledge with which the Bible has to do. How does man come to know God? He may infer something about Him from the study of himself. Our ideas of causality, of teleology, of morality may lead us to infer that there must be an omnipotent, intelligent, good and righteous Being as the cause of the universe and of ourselves. But this inference, if we were left simply to the activity of our own minds, could never be more than a supposition, a formal idea, of whose corresponding reality we could never be sure. Truly, personally, and religiously we can know God only in consequence of impressions coming directly from Him, and affecting primarily the fundamental function of our mental life, namely *feeling*. That we are capable of receiving such impressions is here taken for granted. We are not directly conscious of their origin, as we are conscious of the origin of our sense-perceptions. If that were the case, religion would cease to be a matter of freedom, and would become a matter of physical, or at least logical, necessity. But the fact that God never becomes an object of outward sense-perception, or of objective consciousness, is no reason for denying the possibility of an immediate contact with Him in our subjective consciousness. Such a denial would involve the error of *deism*, which holds that God indeed exists, but at so great a distance that there can be no communication between Him and the world now. We, as Christian theists, are bound to hold that God is not far off, but that He is around us and within us as the light and air of heaven, and that in Him we live, and move, and are. And the organ of our souls through which we are made aware of His

presence, and through which He affects our mental life, is undoubtedly feeling. Feeling, certainly, is the basis of religion, and of course also of religious knowledge, or knowledge of God. To say that religion has its source in the feeling of absolute dependence upon a supreme being, may not be an adequate statement of the fact. There are doubtless other elements which enter into this feeling besides the sense of dependence; but that the primary seat of communion between man and his Maker is in feeling, there can be no doubt. And it is in feeling that those divine impressions are received which incite the cognitive faculties to the formation of religious cognitions. Usually the most significant of those divine impressions are concomitant with striking, stirring events in the outward physical world, such as miracles, or extraordinary natural or historical occurrences; and some would confine the word *revelation* to these external events, while to the internal mental impressions they would apply the word *inspiration*. We can, however, not see much reason for the distinction, as the external event can in no proper sense be regarded as revelation until the effect has been felt in the heart of the spectator; and then only can the cognitive faculties be stimulated to the production of religious knowledge.

Now this production of knowledge out of the inspiration or affection of the heart, again, is interpretation, and involves the possibility of error, just as does the interpretation of the impressions of nature. God impresses our souls in feeling, and thus stimulates our minds to the apprehension of Himself. This is *revelation*, no matter where or when it takes place, whether in Palestine or in Greece, whether in the hoary ages of the past or in the days of the present. But the revelation, or inspiration, has become knowledge only when we have made the *discovery*, that is, when we have translated the impressions and feelings into ideas, cognitions, thoughts; and the clearness and vitality of this knowledge will be in proportion to the energy of the inspiration out of which it is born. This translation of inspiration into knowledge, however, may at first be faulty, just as our interpretation of the

impressions of nature may be faulty. We make many mistakes in this operation. Abraham made a mistake when he interpreted the voice of his conscience to mean that God required him to slay Isaac. Why men should make mistakes at all is a question which we need not here attempt to answer. It is enough to know that it is now, and always has been, a fact. Perhaps a finite being could never in any other way make any progress at all; as no child has ever learned to walk without getting more than one fall. But in spite of our mistakes and falls, the divine, stimulative, educative activity never ceases until it has led us to *discover*, to know, what it is God's purpose to teach us. It is in this way that God educates individual human beings now, and causes them to know Himself and whatever is knowable of Him, employing for this end the whole world of nature and of history as outward institutions with which to connect His inward operations. And it is in this way that He has educated the race, and is still educating it. The whole history of mankind is a divine education, and the whole world is a divine storehouse of apparatus and object lessons for the purposes of this education; while the most important activity of the Educator is exerted, inwardly in the heart of man. God makes Himself known to men by means of nature and history; but He makes Himself known especially in and through man himself. And in consequence of the spiritual solidarity of mankind, He moreover makes use of the knowledge acquired by one generation for the spiritual enlightenment of subsequent generations.

There is, however, a difference among men in respect of the degree of susceptibility for divine revelation. Some men are more susceptible than others to divine impressions, and more apt in the interpretation of them. Their consciousness is more open to impressions, manifestations, from the Infinite Consciousness, from which they themselves have sprung, and of which their own minds are modes. These are the prophets, the apostles, the teachers of mankind, who speak to others the words of God as they themselves hear and understand them. They are not infallible, not omniscient, nor are they furnished with oracles which are incom-

prehensible to themselves; but they are bearers to their fellows of light from the Infinite and Eternal Light. Preëminent among these is Christ, in whom dwelleth the fullness of the Godhead bodily, not physically, of course, or locally, but noetically and ethically; who is in the bosom of the Father, hearing the Father's very heart-beats, and declaring Him to the world with absolute fulness and fidelity. He speaks to the world the truth which He has heard from God—the truth of God as it has taken shape in His perfect human consciousness. And the revelation which comes through His consciousness is, therefore, not indeed the end of God's self-revealing activity in the world, but the highest point which that activity has ever reached, and the basis and type of its exercise in all future ages.

And, now, in order that the revelation of God in the experiences of the chiefest minds of mankind, and above all in the experience of Him who "in all things has the preëminence," may be made available for the spiritual enlightenment and training of men in all ages, God has provided for its preservation in written form. And in this preservation there is nothing miraculous, nothing transcending the ordinary laws of human history. Under the instinctive tendencies of human nature and the ordinary operations of divine providence, so far as we can understand now, it came to pass that the experiences, the knowledge, of prophets, and apostles, and teachers sent from God, began early to become crystalized and fixed in letters, monuments, writings of various kinds. In this way Sacred Scriptures came in course of time to exist. Our present Bible is the result of this process of the crystallization and fixation of revelation in written form. It does not contain all the sacred writings that have ever been produced. There were written documents, historical, poetical, and legendary, preserving experiences of divine revelation, long before any part of our present Old Testament was written. Some of these are quoted in the Old Testament itself. And there were such documents also among the Gentile nations. St. Paul quotes from several of them in his address at Athens. The hymns of the Vedas and the poems of Homer, with all their imperfections, were

yet religious writings by means of which the feelings and experiences of early generations of men were preserved for the instruction and edification of subsequent generations. But our present Christian Scriptures constitute in a preëminent sense the Holy Scriptures of the world. They are not in all respects infallible, or inerrant. But they are "such as they are." We have already observed that in the interpretation of those divine impressions in the heart, which constitute the essence of divine revelation, there is always the possibility of error. And that possibility, of course, extends to the written form in which a revelation may be preserved. It would be in vain to contend that everything contained in our Bible now is absolute divine truth, that there are in it no inadequacies of expression, no slips of memory, no misapprehensions of truth, no doctrinal or moral shortcomings. The knowledge of God in the Old Testament is never equal to that which we have in the New, and the character in which He is represented is sometimes painfully defective. The moral code of some of the writers of the Old Testament is far lower than the code of modern Christian ethics; as, for instance, when it is provided that a master shall not be punished for beating to death a slave, provided the death ensue not immediately upon the beating, but a day or two later; the loss of the money value of the slave in such case being supposed to be punishment enough. Even some of St. Paul's statements in regard to moral questions, such as slavery and marriage, cannot be regarded as satisfactory in the light of the modern Christian consciousness. And, indeed, every doctrinal and moral statement contained in the Bible must be read and interpreted in the light and spirit of the Christ before it can be invested with absolute validity for Christian faith and life; and this means, of course, that for one who is not a Christian the Bible could be no religious guide at all; while for one who is a Christian, Christ Himself is the absolute light of the world, by the illumination of whose Spirit the Bible itself and every other form of revelation must be judged.

But such as it is, the Bible contains the record of the progressive religious experience, of the growing religious knowledge of

mankind, from the earliest times until it reaches its highest point in the Christ; and this record, not indeed in its fragmentary parts, but in its totality, possesses the peculiar quality of being profitable for the instruction of all present and future generations. The crystallized experience and knowledge of holy men of old, though not absolute and free from imperfections, yet comes itself to be a means, in connection with never ceasing divine manifestations through the spirit of Christ, for the further advancement of divine knowledge among men. As in other spheres of knowledge the existing body of literature saves successive generations from the necessity of always beginning *de novo*, and thus makes progress in knowledge possible; so the Bible saves successive generations from the necessity of beginning always anew, and thus makes possible progress in religious knowledge. Taken in its separate parts the Bible is not infallible, so that one might pick out a lot of texts and suppose himself to have infallible religious knowledge in them. Nor is the Bible a substitute for God and for His self-revealing activity among men now. God has not withdrawn from the world now, and left behind Himself only the Bible as the sole source of all divine knowledge, according to the dream of those who contend most strenuously for an "infallible Bible." God Himself is the ever present and ever living source of religious knowledge now as He has been in ages past; and Christ is still our only Prophet and Teacher. But the Bible is an invaluable aid in the religious teaching and training of mankind, helping men to interpret the divine impressions and influences which they feel in their own souls, as well as the manifestations of divinity which they perceive in the outward world of nature and history. If the individual man had the privilege of living in this world milleniums of years, he might perhaps out of his own single spiritual experience construct an adequate knowledge of God and of His ways, without any help from beyond himself. But in view of the brevity of human life here, it is well certainly that the records of the purest and best religious experience of mankind in the past should have been preserved as a rule of faith and practice for men in

the present and the future. The Bible, in this view, does not present itself as a foreign authority, coming in to override the self-activity of the human mind in its effort to obtain religious knowledge, but as a condition rather of making progress in religious knewledge thoroughly natural, rational, and historical. If the Bible were simply a miraculous book, if it did not bear the marks of "discovery" as well as the marks of "revelation," if the knowledge conveyed by means of it were what is sometimes called "supernatural knowledge," then there would be required a permanent supernatural agency on the earth for its right interpretation, and Romanism rather than Protestantism would be the true theory of Christianity.

In the way of illustration of the value of the Bible, in the view in which it has now been presented, may be taken Linneus' system of botany in its relation to the progressive knowledge of plant life. Though not infallible, that system, together with the successive additions and modifications which it has received from subsequent thinkers, is an invaluable help to the student of botany in every generation. Of course, in the last instance, the vegetable world itself is the real object and source of knowledge, revealing itself directly to the mind of the inquiring student, who interprets the impressions which he receives from it, and converts them into scientific knowledge. But if every generation of students would have to go back and begin their work of discovery and interpretation precisely where Linneus began, we can easily see what a disadvantage there would be in such a condition. There could in such case never be any progress in botanical knowledge. Each generation would merely repeat the work of its predecessors. It is therefore of vast advantage to the student to be able to go forth to the study of the vegetable world with Linneus and Gray for his guides. Similar examples could be drawn from every other department of human life and literature. Literature in any form preserves and makes permanent the intellectual gains of one generation for the benefit of the generations following. This illustrates the nature and use of the Bible. The Bible is not a supernatural book in any other sense than that in

which religion and the human soul itself are supernatural. It is not in its several parts infallible. If infallibility is to be attributed to it at all, it can be attributed only to its general moral and religious spirit as a whole, or to the *testimony of Jesus, which is the spirit of prophecy.* As a book, or, rather as a collection of books composed by different authors, it participates in all the infirmities and limitations of the men and ages to which it owes its origin. And yet as religious or inspired Scripture it is profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness. God uses it, as He also uses the Church, for the progressive advancement of religious education among men, or for the progressive disclosure and discovery of divine truth. And by the use of it He has taught men now to know more than many of its authors knew. For if we did not know more, how then could we criticise any of its statements? We can, in the spirit of Christ, criticise the Bible, as Christ himself criticised it; but we cannot dispense with its help in our spiritual development. It is with the Bible not otherwise than with the Church, which likewise in its empirical, historical form is not infallible, but is yet a *pedagogic* institution of vast importance in the religious training of mankind. There is much in the church that is human and liable to criticism; and yet through her teaching men may be led to know infallible divine truth. So with the Bible; though it presents marks of human limitation in every page, yet our Divine Teacher knows how to use it for the purpose of leading us to the apprehension of the one eternal and saving truth *as it is in Jesus Christ.*

The Altar in the Christian Church.

The word *altar*, *βωμός*, *θυσιαστήριον*, does not occur in the New Testament in the sense of a piece of church furniture. In Hebrews 10:18, where it is said that we have an altar, *θυσιαστήριον*, whereof they have no right to eat who serve the tabernacle, "the word denotes the *cross* of Christ, to eat of which means to appropriate the fruits of Christ's atoning sacrifice.

That from which the Lord's Supper was dispensed was originally called the *table of the Lord*, τραπέζα κυρίου, *Mensa Domini*, and was nothing more that a common wooden table. Paul tells the Corinthians that they can not "be partakers of the Lord's *table* and of the table of devils," and Christ promises His disciples that they "shall eat and drink at His *table* in His Kingdom."

This terminology remained in use for a considerable time in the post-Apostolic and old Catholic church; and in fact never entirely disappeared; for in one of the prayers of the Roman Ritual used in the dedication of an altar it is still called *mensa*: "Adesto, Domine, dedicationi hujus *mensae* tuae, etc." The primitive Christians were accustomed to associate the idea of the altar with the idea of *sacrifice*, in the Jewish and pagan sense, and of course could admit of no such idea in Christianity. To their minds an altar implied a victim and shedding of blood. But Christianity has no need for any such ceremony. In the New Testament, especially in the epistle to the Hebrews, Christ is represented as one in whom the Christian has all, and more than all, that the Jew believed himself to have in the altar, and priesthood, and sacrificial ritual of the Old Testament. Hence the Christian has no need of any altar. To the taunt of Celsus that the Christians had no altars, statues, and temples, Origen replied that they "regarded the spirit of every good man as an altar from which arises an incense which is truly and spiritually sweet-smelling." His idea was that the point of contact between God and man in worship is not in some outward material thing or structure, but in the human spirit. Still in course of time the word altar came into current use to denote the piece of furniture from which the Lord's Supper was administered, and near which some of the most sacred services of religion were performed. A number of distinct circumstances doubtless led to this result. One of them was that the sacred offerings of the Christians, which consisted generally in gifts of bread and wine and other articles of food to be consumed in the *agapæ*, and which were commonly deposited upon the communion table, began early to be called *oblations* or *sacrifices*. Another no doubt was

a sense of the inherent fitness of the thing, as it was felt that in Christian worship there was a sacrificial element, a service performed for the glory and pleasure of God, which was properly symbolized by the idea of the altar so familiar to the Christian mind from the study of the Old Testament. And still another circumstance which served to bring into currency the term altar was the example and influence of the Jewish and pagan cults with which the Christians were familiar. In this as in other respects the pure wine of Christianity was poured into vessels derived from the older forms of religion, which had gone before. And thus while in New Testament times the Christians had no altar, except such an one as they that served the tabernacle could not eat of they now came to have one that was conformed to the fashion of the tabernacle itself.

The term *altar* occurs, at first interchangeably with the term Lord's table, and in a somewhat spiritualized or figurative sense, in such writers as Ireneus, Tertullian, and especially Cyrpian. Quotations may be read in Bingham's *Antiquities of the Christian Church*, book VIII, chap. VI, and references in Achelis' *Praktische Theologie*, Vol. II, p. 37. In the time of Augustine the term *altar* had become the general designation of the object in question; although Augustine himself, as also Chrysostom in the eastern church, still most generally used the term *Lord's table*. And with the word also came the thing; or rather both word and thing came together in consequence of a radical transformation of the conception of Christianity that was gradually going forward in the Catholic church. Christianity became a new system, a *lex nova*. The ministry became a priesthood, similar in conception to that which once officiated in the temple at Jerusalem; Christian worship became transformed into an order of formal ceremonies and material sacrifices; and the communion table became an altar in the old Jewish and pagan sense, on which were offered no longer the prayers and spiritual aspirations of pious hearts, but the incense of Arabia and the unbloody sacrifice of the mass. In conception it was no longer the altar of Ireneus, and Tertullian, and Augustine, and in form and materials it was changed to corre-

spond with the altered conception. The wooden material gave way to stone, and its significance was determined by its relation to the sacrifice of the mass and to the cult of the relics of saints.

In primitive times table-altars were placed whenever there were Christian assemblies, and wherever the Lord's Supper was celebrated, in private chambers, in caves and catacombs, and in open fields and forests. When circumstances permitted the building of churches, or the transformation into churches of already existing buildings, the altar formed a part of their regular furniture. In the earliest churches, the basilicas, it was located in the sanctuary, a space separated from the rest of the building by a railing or chancel including a recess at one end of the building. Here, on a somewhat raised platform, the altar had its position; standing free from the wall however, for in a semi-circle behind it were the thrones or seats of the bishop and his presbyters. From this point behind the altar the prayers were said, and the sermons preached; until Chrysostom and others set the fashion of stepping forward and preaching from the chancel, in order that they might be the better understood by the people.

From the earliest times to about the middle of the fifth century the direction of churches was uniformly from east to west, having the entrance at the eastern, and the sanctuary with its altar at the western end. In this respect they resembled the orientation of the temple at Jerusalem, in which also the most holy place was at the western end, because, as it is stated in I Kings 8:12, "Jehovah desires to dwell in thick darkness." The real reason for this arrangement of the temple was probably that it might present a contrast to that of heathen temples, in which the shrines and images of the gods were always placed towards the east end. The latter arrangement was in harmony with the uniform custom of ancient peoples of praying with face turned towards the place of the rising sun. This custom had its origin probably in the primitive worship of the sun, and was observed not only by the Gentiles generally, but also by the Jews, and afterwards by the Christians. That this was the posture of Christians in prayer is proven by abundance of testimony. Thus Tertullian, Apolg.

cap. 16, mentions the fact that they were accused of "worshipping the sun painted on a piece of linen cloth," and says, "The idea no doubt has originated from our being known to turn to the east in prayer," and then goes on to say that this was a common custom not only of the Christians but also of their enemies. Augustine, speaking of the same custom, says "When we stand up to pray we turn towards the east, that the soul may be admonished to turn itself towards a higher nature, that is, the Lord," de Arat. Domini in Morte, lib. II. In the *Apostolical Constitutions*, lib. II, cap. LVII, the same custom is enjoined, and the reason given for it: "Let all rise up with one consent, and *looking towards the east*, after the catechumens and penitents have gone out, pray to God *eastward*, who ascended up to the heaven of heavens to the east; remembering also the ancient situation of paradise in the east, from whence the first man, when he had yielded to the persuasion of the serpent, and disobeyed the command of God, was expelled."

But if the congregation was to face toward the east during the celebration of worship, while the sanctuary was in the west end of the church, it is plain that the people must turn their backs toward the officiating minister and the altar. This came in course of time to be felt to be an impropriety; and so from about the middle of the fifth century onward the direction of churches was usually reversed, the entrance being placed in the west and the sanctuary with its altar in the east, so that in turning to the east the congregation would at the same time turn to the altar. It involved the consequences, however, that the officiating minister, if he was to face in the same direction as the congregation, was compelled to turn his back to the people when leading in them in prayer. It secured, however, the possibility of all at the same time turning towards the altar. Walfridius Strabo in the ninth century declares that this was the arrangement of much the largest number of churches *pluralitatem maximam ecclesiarum*, of his time. Subsequently, however, a new motive for turning towards the altar in prayer was found in the dogma of *transubstantiation*. This dogma received formal ecclesiastical sanction

first in A. D. 1225, but it was believed much earlier and exerted its influence upon religious thought and action. When the Lord Jesus Christ was supposed to be bodily present upon the altar in the form of the host it was manifestly proper that all eyes should be directed towards it. And under the influence of this dogma, the former custom of looking towards the east, in the offices of devotion, was forgotten. The altar came now to be the object towards which all faces were turned, no matter where it might be placed, and churches were no longer located with reference to the points of the compass. Here we have the origin and meaning of the whole matter of posturing before the altar during the performance of public worship. If the dogma of transubstantiation be denied, there is no dogmatic reason for a minister's turning his face towards the altar while conducting prayer, especially if this involves the necessity of turning his back towards the people and so making it difficult for them to understand him; and this practice has in Protestant churches been justly regarded as an evidence of a tendency towards popery, although many who have followed it may not have understood its meaning at all.

As early as the third century the custom began to prevail of building chapels or churches over the graves of the martyrs, or of depositing their bones in churches; and from the fifth century onward the altar became the receptacle for these sacred relics. In consequence of the new use to which it was thus put, it assumed a new structure and appearance, being now generally built of stones in the form of a sepulchral mount. This custom was advocated by the most eminent ecclesiastics of the time, and prevails in the Greek and Roman Catholic churches to the present day. As a Scriptural argument in its favor Rev. 6 : 9 was appealed to, where the souls of them had been slain for the word of God and for the testimony which they held are referred to as "being underneath the altar"; which is accordingly sometimes designated as *testimonium* and *martyrium*. Jerome refused the dedication of a church because it contained no relics. At the 7th Ecumenical Council, held at Nicæa, A. D. 787, the custom of depositing under the altar the relics of some saint or martyr

was elevated into a law, and it was ordained that all churches must have some relics and that without them no church could be lawfully consecrated. This law prevails in the Catholic Church to the present day; and these relics have become an object of much superstition, being supposed to be endowed with miraculous power, and worthy, according to the Council of Trent, of *veneration* and *honor*.

The basis of this worship of relics may be supposed to exist in the common feeling of piety, which causes us to transfer some of our affection for the dead to objects which were closely connected with them in life, such as a lock of hair, a baby's little shoes, or an old man's chair. This innocent feeling has in the relic cult become the source of a vast and degrading superstition and of no little imposture and fraud. The belief in the miraculous efficacy of the relics of the saints may be traced back to a phase of thought with which we are no longer familiar, and which we can scarcely realize. To our mind there is an essential difference between matter and spirit. They are two distinct substances, which cannot directly affect each other. But to the ancient mind they appeared to be one in principle, so that they could act and react upon each other directly. Hence it was not difficult for the early Christians to believe in a spiritual efficacy in the water of baptism, or in the bread and wine of the Lord's Supper. Where we now see only *signs* and *symbols* they saw actual sources and instruments of spiritual power. On this point compare Hatch, Hibbert Lectures, 1888, p. 19. In the same way in which they believed matter in general to be capable of becoming a vehicle of spiritual power, the ancient Christians saw in the relics of the saints not merely a means of personal communion with them, but also vehicles for the communication of their power for various purposes, to men in the flesh. This is the same phase of thought that finds expression in Acts 19:12, where it is reported that handkerchiefs and aprons brought from the body of Paul served as means for the healing of diseases and the casting out of evil spirits.

As the worship of the saints increased and relics multiplied, it

became customary to add additional altars in the same church for their accommodation. When Gregory I. had the bones of the saints exhumed from the catacombs for the purpose of having them bestowed in the churches, a great number of altars was required, and some churches had as many as forty and fifty. These were placed in various parts of the church, along the four walls and elsewhere, and were consecrated to the particular saints whose bones they were supposed to contain. The principal altar, which was consecrated to the patron saint of the church, was distinguished from the rest by its larger size and more elaborate decorations, and was named the *high altar, altare majus, altare summum.*

Among the various adjuncts of the altar deserve to be mentioned, first, *crosses* and *crucifixes.* The former became common in the fifth, the latter in the ninth century. The crucifix is confined to the western church, the altars of the eastern churches being without it. An important adjunct of the altar, since the prevalence of the doctrine of transubstantiation, is the *tabernacle*, in German called *Herrgottshäuschen*, in which the consecrated host is kept. The custom of burning lights upon the altar —since the time of Chrysostom wax candles have been used— during the celebration of worship, is as ancient as the custom of building churches and erecting altars itself. History knows of no time when they were not used. But what the significance of this custom is, or how it originated, is not known. It may be a memorial of the early times of persecution, when Christians could only meet at night, and when artificial light was necessary for the illumination of the place of meeting. The custom may have been promoted also by the necessity of artificial light in churches previous to the general introduction of glass windows; so that what was at first a matter of necessity became afterwards, when the necessity had ceased, a matter of sentiment. The explanation that the lights of the altar are a symbol of Christ, who is the light of the world, or that they represent the truth of God's word, as the candlestick with its seven arms is supposed to have done in the Jewish temple, is of recent date and does there-

fore not account for the origin of the custom. In any case the rays of a wax candle contending with the rays of the sun itself, would not be a very striking symbol of Christ as the light of the world.

In the time of the Reformation the altar became a special object of reformatory zeal and action on the part of the Protestants. This was due, first, to the fact that it stood as the exponent of the doctrine of transubstantiation and of the sacrifice of the mass, which the Protestants regarded as idolatry; and secondly, to the fact that it was identified with the relic worship of the time, and with the superstitions to which that gave rise. All the Reformers agreed that there can not be more than one altar in a church. But as to its treatment three alternatives were possible. It might be totally removed and its place supplied by an ordinary table; and it might be stripped of its superstitious adjuncts and so tolerated; or it might be left substantially as it was, but its significance might be so explained as to lead to its reformation gradually. The last alternative was chosen by the Lutheran Reformers; although this was not exactly agreeable to the mind of Luther. He would have approved a more radical procedure, but did not think it expedient at the time to push the matter. "In a *real mass* among simple Christians," he says, "the altar could not remain thus, and the priest would always have to turn towards the people, as Christ doubtless did in the celebration of the Supper. But that must abide its time." See Daniel's Codex Lit., tom. II, p. 6. The Reformed Church on the other hand, proceeded more radically. In some churches, especially in Switzerland and France, the altars were abolished, in others they were merely transformed. If we remember what abominations there had been connected with them, we can easily understand, if not excuse, the iconoclastic zeal of our Reformers against them. At first the very name was rejected, and the Reformers went back to the simple New Testament name of Lord's table. The same puritanical zeal prevailed also for a time against organs, pictures, bells, and similar objects found in the old churches. But this was an extreme which did not long

maintain itself. It was only in the more Puritanical sections of the Reformed Church, in Holland, Scotland, and elsewhere, that the exclusion of the altar, both as to thing and name, became permanent. In the German Reformed Church, especially it has long since been restored to its proper place, just as the once banished organs, bells, and pictures have all come back again. In the rubrics of the *Book of Common Prayer* of the Anglican Church the word altar is never used. Instead of it we read *communion table*. In the rubric preceding the communion it is said: "The *Table*, at the Communion-time, having a fair white linen cloth upon it shall stand in the body of the church, or in the Chancel. And the minister, standing at the right side of the *Table*," etc. In our *Order of Worship* of 1866 the rubric directs that the minister shall take his "place on the right of the altar," not in front of it. The *Directory of Worship*, in its rubrics, mentions neither altar nor communion table, and lays down no rule relative to the position of the minister.

We have already intimated, near the beginning of this article, that the early Christians were, at least in part, guided by a sound instinct in gradually adopting the altar in place of the earlier and more simple communion table. If there be a sacrificial as well as sacramental element in Christian cultus, as we believe there is, then it is proper that this should, in some form, be represented in the structure and furniture of the church. And the altar, stripped of its middle age accretions, appropriately serves that purpose, and should be shaped and located with reference to it. But the altar also serves the purposes of a table, the Lord's table; and thus represents the sacramental element of cultus, and should be shaped and located also with reference to this view. And a church without an altar, or with a common parlor stand in place of it, always, to our mind at least, lacks an important article to make it complete.

And if the Lord's Supper is the central act of Christian worship, in which the sacrificial and the sacramental elements are equally combined, then the altar should occupy a central position in the place of worship—that is, not necessarily in the middle of

the church, but in the middle of the *sanctuary*. It ought not to be at the side of the church, but it ought to be so placed as to be easily within sight and reach of the congregation. There is manifest propriety, though there may be no dogmatic reason, in the turning of the countenances of a worshipping congregation in one direction, or towards one object; and no object more suitable for this purpose exists than the altar. But then it must be so placed as to make it possible for the minister to face the altar as well as the congregation, without turning his back to the latter. For the minister to turn his back to the congregation during prayer is not in harmony with the Reformed idea of cultus, which does not presume that the God worshipped is confined to the altar. The Reformed idea requires that the congregation should be able to hear and understand the words spoken by the minister, which is not easy when his back is turned towards it. In the Catholic Church this is not an important matter, as it is not necessary that the people should understand the priest, since he acts *for* them rather than with *them*. But this is not the theory of Protestantism. Here the doctrine is that the people are really benefited only by what they hear and understand. Hence it is justly offensive when the minister turns his back towards them in the most solemn service of worship. This could be justified only if there were strong dogmatic reasons for it; and no such reasons exist, unless they be in the doctrine of transubstantiation. Hence, too, such posturing must always give rise to the suspicion of "Romanizing tendencies," and calls forth reaction agaist all proper liturgical worship; just as the destruction of altars in the Reformation was a reaction against the abuse of them in the middle ages.

The Crisis in the Presbyterian Church.

The Presbyterian Church in the United States has for a number of years been in a state of agitation and conflict that has seriously crippled her prosperity and her usefulness. This fact,

it may be said, in one sense, concerns only the Presbyterian Church. The quarrel in which she is engaged is her quarrel; and Christians of other denominations have no business with it. We know that Presbyterians themselves have sometimes taken this view of the case. In another view, however, the condition of the Presbyterian Church is a condition that affects more or less directly at least all Protestant denominations. If the Presbyterian Church be a real part of the Catholic Church of Christ, then all other churches are interested in what is taking place within her fold; and it is their duty to study her condition, and their right to express their judgment in regard to that condition. This we hold to be especially true of the Reformed Church in the United States, because of her peculiar relation to the Presbyterian Church in the general union of Reformed Churches in this country. Hence we feel under obligation from time to time to give attention to the quarrel that is going on among our Presbyterian brethren; recalling the fact that years ago, when a serious controversy existed in our own Church, leading Presbyterians did not hesitate freely to express their opinion in regard to it.

The matter of contention in our sister denomination is the Westminster Confession and the authority which is supposed to belong to it in the Presbyterian Church. This Confession was adopted in 1647, and represents the extreme Calvinism as well as the peculiar metaphysics of the seventeenth century. There are especially two points in regard to which the correctness of its teaching has been widely questioned in recent times. These relate to the inspiration and inerrancy of the Sacred Scriptures and to the doctrine of divine predestination. The confession may be so interpreted as to teach the verbal inspiration and literal inerrancy of the Bible. This was probably the sense in which its authors understood it. But if this doctrine of the Bible were correct, then there could be no room for any science of Biblical criticism, either lower or higher. The only thing for theologians to do would be to accept the Bible as it is, and ask no question as to its origin. This, however, in the view of a

large and ever increasing number of scholars, is no longer possible. And a number of the most able and sincere scholars in the Presbyterian Church have adopted and published views concerning the Bible, in harmony with the all but universal opinions of European scholars, but in conflict with the interpretation of the Confession just referred to. Some of these, like Drs. Briggs, Smith and McGiffert, have been driven out of the Church, much to the surprise and scandal of honest Christians in other denominations. This, however, has not served to free the Presbyterian Church from trouble; for there are many others, if not indeed a majority, among her ministers and teachers, who hold substantially the same views as those held by the scholars who have been driven out. In fact, the heresy trials connected with these cases have only served to spread the infection.

But the point in the Confession in regard to which there is most wide-spread dissatisfaction is the subject of divine predestination. Our readers are doubtless familiar with the teaching of the Confession on that subject. That teaching is that "God from all eternity did by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will freely and unchangeably ordain whatever comes to pass"; that "By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated into everylasting life, and others foreordained unto everlasting death"; and that "Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when, and where, and how he pleaseth." This teaching fairly and honestly interpreted makes sin a necessity grounded in the divine will, and God the responsible cause of the damnation of sinners. To say, as the Confession does, that this doctrine does not make God the author of sin, nor deny the free will of the creature, is to juggle with words. It is merely denying the consequence which is necessarily involved in the proposition affirmed. And when it is affirmed that *elect* infants dying in infancy are regenerated and saved, the necessary implication is that there are other *non-elect* infants dying in infancy, who are not saved. This is undoubtedly the sense in which the Confession was understood by its authors;

and this was the teaching of Calvinism in the seventeenth century. Dr. Parkhurst, therefore, is not wrong when he says, "Our doctrinal prospectus advertises us as beliving that little children, perhaps the babe at your bosom, are damned, already damned, damned before they were born, damned from everlasting to everlasting."

These doctrines, we have reason to believe, are now rejected by a large majority of Presbyterian ministers and elders. Some, indeed, try to persuade themselves that they are not taught in the Confession; while probably a much larger number, recognizing the futility of such a pretension, consider subscription to the Confession a violation of conscience, and earnestly desire either a revision of it, or the formulation of a shorter creed to take its place, with the objectionable doctrines left out. A minority of ministers and elders, however, who really accept the teaching of the Confession on this subject, or try to make themselves believe that they do, are opposed to every measure of relief, and have thus far frustrated every movement looking in the direction of relief. Some eight or ten years ago, when the revision movement was unquestionably favored by a majority of Presbyterians, and when this movement seemed to be sure of a successful issue, it was suddenly thwarted by the adroit springing upon the Church of several great heresy trials, which inflamed men's passions, aroused prejudices, and apparently made clear and calm thinking for the time being impossible. The consequence was a failure of the work of revision; which according to the conviction of many was the real end aimed at by the prosecutors of the heresy trials. Since then the Church has been kept in a state of panic by reiterated charges of heresy. The faithful have been kept in a state of alarm by the representation that it is not only a few articles of the Confession, but the credibility of the Bible, the existence of the Church, and the sovereignty of God, that is at stake; and that for Presbyterians at least there will be nothing left but the darkness of despair if a single article or letter of the Confession is touched. Thus the the cause of revision seemed to be defeated, and the wholeness of the Confession assured for years to

come; although this result was accomplished at the price of the expulsion from the Presbyterian Church of some of her best sons, and by the crippling of her work and the retarding of her progress.

But the hope of peace was shortlived. No sooner was there a lull in the agitation of voices occasioned by the heresy trials, than the demand for revision was heard again. It was voiced by such men as Drs. Hillis, Parkhurst, and many others, and seconded last spring by overtures coming to the General Assembly from a number of Presbyteries. The General Assembly could not do otherwise than give the matter some consideration. What it did do, however, was not much. The conservatives seem to have had the field. The Assembly merely appointed a committee which is to report on the subject one year hence. Meanwhile the discussion and agitation will doubtless be kept up. Such movements can not be controlled by the arbitrary will of men. And the ministers and scholars of the Presbyterian Church are not made of such stuff that they can be commanded to keep silence when they have convictions to express. In the present case there are convictions on both sides of the question; and we may, therefore, expect during the next year or two to hear a good deal of the noise of theological battle in our sister Church.

What will be the outcome of this battle? Evidently the conservatives, though in the minority, expect to gain a victory over their opponents, the progressives; and to accomplish this result they would not be unwilling to witness a very considerable exodus of dissatisfied ministers and members from the fold of their Church. They say the Presbyterian Church is what the standards have made her, and exists only for those who accept the standards; while those who are not satisfied with the standards as they are, should consider themselves bound to go out of the Church and leave her at peace. This, of course, is putting the standards before the Church, and supposing the latter to exist for the sake of the former. But this, it may be said with reason, is not the spirit of Protestantism. It is the willful blindness of ecclesiastical obscurantism. The Confession, it cries out, we go

with the Confession, right or wrong. It seems, too, that the conservatives count a good deal on the diversity of opinion among the progressives for the defeat of the latter's cause. They say the advocates of change are not agreed as to what they want. Some want a revision of the standards in a few points, others want a radical revision; while still others would prefer a new creed, although they might differ among themselves as to its length and character. There is doubtless much truth in this representation, and the conservatives have in the circumstance represented a powerful ally. It is not an easy thing either to make or mend creeds—a fact, however, which does not add anything to the weight of the old creeds, but rather tends to raise doubts as to their propriety and usefulness in general.

The arguments of the conservatives against revision relate to the question of the necessity and present expediency of the movement. They say that in those particulars in regard to which the Confession is most criticised, its teaching is misunderstood. The Confession, they say, does not teach that God is the responsible author of human sin, or that there are infants in hell. But if not, why then, it may be asked, do they oppose a revision that would show clearly what it does teach? Their answer would probably be that what the Confession teaches is the teaching of the Bible, and that it would be dangerous and rash to attempt any change in the statement of Biblical doctrine; to which the reply might be made that there are millions of as good Christians as any in the Presbyterian Church who do not find the doctrines objected to in the Bible at all. But another argument against revision, that is much insisted on, is that, though the Confession were defective and revision needed, the present would be an inopportune time to make it. The present is a time of agitation and passion, and is therefore unfavorable to such calm thought as would be required to revise the Confession. What the Church now needs is rest and peace and devotion to practical work. Besides, the Confession is not now accepted by all, and the cause of revision should wait until all again heartily receive its teaching. The answer to this is obvious. Was not the time when the Con-

fession was framed a time of agitation and strife too? Were not all the Reformation confessions framed in similar circumstances? Suppose the Catholics had said to the Protestants, the present is a most inopportune time for the framing of confessions; let us wait until we shall all be of one mind again, and nobody shall any longer be excited. What would the Protestants have said to such suggestion? Besides, how is it expected that the desired calm shall ever be restored? There are differences of theological convictions? A large number, perhaps the majority of the most spiritually minded men in the denomination are convinced that the Confession teaches doctrines that are not Christian, and that are dishonorable to God. How are these to be silenced? Are they to be driven out of the Church? In that case the Church might have peace, but would it not be the peace of death? That the Church needs peace is doubtless true. But that peace will never come so long as an arrogant minority, or majority, refuses to allow changes to be made in the standards, and then passionately invokes the power of discipline in order to enforce the teaching of those standards. The crisis in the Presbyterian Church cannot be met in that way. How it will be met is a matter of interest to thoughtful Christians in all the churches. For the case of the Presbyterian Church is not singular. All Protestant churches are very much in the same situation. In all of them religious and theological thought has somewhat outgrown their confessions. Will they be able to bring up their confessions to their present standards of thought, and thus prove their vitality and divinity, or will they go to pieces on this rock of theological and confessional divergence as Romanists expect they will? In this view the result in the Presbyterian Church will be awaited with much interest everywhere.

VII.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

GOD'S EDUCATION OF MAN. By William DeWitt Hyde, President of Bowdoin College. Pages xii + 252. Houghton, Mifflin & Company, Boston and New York, 1899.

President Hyde is known to the theological public as the author o a volume on *Social Theology*, which has been widely read, and as the writer of numerous articles in various periodicals. The reputation which he has thus made for himself is well sustained in the little volume now before us. Professor Hyde understands the art of writing books *that can and will be read*. He knows what he wants to say and stops when he has said it. The present age is too busy an age to read ponderous volumes, whose contents could all be expressed in a dozen or two of pages. Books, moreover, are too numerous to leave much of a chance of being read to the large works of thousands of closely-printed pages. Whoever wants to get the ear of the public now must reduce what he has to say to the smallest possible compass, and must say it in the plainest and most direct possible way. The man who multiplies words in order to hide poverty of thought cannot expect to get a large circle of readers. This is a principle which Professor Hyde seems to know thoroughly, and his books therefore are readable and instructive.

The title of the present work is an indication of its character. Theology has for ages regarded man as a condemned criminal, whose great ancestor, Adam, in the "probation" to which he was subjected, lost the quality of righteousness with which he was endowed in his creation; and God as an incensed judge, who stands ready to inflict punishment upon the wretched sinners of the human race, and is only restrained from doing so with the greatest difficulty. For this conception Professor Hyde substitutes the idea of God as a wise and patient teacher, who is ever eager to impart to man lessons which it is good for him to learn; and of man as a *pupil*, often dull, wilful and wayward, yet one whom the great teacher loves, and whom He does His best to educate and train for honor and blessedness and immortality. This idea, which in this country is usually associated with what has been called "the new theology," is in fact an old idea that has been revived in recent years, after having been neglected for ages. It is older than the Augustinianism, which has taught us to look upon mankind as a *massa perditionis*, and upon God as an enraged and capricious judge. It was the theology of the Greek Church in its

best days. It is this idea of God as man's *Tutor* or *Teacher* that forms the subject of one of the finest treatises of Clement of Alexandria, namely, *The Paidagogos.*

This is the leading idea which Professor Hyde presents in this little book on *God's Education of Mankind.* The book is divided into five sections or chapters, the first treating of "The Reorganization of the Faith"; the second of "Control by Law"; the third of "Conversion by Grace"; the fourth of "Character Through Service," and the fifth of "Two Types of Idealists." In the first or introductory chapter the author deals with fundamental theological principles, and to the theologian this will be the most interesting portion of the book. The ideas of God, of His will, of Christ as the historic revelation, of the Holy Spirit as God in Humanity, of the Trinity, of sin and the atonement, are some of the ideas which are here brought under consideration. With the definition given of some of these momentous subjects all readers will, of course, not be satisfied. This will be the case especially with the explanation which is here given of the doctrine of the Trinity, which we could wish the author had treated more fully. What he says seems to imply only a trinity of revelation. But as it is it is stimulating and instructive, and withal presents a phase of thought with which the modern theologian is bound to reckon. The theologies which have been current up to the present time are undergoing a process of disintegration; and the reverence in which they have been held in the past does not now shield them from criticism and questioning; nor does it cause the rejection of new thoughts just because they contradict the old.

On the present status of the theological creeds the author delivers himself as follows: "The current creed of Christendom is a chaos of contradictions. Truths and lies, facts and fancies, intuitions and superstitions, essentials and excrescences are bound in one bundle of tradition which the honest believer finds hard to swallow whole, and which the earnest doubter is equally reluctant *in toto* to reject. It is high time to attack this chaos, to resolve it into its elements, and to reorganize our faith into a form which shall at the same time command the assent of honest and the devotion of earnest men. This work can not be done roughly with the broad-axe. The problem is not mechanical, but vital. One can not chop the creed in two, and say, 'This half is true and that is false.' We must discover the germ of life in the old and somewhat decrepit body of current tradition, and from that vital germ we must breed the fair and vigorous body of the faith that is to be." To this work of breeding a new faith out of the fundamental elements of Christian beliefs the book under notice is a contribution. Its leading principle we believe to be right. It presents God in the capacity of a Father and of a Teacher of infinite wisdom and patience, and man in the capacity of a child of God, disobedient and rebellious often, but still as a child of God, whom

He is leading, and teaching, and disciplining, and preparing for citizenship in His eternal kingdom of righteous and holy love. The theology growing out of this principle will be a better and a truer theology than Augustinianism, and we believe that it will be the theology of the future.

A DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE, *Dealing with its Language, Literature, and Contents, Including the Biblical Theology.* Edited by James Hastings, M.A., D.D., with the assistance of John A. Selbie, M.A., and chiefly in the revision of the proofs, of A. B. Davidson, D.D., L.L.D., S. R. Driver, D.D., Litt.D., H. B. Swete, D.D., Litt.D. Volume I, A–Feasts, pp. 864. Volume II, Feign–Kinsman, pp. 870. Pages double columns, nine by five and a half inches, brevier type. Price $6.00 per volume. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh. 1899.

A Bible Dictionary is an indispensable article in a minister's library. No Biblical student can afford to do without it. And the want of such help has from time to time been supplied by various publications. As early as 1722 the Abbé Calmet published his Dictionary of the Bible, which was translated into various European languages, and given to the English reading public, in four volumes, by Dr. Hackett, early in the present century. In 1860–63 a new Bible Dictionary was published by Dr. William Smith, of London, in three volumes. This book has been republished in different editions, the last American edition consisting of four volumes. In its time this was probably the most complete and most thorough Dictionary of the Bible extant in any language. Such, however, has been the progress of Biblical learning in recent times that this work no longer represents the present state of Biblical knowledge. There is no doubt that within the past twenty-five years the advancement of Biblical knowledge, resulting from critical study and from archeological discovery has been far greater than that accomplished in the time intervening between Father Calmet and William Smith. In order to make available for Bible student's generally the new knowledge thus gained, a new Bible Dictionary had come to be an imperative demand. And this demand is now being met by the publication of the Dictionary prepared by Dr. Hastings and his eminent assistants and contributors. The work is to be completed in four volumes, of which two have already appeared, and the other two are expected to appear during the present year.

This Dictionary is a "Dictionary of the Old and New Testaments together with the Old Testament Apocrypha, according to the Authorized and Revised English Versions, and with constant reference to the original tongues. * * * Articles have been written on the names of all persons and places, on the antiquities and archeology of the Bible on its ethnology, geology, and natural history, on Biblical theology and ethics, and even on the obsolete and archaic words occurring in the English Versions." This statement of the Preface will be found to be borne out by an ex-

amination of the pages of the work as far as it has now been published. There are articles explanatory of all words found in the Bible, with the exception perhaps of a very few whose meaning is self-evident. All proper names, all common nouns, adjectives and verbs, and even conjunctions and prepositions, will be found in their appropriate places, with illustrations of their meaning. For instance, we have articles on such verbs as *to be*, *to give*, *to go*, *to halt*, *to hail*, *to happen*. Five pages are devoted to the verb *to go*. Then there are articles on such conjunctions as *and*, *because*, *for*, and the like. One whole page is given to the word last mentioned. And these articles are not by any means without interest or value. In fact the reader will often be surprised to find how much information is contained therein in regard to words whose precise and full meaning he has heretofore failed to perceive. But there are not merely articles on Biblical words and phrases, but also on Biblical and theological ideas, like *decalogue*, *heredity*, *hexateuch*, *architecture*, though the terms themselves may not appear in the Bible. Thus twelve pages are devoted to the subject of Biblical *ethics*, eight to the doctrine of *conscience*, six to Biblical *cosmogony*, one and a half to *creed*, and seven to *eschatology*. It will thus be seen that the Biblical student can scarcely look in vain to this dictionary for information on any possible subject in which he may be interested.

And the information will always be found to be reliable and correct according to the latest and best sources of knowledge. The contributors, one hundred and twenty-eight in number, are men of the highest standing in the world of theological scholarship, and were usually selected because of special work done along the line of the articles to be contributed by them. The majority are from Great Britain, although America also has a fair representation among the number. Of course among such a number of writers all are not equal for scholarship and general theological tendency. We have such men as Willis J. Beecher and B. B. Warfield by the side of S. R. Driver, Alfred Plummer, and the veteran A. B. Davidson. But all important articles are signed by the full names of their authors, and the intelligent reader is therefore never at a loss as to how much weight he is to attribute to an article. One peculiarity of this Dictionary is that its authors almost without exception are familiar with the methods and results of modern German scholarship. This is apparent not merely from the account of the literature subjoined to the articles, but, in many cases at least, from the nature of their contents. Another peculiarity is that its articles throughout reflect the best Biblical science of the present day without distortion or evasion. This is the first Dictionary of the Bible in English in which full account is made of the results of the higher criticism of the Bible and of modern scientific investigation. If the theory of the composite origin of the Hexateuch and of other Biblical books be true, then it is plain that serious modifications

must be made in the hitherto current conceptions of the history of Israel. A similar result follows from the acceptance of the doctrine of evolution. And this Dictionary in general fairly and honestly makes the modifications required. It is an honest Dictionary according to the present standards of knowledge.

We proceed to give a few illustrations of the manner in which important subjects are treated. H. E. Ryle, in an article of five pages on *Abraham*, says that "there are cogent considerations which must modify the acceptance of a uniform *literal* historicity for the narrative of Abraham; but that this is not inconsistent with the view that in Abraham we have the great leader of a racial movement, who left upon his fellow-tribesmen the distinctive features of his religion." The author also makes the remark that what Abraham supposed to be a command of Jehovah to sacrifice Isaac was merely a misinterpretation, resulting from the custom of the times, of the question of his own conscience whether he had sufficient trust in God to surrender even his own son. A. C. Headlam, writing on the *Acts of the Apostles*, maintains that this work is by the same author as the Gospel according to Luke; but he concedes that this author must have used sources of various degrees of value, and holds that while the book as a whole is credible, it contains minor errors, and is not in the traditional sense infallible. E. L. Curtis, in a twenty-page article on Biblical *Chronology*, brings down the period of the Exodus to about 1200 B. C., differing by almost three hundred years from that of the received chronology. He also holds that the *census* mentioned in Luke 2 : 1, 12 is wrongly dated, and does therefore not help to fix the date of Christ's birth. In the article on *Circumcision* it is stated that this strange rite, like tattooing and other bodily mutilations among different nations, was originally a sacrifice to the tribal god, and a *marking of his followers* so that they might be known by him and by each other. In the article on *Baptism*, A. Plummer notes the apparent discrepancy between the formula of baptism as given in Matt. 28 : 19, and as used in the Acts of the Apostles, and solves the difficulty by observing that when Luke in Acts says that persons were baptized "in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ," he does not indicate the *formula* that was used, but merely states that such persons as acknowledged Jesus to be the Lord and Christ were baptized. He, however, also states the view that the formula in Matthew might be more recent than the first administrations of baptism. His remark that the right of infant baptism can neither be proved or disproved from the New Testament, and that in the apostolic age immersion was practiced as well as other modes, though doubtless correct, will hardly satisfy either baptists or pedobaptists.

To those theologians who have feared that the acceptance of the doctrine of evolution might be fatal to the doctrines of the fall and of the incarnation, it will doubtless be of interest to know what is said on these subjects in this Dictionary which will probably help

to shape theological opinion for some time to come. J. H. Bernard, fellow of Trinity College, and lecturer in divinity in the University of Dublin, writing on the former subject, uses the following language: "We find, then, that the doctrine of the Fall, when subjected to examination, is in no way inconsistent with the theory of the evolution of man from lower types, and his growth 'from strength to strength' as the centuries have gone by. There has been a continious intellectual development. When the pre-Adamite ancestor of the human family was fitted to receive the divine gift of reason, it was granted to him. Like Christ, Adam came *in the fullness of time*, when all things were ready. Up to this point the evolution had been unconscious; henceforward it was to be conscious, and partly assisted by voluntary effort. And the first experience of evil, explicitly recognized as evil, would afford a fresh starting point for his growth. For such experience of evil would in any event—whether it was conquered or the conqueror—involve a rise in the intellectual scale. Had it been overcome, as it might have been overcome, there would have been a rise in the spiritual scale as well. But in the event there was intellectual growth, accompanied by a descent to a lower spiritual level, from which it would be impossible for man to rise without the aid of divine grace. And so the incarnation and the atonement mark in the history of mankind a crisis, and introduce a force as potent, as when God *created man in His own image.*" On the subject of the *Incarnation* R. L. Ottley, formerly principal of Pusey House, Oxford, writes: "The evolutionary movement, whether in physical nature, or in human history, which tends toward a 'fulness of time' seems unaccountably to fail unless crowned by the appearance of One who is the flower of human kind, and whose coming marks a climax in revelation."

But this notice has grown to more than ordinary proportions, and we must bring it to a close. It remains only to state that these magnificent volumes of this valuable Dictionary are gotten up in the best style of the book-maker's art. The paper and the binding are of the first quality, and worthy of a book so valuable. Ministers and students who are in need of a Bible Dictionary ought not to be satisfied with anything less complete and perfect than the work which is here brought to their notice.

SELFHOOD AND SERVICE. *The Relation of Christian Personality to Wealth and Social Redemption.* By David Beaton. Pages, 220. Chicago, New York, and Toronto. Flemming H. Revell Company. 1898.

We suppose the intentions of the author of this book to be good. We are sure that he says many good and true things. He holds that human personality is a sacred thing, and that the possession of private property is not inconsistent with the idea of Christian personality. This is correct. He also holds that business should be regarded as a sacred interest. "We must find a

principle of action," he says, "which counts business as holy as worship, indeed, as itself a worship in the spirit of brotherhood and help which all true brotherhood implies. A principle of life which holds the forum as sacred as the temple, and the workshop as holy as the altar, which treats the physical needs of men as tenderly and sacredly as their spiritual weaknesses, and which draws no line of demarcation between sacred and secular. A principle which leads us to a genuine imitation of Christ in making all life sacred, all service a doing of the 'Father's business.'"

That, we think, must be conceded to be a sound principle. But this statement occurs on page 213, near the close of the book, and the preceding discussion would not lead any reader to suspect that the author had in his mind a principle so lofty. Indeed the impression is made constantly that the author considers himself as holding a brief in behalf of very rich men, and as being under obligation to make the very best defence for them that can be made. He manifests some sympathy for the sufferings and sorrows of the poor, but a great deal more for the perplexities and troubles of the rich. He never has a word of condemnation of the current methods by which wealth is accumulated in the hands of a few long-armed and long-headed men, and the masses impoverished. He contends that it is the right of personality to unfold and exert itself to the utmost of its power in the accumulation of wealth. If a long-headed individual, by the exploitation of the labor of his fellows, is *capable* of amassing a fortune of five hundred or a thousand millions, he has the right to do it, although his doing it may reduce a hundred thousand men to dependence and poverty, and bring untold numbers of women and children to premature graves. Our author, in his defence of the rights of the personality of the rich, forgets the rights of the personality of the poor; and he forgets that the rights of the former must have their limitation in the rights of the latter. Surely if it is the right of one man to develop his personality to the utmost of its capacity, that does not give him the right to degrade the personality of a thousand of his fellow-men and reduce them to the capacity of mere "hands" or "numbers" in his mill or shop. And just as surely, if it is the right of one man to own private property, it is the right of other men to own something too; and no man, or number of men, though they may have the capacity and the power, can have the right so to conduct their business as to make it impossible for a thousand other men ever to acquire any property. It is at this point that the book under consideration is fatally defective.

But while our author has not a word to say on the methods by which great fortunes are accumulated, he says a good deal in regard to the manner in which they ought to be used. His idea in general is that great wealth should be consecrated to the service of God and man. And no doubt that is true. But what is his idea of "consecration"? From the perusal of his pages one gets

the impression that what he is thinking of mainly is the idea of refined living—not vulgar or ostentatious extravagance—but *refined* living, in finely-furnished mansions, surrounded by the treasures of art and literature, and besides this, also, a readiness to contribute of the superfluity of one's possession to the relief of the poor of the neighborhood and to the foundation and support of public institutions, such as colleges, universities, libraries, hospitals and the like, as well as to the prosecution of the work of Christian missions at home and in foreign lands. Having spoken at some length of these ideals of "the consecration" of wealth, he says, p. 157: "Christians will never really know what secrets of moral and spiritual dynamics are stored up in wealth for a civilized community until such ideals unloose them, as Farraday and Thomson have set free the energies of Nature. Nay, they will never know the productive power of accumulated wealth, the real possibilities of capital, until this moral energy be applied in business."

Now, we have no doubt that men may sometimes "make to themself friends of the Mammon of unrighteous," but we do not believe that there is in general much of "moral and spiritual dynamics" stored up in accumulated wealth. The world is to be saved, not by "consecrated wealth," but by consecrated personalities—that is to say, by personalities who are willing to spend their energies in leading other and weaker personalities to live a higher and better life, rather than in accumulating great wealth for the purpose of founding public institutions. The example of the Master Himself, we think, must be regarded as decisive on this point. He did not think that the world was to be saved by the use of great wealth acquired in ambiguous ways, but by self-sacrifice. The author of the volume before us expresses surprise that so many rich men—and "rich men" now only means millionaires—should have no idea at all of the good they might do by consecrating their wealth to the service of God and humanity. But the fact is not surprising at all, when one remembers the methods by which great fortunes are made, and the effect upon the soul which these methods must produce. Ruskin says, "No man can become largely rich by his personal toil. The work of his own hands, wisely directed, will indeed always maintain himself and his family, and make fitting provision for his age. *But it is only by the discovery of some method of taxing the labor of others that he can become opulent.*" That is what is now called *exploitation.* But exploitation can hardly be regarded as a good means of developing a generous and noble character. When we remember what Christ says about the difficulty of rich men entering into the kingdom of God, and when we remember the words of St. Paul that they who desire to be rich fall into a temptation and snare and many foolish and hurtful lusts, such as drown men in destruction and perdition" (I Tim. 6:9) we can not be surprised that few phenomenally rich men consecrate any large part

of their wealth to the service of humanity. The manner in which most great fortunes have been obtained would make such consecration impossible. Think of Yerkes posing as a philanthropist!

We can not recommend the book which is the subject of this review, as one calculated to do much good to the cause which it is intended to serve; unless it be in the mere negative way of showing to how large an extent the sympathies of theologians and preachers are on the side of wealth and power rather than on the side of poverty and weakness. "It serves them right" is their judgment in regard to the condition of the disinherited masses, "for they are not able, and shrewd, and vigilant, as the rich are." "Let them get that have the power, and let others serve." That is the sentiment of many who would be Christian teachers. It is not the sentiment of the Master, however, nor of His apostle who says "We that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves."

Life of the Rev. Henry Harbaugh, D.D. By Linn Harbaugh, Esq. With an Introduction and Eulogy. Pages 307. Reformed Church Publication Board, and Sunday School Board of the Reformed Church. Philadelphia. 1900.

This neat volume is a monument of affection of a dutiful son to an illustrious father. There are still many in the church who preserve personal recollections of Dr. Harbaugh. Some of these heard him preach when they were students at Lancaster, and he was pastor there of the first Reformed church. Others heard him in the lecture room at Mercersburg. They remember his imposing figure, his genial countenance, and his charming manners. Others who never saw him in the flesh have read his books and his articles in the *Guardian* and in the *Review*, and these all will be thankful to the author of this volume that he has rescued from oblivion the memory of a life that is so eminently worthy of preservation. The book is written in an easy style, printed on the best of paper, neatly and substantially bound, and deserves to have a large circulation in the Reformed Church, which Dr. Harbaugh loved so well, and to whose development and growth he contributed so much.

The volume traces the external history of its subject from his birth and infancy, at the foot of the South Mountains in Franklin county, Pa., to his death in the village of Mercersburg. Dr. Harbaugh, like many other of Pennsylvania's sturdiest and worthiest citizens, was of Swiss ancestry. His great grandfather, Yost Herbach, immigrated from Switzerland about the year 1736, and located first near Maxatawny creek, Berks county, and three years later near Kreutz creek in York county. There his grandfather, Jacob Herbach, lived and died. His father, George Herbach, removed from thence to Franklin county, and settled four miles southeast of Waynesboro, where, in the old stone house which still stands, Henry Harbaugh was born Oct. 28,

1817. Of the early life of the boy in the midst of the rural scenery in which his lot was cast, of his early struggles to get an education, of his journeys and wanderings in the west, and of his subsequent career as a student at Marshall college, we have a full and graphic account in these pages. And these pages should be read and carefully pondered by all college students of the present generation. They would learn from them many a lesson of perseverance, of steadfast purpose, of earnest exertion, of strict application. They would learn how success may be won, and greatness achieved, in the most unfavorable circumstances, without money or fortune.

From Marshall College we are led to follow the subject of this biography to his first charge at Lewisburg; from thence to his second charge at Lancaster, where he lived and labored for ten years; and from Lancaster finally to his third and last charge at Lebanon. We are surprised at the amount of work he is doing. Scarcely is he settled at Lewisburg when he begins to write and publish books. Later on he founds the *Guardian*, writes many articles for the *Review* and other periodicals, and continues to multiply books. And yet he does not shirk his pastoral duties, or neglect his preparation for the pulpit. He does with his might whatever his hands find to do. After having served the church at Lebanon for three years, Dr. Harbaugh was elected to succeed Dr. B. C. Wolff in the professorship of didactic and practical theology in the theological seminary then located at Mercersburg; and here he spent the last years of his eventful and active, though all too brief, life. He threw himself into the work of his professorship with the same energy which he put into all his other work; and in the short space of four years accomplished more than most men do in forty. Besides doing much other literary work, he produced an entire system of dogmatic and practical theology, in the form of lectures, which it was his purpose to give to the public at no distant day. And it has always seemed to us that it was an immense misfortune that his life was not spared long enough to accomplish this result. Perhaps, however, He who controls the destinies of men and churches, knew better than we do what was required in the circumstances of the times.

Dr. Harbaugh lived at a critical period in the history of the Reformed Church. It was just after she had come out of the slough of fanaticism and confusion that had followed almost a century of stagnation and decay. The new-measure revivalism that had swept over large sections of the church had been arrested and cast out; but the soreness of feeling produced by the struggle had not yet disappeared. Moreover the church had entered upon a period of positive reconstruction and progress. In theology and cultus it was necessary that many things should become new. In fact a new system of theology was to be created as well as a corresponding order of worship and church life. This involved in many respects a going back to the Reformation as

well as to the Early Church for constructive principles. It involved an active communication also with the revived theology and church life in Germany, which came into existence after the life and work of Schleiermacher. But it involved also original theological thought and action occasioned by the peculiar environment within which the Reformed Church existed here in America. This process of theological and practical reconstruction in the Reformed Church was what in history was called the *Mercersburg movement.* Dr. Harbaugh was one of the foremost actors in this movement. He was a member of the liturgical committee; and in the pulpit, in the periodical literature of the time, in books, and on the floor of Classis and Synod, he was an ardent and active supporter of the movement. All this is brought out with clearness in the volume before us.

Dr. Harbaugh was no ordinary man. He was great in many departments of mental life. He was a profound theologian, and could follow to their conclusion the most speculative theological theorems. He was great as a preacher. His sermons were never dull. And though they often dealt with the profoundest thoughts, they would not now be called *dogmatic* sermons. He would make dogmas *live* before he would present them in a sermon; and that is the secret of effective preaching. The man who utters "thoughts that breathe and words that burn," will be listened to, no matter how profound he may be. And this Dr. Harbaugh could do. It is only the man who preaches *dead* and *dry* thought, thought which he has not verified in his own soul, that will not be tolerated in the pulpit. Preaching like Dr. Harbaugh's would be acceptable now and always. But Dr. Harbaugh was a *poet* as well as a theologian and preacher. That means not merely that he wrote verses. Many a one has done that, who was no poet at all. But Dr. Harbaugh was a poet. He possessed "the faculty and the gift divine." And his poetical endowment doubtless exercised an important influence upon his theological activity. We remember that in his introductory lecture in the Seminary at Mercersburg he stated that he had chosen Lange as his guide in theology because Lange was a poet, and only a poet could well understand theology and the Bible. Theology depends not merely upon the logic of the head, but also upon the sentiments of the heart; and this is the peculiar sphere of the poet. The man who can deal only in stiff logical formulas, may be fitted for mathematics; he can not be a great theologian. Manifestly this is in harmony with some of the views which the *new theology* has put forward in recent times. This theology has protested against interpreting the Bible, for instance, as if it were a treatise on mathematics, and has insisted that much of it shall be taken as poetry. Where would Dr. Harbaugh stand on this question, if he were now living? We believe that to this question there could be but one possible answer. Dr. Harbaugh would not be a theological reactionaire, *and would never have gone to Rome.* In conclusion,

we heartily commend this biography to our readers; but at the same time express the hope that in the near future some one will give us a work on Dr. Harbaugh that shall set forth the internal history and the development of his theological thought. It is well, certainly, that the outward circumstances of his life should be remembered, but it would surely be a great blessing to the church if we could have a history of his mind. A mind so profound as his would, if its principles were seized upon and presented to the present generation of theological thinkers, still exercise an influence over the modern theological world.

CHRIST CAME AGAIN. *The Parousia of Christ a Past Event, The Kingdom of Christ a Present Fact, With a Consistent Eschatology.* By William S. Urmy, D.D. Pages, 394. Price, $1.25. Eaton & Mains, New York. Curts & Jennings, Cincinnati. 1900.

The title of this work is a fair indication of its contents. In the preface the author says: "This book is an attempt to prove, after twenty-seven years of close attention to the subject, that the second coming of Christ, or the parousia, is a past event, and then to present an eschatology consistent with such a showing. The course pursued is: First, to show that the parousia is an event, not a dispensation, though an event ushering in a dispensation, that dispensation not to end with a cataclysm, but to be extended indefinitely. Second, to show, by a series of arguments so arranged as to give them cumulative force, that this event has taken place."

In the following sentence, page 22, the author states the gist of his theory: "The doctrine which we present is that the second advent of our Lord is a past occurrence; that his parousia took place about the time of the destruction of Jerusalem; and that we are therefore in a very different relation to this event from that in which the primitive Christians were, and cannot regard it in the same manner that they did." His view of the parousia, as given on another page, is to the effect that it was a certain well-defined event, which took place in the apostolic age, in consequence of which Christ is now continuously present among men, by His Spirit to convince, regenerate and enlighten them, as Judge to decide in all individual, communal, and national matters, and as King to rule in all willing hearts, establishing the kingdom of heaven in all believers, and ruling in the world for ever and ever, p. 17. This theory differs from that maintained by many theologians, that Christ's utterances concerning His second coming refer primarily to the destruction of Jerusalem, as the end of the Jewish and distinct beginning of the Christian dispensation, but who see in this event itself a prophecy and type of a more universal coming for the execution of the final judgment of all men, and for the destruction of the world.

The first part of the volume, extending to page 243, is taken up with the scriptural argument for the view presented. Here we

have a minute examination of the eschatological discourses of Christ and the apostles, and especially of the book of the Apocalypse. The question which will naturally arise in the reader's mind while following this argument, is whether after all this is a legitimate use of Holy Scripture. This anatomical dissection of Scripture, as though every sentence and word of it were a separate oracle, can easily be so managed as to destroy the old doctrine of a visible advent and of a world-catastrophy at no distant day; but could it not also be managed in such a way as to destroy the author's own theory? The second part of the volume bears the general title: *A Consistent Eschatology.* Here we have discussions of *the resurrection, the change of the living, the judgment, the intermediate state, future destiny, the millenium,* and *the New Jerusalem.* As would be expected, of course, the idea of a physical resurrection occurring at some definite time in the future is abandoned, the judgment is progressive, the intermediate state no longer exists, and the millenium is already past. The last chapter of the book is entitled *changes required,* and discusses the changes which should be made in the New Testament, the creeds, theology, and devotional literature, on the supposition that the theory presented is true. In this connection we can only say that, whether the author's theory is correct or not, we can readily sympathize with him in his demand for a change in many Rituals for the burial of the dead.

The subject discussed in this volume is interesting and fascinating. Moreover there is much cause for a new study of it. The traditional theories of eschatology are about worn out, and there are few theologians who hold them any longer. We can, therefore, but welcome a book of the kind here under notice. Whether the reader in all points agree with the author or not, he will be benefited. And we accordingly commend the work.

THE POST-MILLENIAL ADVENT. *When the Church May Expect the Second Coming of Christ.* By Rev. Alexander Hardie. Second edition. Pages, 74. Price 25 cents. Eaton & Mains, New York. 1900.

This little book, it is said in the "foreword," was written "because there is a great amount of harmful pre-millenial literature in the world." Its object, accordingly, is to disabuse the minds of Christians of the harmful error of pre-millenarianism, persuade them to quit speculating about the time of Christ's second advent, and to expect the Christianization of the world by the power of the gospel now in operation. The author shows that post-millenarianism is not merely the doctrine of Scripture, but also of the creeds of Christendom, including the Heidelberg Catechism.

LIFE WORK OF PASTOR LOUIS HARMS. Translated from the German of Pastor Theodore Harms, His Brother and Successor, by Mary B. Ireland. Pages, 118. Price 40 cents. Lutheran Publication Society, Philadelphia, Pa. 1900.

The life of a good man devoting himself in noble self-sacrifice to the uplifting of his race, is an example and an inspiration to other men. We have such an inspiration in the life of Loius Harms, of Hermannsburg, on the Lüneburg Heath. By his singular devotion he transformed the parish of Hermannsburg from a careless and indifferent into the most active and spiritually mind Christian community, established a missionary institute, built a missionary ship, founded a missionary colony, a new Hermannsburg, in Africa, from which the light of Christian truth is still radiating in that dark continent. If any Christian minister is laboring in an apparently unpromising charge, away among the mountains, or out in some barren heath, let him recall the story of Louis Harms, and labor with all his might, with the conviction that the poorest parish may be made most interesting and most spiritually fruitful for the Kingdom of God. A good minister will make a good charge anywhere. That is the lesson to be derived from this little volume on the life of Louis Harms, which we commend to young men in the ministry, as well as to Sunday-schools and Christian families.

KANT AND SPENCER. By Dr. Paul Carus. Pages 105. Price 20 cents. The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. 1899.

This pamphlet belongs to the *Religion of Science Library*, which is being published by the Open Court Publishing Company, bi-monthly, the yearly subscription price being $1.50. The present work is in the usual style of Dr. Carus. Its object is to correct some misrepresentations of Kant by Mr. Herbart Spencer; and in the accomplishment of this object much information is given in regard to the philosophical systems of both these distinguished men; but especially of that of Kant. Dr. Carus says: "I do not say that it is necessary to be a Kantist in any sense; but to be a leader of thought, a leader that leads onward and forward, it is indispensable to understand Kant." That is doubtless true; and the reader will find something helpful towards the understanding of Kant in this little volume of Dr. Carus. Dr. Carus is a writer who is always interesting, because he knows what he wants to say and how to say it most directly and plainly.

THE THEOLOGY OF CIVILIZATION. By Charles F. Dole. Pages, xxiv + 256. Thomas Y. Crowell & Company, 46 E. 14th Street, New York. 1899.

This is not a system of theology, but a discussion of the fundamental ideas, by which, in the opinion of the author, the theological thought of the age is coming more and more to be controlled.

Every age has its own theology. There is a theology, as there is a religion, that fits barbarous men; and there is a theology, a thinking about God and about the mysteries of life and death, that fits men in a civilized condition. Theological thought, therefore, is progressive, and advances with the advancing civilization of the world. This is true not merely of what has usually been called *natural theology*, but of Christian theology as well. In fact this is a distinction which we do not suppose our author would accept, though he nowhere formally denies it. He assumes, however, that even in Christian theology there has been, and still is much that has had its origin in methods of thought belonging to barbarous times, and that must now give way before the advancing development of moral and religious life. And it is the purpose of the author, in the volume before us, to trace out some of the fundamental ideas that must be embodied in the theology which the present age shall be able to accept.

One of these ideas is the idea of the moral structure and unity of the universe. The universe is *one* and it is *moral* throughout. In barbarous ages this truth is not recognized. Nature is apprehended as a multitude of discordant principles and powers. Polytheism is the ruling creed. At a more advanced stage polytheism gives way to dualism. There are two principles in the universe, one good the other evil, Ormuzd and Ahriman, God and the devil. This is a phase of theological thinking that has not yet passed away, but which, our author thinks, is passing now. The thought of this age is settling down to the conviction that the world is one and that it is wholly spiritual and good. Neither the doctrine of materialism, nor the doctrine of the perversion of the created universe by a foreign power, commends itself to the best theological thought of the present time. In opposition to the prevailing theories of materialism the author declares that, "There is not and can not be any universal 'ought' in a world of mere matter and force. But this is a world where the 'ought,' being with us and in us, swaying us its everlasting way, can not be set aside or cast out. This must therefore be a spiritual universe. Religion dwells with this sense of 'ought,' is bound up with it, grows out of it," p. 35. "Nature" makes men, in whom the sense of the "aught" is the dominant principle of life. Some may not always be governed by this principle, but it is present in all, and has exercised complete dominion over the greatest and best of men. Man therefore is not the offspring of matter, but of a Spiritual Principle that is, to say the least, no less exalted than himself. And that Principle must be apprehended as an infinite Person, *absolute*, and *sovereign*, and *wholly good*.

The most inveterate relic of barbarous thought in modern theology, according to the author of the volume before us, is the doctrine of *dualism*. And there is apparent reason for the persistence of this phase of thought. For the world in which we live seems to be a world of opposites. "If there is a moral nature

within us, is there not outside of us a realm of things quite unmoral? If there is a power that makes for righteousness, does not that power often seem to be fatally thwarted? May this not then be a sort of two-fold world, as the old Persians conceived it? May there not be two powers, or sets of powers, in it? Is there not as much reason for believing in a devil as in God?" p. 40. The affirmation of these questions has long been the leading method of solving the difficulties of the universe which have given rise to them. But this method of solution, our author thinks, is no longer satisfactory. "Dualism is incompatible with a moral universe. Its doctrine that evil stands off by itself, exceptional, outside of the universal order, enduring forever, no longer fits the necessities of righteous men's thoughts," p. 48. Once it was believed that this doctrine was required in order to explain certain facts of the world of experience. "The idea of a world of struggling opposites once seemed indeed necessary to explain certain things, such as disease, pain and sin. But there is no economy any longer in using this explanation," p. 48. The discussion of the questions here raised occupies our author through two interesting chapters of the work before us, entitled, respectively, *Thorough-going Theism* and *The Good God*. We have not space to give even a synopsis of this discussion; but must content ourselves by simply stating that the conclusion is a theory of God and the universe from which the old principle of dualism has been thoroughly eliminated.

But the elimination of dualism is not the elimination of sin or of physical evil. These are facts which still persist and refuse to be ignored. They may have been misunderstood in the past. The explanation of them may have been a "travesty of justice." "I know nothing more revolting," says our author, "than the traditional teaching about sin. The comparative unconsciousness of sin in the Greek mind, unsatisfactory as it was, was hardly farther from reality. An almighty and wise Lord had brought into the world feeble and childish man, certain to disobey at the first whisper of temptation, doomed in advance to become a criminal, and to lie henceforth under sentence of death. What a travesty of justice!" p. 91. As a criticism of the traditional doctrine many, at least, will not consider this language one whit too strong. But what now is the author's own theory? Is he more successful in solving the difficulty? His theory is in effect that both moral and physical evil belong to the harmony of the universe, and are therefore necessary in order to the realization of the good —necessary, however, not as permanent, outstanding, eternal realities, but as passing conditions only of the good that is to be. "Our clue, as before," says our author on this point, "is in the thought of man as a progressive, growing being. If he begins in innocence, it is the innocence of the animal, the bird or the butterfly. The animalism, the greed, the selfishness of the young child is no sin, or evil, but rather the ruling and necessary condi-

tion of the lower life. No one doubts this to-day. What then is the sense of sin, but the consciousness of an ideal, above the animal life," p. 93.

This may be accepted provided we retain a proper sense of the self-existence and self-causality of the human personality. Our author, however, seems to us at this point to come short of the complete apprehension of the truth. He represents the human will as but a "form or manifestation of the one creative power," p. 92; and says, p. 128, "when was there ever a motion in you that arose uncaused and unrelated, and that was not a throb of the universe life, beating in you? Search consciousness through, and you find no such original motion on which to base a thrill of pride or superiority." This seems to us to be reducing the human personality from the condition of a self-determining subject to that of a mere passive organ of the Infinite, of which as it is impossible to predicate praise, so also it is impossible to predicate blame. With this, however, the author is not consistent, when he goes on to say, "Give glory to God for them (faith, hope, good will), as you thank Him for the air you breathe, and go forth with your beautiful gifts to share them and proclaim that God intends them for all." That is *exhortation*; but what sense is there in exhortation if there is never "a motion in the human heart that is not a throb of the universe-life beating in the soul"? Clearly there is here a defective apprehension of the thought of personality, which must exercise its influence upon the apprehension of the thought of moral responsibility and of sin. God's productive activity reaches its highest point, not when it gives rise to beings whose activity has it sole cause in His own will, like the motion of the star or plant, but when it gives rise to beings that have an existence and causality of their own.

But notwithstanding this apparent defect in his *formal* conception of personality, the author brings out some very valuable thoughts on the *material nature* of personality, in three chapters, entitled respectively *The Beginnings of Personality*, *What Personality Is*, and *The Cost of Personality*. The author here assumes that on its material side the conception of personality is an ethical conception. "When we say that God is person," he writes, p. 163, "we mean that there is Infinite Good Will, using almighty power, by all the methods of intelligence, for the highest welfare of all beings." It is not sufficient, then, to define personality as the union of reason and will. The will entering into it must be *good* will. The bearing of this definition upon the idea of God as well as upon the idea of man will be at once apparent. God must be *good* in order to be God. A God without character would not be God. With this conception of God in view, we can say truly that "God is love." But a loving, personal God is a *living* God; and life implies internal distinctions; and here we have a basis for the Christian doctrine of the Trinity; although the result may not be the church doctrine.

And now the human personality must be similar to the divine. It must be good will, such as has never yet been fully realized in any man but Jesus the Christ, but is to be realized in all. And the complete realization of personality will be the complete realization of religion, of morality, and of happiness. The religions of the past have been the religions of childhood, conventional, formal, legal. But this phase is passing away, and we are now entering upon the religion of manhood. We should say that this process of transition from the religion of childhood to the religion of manhood began with the advent of Christianity; although for many Christian communities it is as yet very far from being complete, and there is doubtless much that is childish in all the churches. But here we must bring this notice to a close, merely adding that the titles of the last two chapters of the book are, respectively, *The Religion of the Child and the Religion of the Man*, and *The Process of Civilization*. We recommend the work to the interested reader.

THE SOUL OF MAN, *an Investigation of the Facts of Physiological and Experimental Psychology*. By Dr. Paul Carus. With 182 Illustrations and Diagrams. Second Edition. Pages xviii + 482. Price, 75 cents. Heavy paper binding. Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. 1900.

"The present book," we are told in the preface, "purports to be a systematic presentation of the facts of psychology in their relations both to physiology and religion and ethics." The book is, however, by no means a treatise on psychology in the ordinary sense. It is not intended for beginners. Many things that one naturally looks for in manuals on psychology are omitted in this work, and in their stead we meet with discussions which are not usually found in such manuals. The peculiarity of the work in this respect is intimated in the following paragraph of the preface: "While this book does not contain new facts, it offers some new interpretations; but these new interpretations set the old facts in clearer and better light. Their recognition may prove more important than a discovery of new facts. They refer mainly to the nature of mind, the origin as well as the organ of conciousness, the correlation of natural and artificial sleep (hypnosis), the significance of pleasure and pain, and also the part death and immortality play in the economy of soul-life." The chief value of the book, in our opinion, is derived from the consideration of these higher problems in psychological science.

The material of the book is divided into six sections treating respectively of the following subjects: *The Philosophical Problem of Mind; The Rise of Organized Life; Physiological Facts of Brain-Activity; The Immortality of the Race and the Data of Propagation; The Investigations of Experimental Psychology; The Ethical and Religious Aspects of Soul-Life*. Under the first section we have discussions of such subjects as feeling and motion, the origin of mind, the nature of mind, facts and reality, truth

and mind, telepathy, mind and eternity. In order to give our readers some idea of the views presented in these discussions, we may begin by saying that Dr. Carus is a *Monist* and an *Evolutionist*. He repudiates the commonly received dualism between matter and mind, and he regards all existence as the product of an orderly and progressive evolution. There will doubtless be many who will accept his views in regard to the second point, but will not be able to follow him in regard to the first. Mind and matter, it will be said, exhibit different qualities, and must therefore be different substances. But if men will think long enough, they will at last discover that this view is beset with as many difficulties as is the doctrine of monism. What is substance? What is matter? What is mind? Let any one attempt to give an answer to these questions; and the attempt will most likely dispose him to listen patiently even to such theories as that presented by Dr. Carus. Dr. Carus may, indeed, have failed of the true solution of the problem under consideration, as many before him have failed. He assumes that the elements of mind, which he regards as feeling, are latent in matter, or rather form a phase of matter itself. "As light originates out of darkness," he says, "being a special mode of motion, so feeling originates out of the not-feeling. The not-feeling accordingly contains the conditions of feeling in a similar way as potential energy contains the potentiality of kinetic energy." The medium between this universally diffused feeling and the organized soul of man is *memory*. Dr. Carus quotes with approbation the saying of Professor Hering that *memory is a universal property of organized substance*. The preservation of form in living substance and memory are one and the same principle; and this principle is the basis of the soul. Now we confess that this is an explanation that does not satisfy us. A metaphysical study of existence will probably lead us to monism of some form, but we anticipate that it will be something idealistic rather than materialistic. It is due to add, however, that Dr. Carus also repudiates the common doctrine of materialism. Of course from what has been said it must follow that Dr. Carus gives up the doctrine of *vitalism* in regard to the origin of the soul.

The section treating of the physiological facts of brain-activity is interesting and instructive and profusely illustrated, but we have not space for any synopsis or criticism of its contents. For the same reason we pass over also the chapter on *fecundation and the problem of sex-formation*. In the section on experimental psychology we have been interested especially in the author's treatment of hypnotism and kindred subjects. In regard to hypnotism he follows neither exclusively the school of Paris, which treats the phenomenon as due wholly to physiological changes, nor that of Nancy, which supposes it to be produced wholly by suggestion. He raises a warning voice against the abuse of this strange soul-power, and questions whether it can

ever be exercised to much profit. What is said on the subject of suggestion in general could be studied with profit by preachers and other public speakers.

The last section will be read with most interest by the theologian and moralist. We permit ourselves to make a few remarks on the author's treatment of the question of the freedom of the will. He begins by saying that the freedom of the will must not be held in such way as to make it conflict with the necessity of science. The *must* of science and the *ought* of ethics can not contradict each other. Each must have its own rights. Freedom of will, according to Dr. Carus, *means that a man is free to do what he wills.* In the region in which the will can properly be exercised, it can not be determined by any thing outside of the man himself. But this position is not inconsistent with determinism, and Dr. Carus declares himself a determinist. He says that the will must be determined by its own character. Hence whatever a man wills he must will of necessity. We think Dr. Carus fails to remember here that the will itself must pass through a process of evolution, and that it is only when the stage of perfection has been reached that freedom and necessity have become one. Granted that the will is determined by its own character. But what if there is no character as yet, as in the case of the child? Will it be said that the will is determined by its own native constitution? Then we have psychical determinism, which is as fatal to morals as is physical determinism. In order to morality it is necessary to maintain the *formal* freedom of the will, or the freedom of choice, as the condition of the attainment of *real* freedom, in which self-determination has become one with necessity.

On the subject of the immortality of the soul Dr. Carus is perhaps not as clear as many might desire. He holds that death is not a finality. Of course, he never thinks for a moment of supposing death to be *the effect of sin.* "Death is the twin of birth," he says. But while individuals die, humanity does not die; and every man lives again in his descendants. And this consideration should have an ethical influence upon our life now. But if this were all of immortality, the ethical influence would soon not weigh very heavily. Dr. Carus, however, means more; for he says, on page 423, "Our existence after death will not merely be a dissolution into the All, where all individual features of our spiritual existence are destroyed. Our existence after death will be a continuance of our individual spirituality, a continuance of our thoughts and ideals. As sure as the law of cause and effect is true, so sure is the continuance of soul-life even after the death of the individual according to the law of the preservation of form." With that we may be satisfied.